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SUMMARY 
Since the advent of international assistance, the aid paradigm has changed continually and 
the choice of mechanisms for providing assistance has evolved in order to try and pursue 
better approaches. Along with the traditional project approach, the sector-wide approach 
involving budgetary support has emerged as a new aid modality since the mid-1990s. 
While many donors – e.g. the UK Department for International Development (DFID), the 
World Bank and the European Union (EU) – have embraced the new modality, some 
donors have kept their distance from this trend, relying mostly on project assistance – e.g. 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA). However, the extent to which aid resources are absorbed in 
the recipient government/sector under the different aid delivery mechanisms is not well 
known. This thesis provides insight into this question by exploring the process of absorbing 
foreign funds in the education sector.  
 
Employing a phenomenological research approach, the process is examined from the point 
of view of local actors and beneficiaries of aid aimed at improving education quality. The 
context chosen is basic education (primary and junior secondary) in Ghana after the 
introduction of the national basic education reform, which was announced as the Free 
Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) programme in 1996. Two cases are 
chosen for comparison: the Whole School Development (WSD) programme financed by the 
DFID; and the Quality Improvements in Primary Schools (QUIPS) programme facilitated by 
USAID. The former constitutes a sector-wide type of assistance, which put Ghanaian 
officials in charge of DFID funds and the implementation of the programme; while the latter 
adopted a project type model, with implementation managed directly through a USAID-
funded project office. The major part of the data is derived from interviews conducted in 
2006 with significant educational personnel at three different levels: Ministry of Education 
(MoE) headquarters, the District Education Office (DEO), and the schools).  
 
The analysis reveals a complex picture of aid absorption, which illuminates the pros and 
cons of the two approaches in relation to impact and sustainability. The study finds that the 
QUIPS project achieved tangible results in the pilot schools, while the WSD programme 
made little impact at the school level. The WSD programme, which used existing structures 
within the education system to deliver funds and resources to schools, showed evidence of 
high fungibility, but appears to have strengthened the Ministry‟s administrative capacity. On 
the other hand, the QUIPS approach, which had low fungibility, has been severely criticised 
by Ghanaian officials, who questioned its sustainability and contribution to system-wide 
change. The thesis concludes by stating its specific contribution to the literature on 
international aid assistance to developing countries and making recommendations for the 
Ghanaian context.    
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with aid absorption – the process of absorbing international 
funding – in the education sector. The procedure is explored from the point of view of 
actors working in educational development, with particular reference to Ghana. The 
context chosen is the Ghanaian basic education sector (primary and junior secondary 
education) after the introduction of the national basic education reform act, announced 
as the free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) programme in 1996.  
 
Two programmes were chosen for comparison: the Whole School Development (WSD) 
programme and the Quality Improvement in Primary Schools (QUIPS) programme. The 
former was financed by the British Department for International Development (DFID) 
and the latter was funded by the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID).  
 
My interest in aid absorption developed through my work experience in Ghana, where I 
was posted by Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) to the Ghanaian 
Ministry of Education from 2000 to 2002, to facilitate Japanese education programmes 
in association with the fCUBE programme.  
 
On taking up my posting, JICA briefed me on the Ghanaian basic education sector, 
describing it as one of the rare examples of a successful state programme. However, 
the situation I encountered in the field turned out to be very different from that I had 
been led to believe. In reality, there were several donor-facilitated programmes being 
simultaneously implemented under the auspices of the FCUBE programme. The 
donors‟ initiatives were designed according to the FCUBE framework to a certain 
extent, yet their approaches seemed to be very different from one another.  
 
This situation, in which different approaches coexisted with the aim of achieving the 
same educational objectives, led me to question which approach to educational 
development was actually most appropriate to Ghana. It seemed that discovering the 
approach that was most relevant to the Ghanaian context was vital in order to utilise 
limited resources most efficiently in future; yet, neither the ministry nor the donor 
agencies had the answer.  
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In fact, in the ministry, it was often heard how much was budgeted for activities; how 
much more the sector needed; and even what the resulting output or outcome was 
expected to be. Yet, we still didn‟t know much about how aid input complemented the 
ministry‟s development efforts, how the aid was absorbed in the process, or how it 
were transformed into effective development.  
 
This process was something of a „black box‟ in the education sector. Substantial 
foreign assistance was being channelled into basic education but we (the ministry and 
development partners) didn‟t have any accurate information about how this external 
funding enhanced the quality of education; and this made me feel uneasy.  
 
By the time I left Ghana in 2002, it was apparent that the objectives of FCUBE were not 
going to be achieved as soon as planned. Considering the substantial amount of 
international assistance supporting FCUBE, I was dismayed at the realisation that 
seemingly judicious allocation of aid funding did not always facilitate development 
efficiently. At the very least, any progress the sector was making seemed to be 
disappointingly slow. I wondered why such substantial external funding had failed to 
bring about the expected outcomes as quickly as had been anticipated.  
 
The objectives set for FCUBE might have been too ambitious; even so, I could not get 
rid of the feeling that any progress made in the sector was not commensurate with the 
level of funding. Indeed, I wondered exactly how much progress had resulted from the 
donors‟ substantial input; and if the approach taken significantly determined differences 
in how the funds were absorbed or in the final outcome.  
 
Again, I returned to the same questions: „How are external funds absorbed?‟ „Which 
approach to the use of external funds is most efficient in improving the quality of 
education?‟ These were the kinds of questions that exercised my curiosity and interest 
over the years.  
 
In this introductory chapter, the broad framework in which this study took place is laid 
out. It begins by clarifying the rationale for the study, followed by its focus. Lastly, the 
structure of the thesis is introduced.  
 
 
1.2 Rationale for the Study 
The significance of the topic 
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The literature on aid effectiveness has yielded unclear and ambiguous results. This is 
not surprising given the heterogeneity of aid motives; the current limitations of analysis 
and of its tools; and the complex causality chain linking external aid to final outcomes.  
 
The causality chain has been largely ignored and, as a consequence, the relationship 
between aid and development has mainly been perceived as a kind of 'black box'. 
Indeed, project evaluation reports often fail to capture the whole and complex reality, 
especially that from the point of view of the recipient.  
 
Voices on the side of the recipient have been largely ignored (King, 1986). If they are 
heard at all, at best, only those of high-ranking policy-makers and officers have been 
noticed. This thesis is an attempt to listen to and analyse the missing voices. It hopes 
to capture the „reality‟ from the point of view of the recipient and make a contribution to 
filling the gap in the aid literature.  
 
If more were known about the process of absorbing foreign funds in the black box, the 
risk of failure might be reduced and the most efficient way of linking input to 
development outcome could be pinned down in a specific context.  
 
The importance of specific context in an exploration of aid absorption 
While various common factors influence the processes of aid absorption in many 
developing countries, the unique historical, political and socio-economic factors in each 
ultimately determine the process. Therefore, there is a need to examine the kind of 
approach to educational development that is more appropriate than others in any given 
country context. This study seeks to explore two cases extensively in order to examine 
the rationale behind different approaches to educational development; to discover the 
factors that shape and determine whether approaches have the benefits that their 
advocates claim; and to identify possible ways of eliminating or at least reducing 
obstacles, thus improving the chances of success.  
 
The selection of Ghana  
I selected Ghana as the context for a case study because the country has received 
substantial international assistance to education over the last two decades (World 
Bank, 2004a pp.7-8), particularly since the initiation of the FCUBE programme in1996; 
and it is now a reasonable time to review aid approaches with the aim of identifying 
strategies for the ministry‟s future direction in educational development. In addition, due 
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to my previous attachment to the ministry, I have personal relationships with the staff 
there and thus assumed that this connection would facilitate my research.  
 
The selection of USAID and DFID 
A significant change is occurring in the modalities of aid delivery. Along with the 
traditional project approach, the programme approach – including sector-wide 
implementation and budgetary support – has emerged and become a major aid 
strategy. However, as the international aid community adapts to embrace this new 
modality, some agencies continue to use the project approach.  
 
Nevertheless, little is known about whether the assumptions that advocates of each aid 
approach espouse have been brought to fruition. Therefore, useful insights may be 
gained if the two different approaches can be compared in the same context. USAID 
and DFID are the two biggest bilateral donor agencies operating in the Ghanaian 
education sector, both formulating their programmes under the FCUBE initiative, but 
each having opted a different approach.  
 
For this reason, DFID‟s WSD programme and USAID‟s QUIPS programme were 
chosen for this study. The selection of case studies is discussed in further detail in 
chapter 3.  
 
An exploration of the subjective views of Ghanaian actors  
Research into aid absorption itself does not have a long history and is generally 
discussed within the context of aid effectiveness. Research into aid effectiveness tends 
to focus on monetary efficiency from the donor perspective (Cassen and Associates, 
1994; Chenery and Strout, 1966; Nurkse, 1953; Riddell, 2007b). Even the literature on 
aid effectiveness in developing countries tends to focus on policies and economics at 
the macro level (Carlsson et al., 1997; World Bank, 1998). Thus, much of the detailed 
study on aid absorption focuses on the central level; the full picture of how external 
funds are absorbed at the various other levels from a recipient perspective is not well 
known.  
 
Furthermore, there is little research focusing on the views of those involved in the 
programmes. There is not much captured from recipient countries in terms of what they 
think about donor-funded projects and how external funds are spent; let alone the 
views of officials in local education authorities and those actually in and around schools 
(e.g. head teachers, teachers, school management committees (SMCs), parent teacher 
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associations (PTAs) and communities). These voices are often left unheard (Leach, 
1997).  
 
The adoption of multilevel analysis 
Donors tend to consider the recipient as a single entity, failing to appreciate its 
diversity. However, the recipient is composed of diverse individuals at various levels. 
Looking at one level can fail to capture the dynamics of the reality in which the recipient 
actors operate. For this reason, I adopted the method of multilevel analysis.  
 
However, this is not to deny the importance to this study of macro level policy and 
systems. On the contrary, as Crossley and Vulliamy (1997) contend, micro level reality 
is affected by macro level environment, and not enough attention has been paid to 
linking the two levels in educational research in developing countries. Therefore, this 
study attempts to link the various levels, taking into consideration the voices of officials 
at the headquarters of the Ghana Ministry of Education (macro level); the interpretation 
of project policy and its implementation by district education officials (meso level); and 
what is actually delivered in school (micro level).  
 
 
1.3 Focus of the Study 
This study has attempted to explore perceptions of how external funds are absorbed in 
the recipient country. The uniqueness of the study is that these perceptions are 
examined from the viewpoint of those involved in donor-funded projects at various 
levels, especially those in charge of budgets.   
 
In so doing, the study probes Ghanaian education actors‟ views on external assistance 
and its absorption in the sector; how they were involved in programmes; how they 
accounted for their own experiences; and what their concerns, expectations and 
recommendations were. The emphasis is placed on investigating the „reality‟ 
experienced and comprehended by various actors at different levels, namely education 
officials at the national level, local district officials, and those in schools (head teachers, 
teachers and SMC members).  
 
Donor agencies tend to blame recipients for project failure (Eade, 1997), whereas 
recipients tend to attribute delays in the implementation of educational activities or 
unexpected slowness of development to the lack of resources or to donor agencies‟ 
complex procedures for releasing funds.  
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This study attempts to find an explanation that goes beyond these clichés, and to 
explore what really happens to external funds in the recipient sector. This is especially 
important in the context of Ghana, which has embarked on a new round of reforms in 
2007 (GoG 2007) and is attempting to collaborate with donors as they intensify their 
efforts to help developing countries meet the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), 
including universal primary education.1  
 
It is useful to review the approaches to the delivery of external resources and draw 
upon lessons learnt in order to inform the further development and management of the 
education sector. This study intends to explore this territory. 
 
 
1.4 Thesis Organisation 
The thesis is organised into eight chapters. The first part (chapters 2 to 4) is mainly 
concerned with the foundation of the study, i.e. its context, literature review and 
research design. The context of the study is described in chapter 2. First, an overview 
of donor assistance to the Ghanaian basic education sector is provided. This is 
followed by a description of the FCUBE programme and its implementation in relation 
to donor coordination and aid approaches. Third, USAID assistance and DFID 
assistance to the FCUBE programme – notably through the WSD and QUIPS initiatives 
– are portrayed.  
 
Chapter 3 reviews the literature on key issues to help explore aid absorption. Aid 
approaches (i.e. problem assistance, and project and programme assistance) and key 
related issues (i.e. project implementers and poachers) are reviewed. The literature on 
monetary fungibility, ownership and sustainability is explored. The review in this 
chapter provides the conceptual framework for the study.  
 
Chapter 4 defines the research questions and the methodology utilised for inquiring 
into them. In order to understand subjective views on international assistance, the 
                                                     
1
 Ghana was selected as 1 of 16 countries by Fast Track Initiative, which was to disburse GBP 
500 million to these countries, beginning in 2006 (Taylor, 2005). The World Bank approved USD 
14.2 million for Ghana Fast Track Initiative (World Bank, 2009). The UK is also providing GBP 
105 million from 2006–2013 to help Ghana implement free high quality basic education to all of 
its children (DFID 2006; DFID 2009b).  
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study adopts a phenomenological orientation. Bearing this in mind, the nature of data 
collection and analysis strategies is clarified.  
 
Chapters 5 and 6 provide the thick analytic description, the former addressing QUIPS 
and the latter WSD. Each chapter is laid out according to the three key issues that 
have emerged – fungibility, impact and sustainability – on the three levels: macro 
(national headquarters), meso (district) and micro (school).  
 
Chapter 7 develops analytic insights into international assistance to educational 
development in Ghana by inquiring into the themes that are interwoven through the 
case studies of WSD and QUIPS. It also answers the research questions in the light of 
the literature on accountability, power, trust, ownership and sustainability the research 
questions.   
 
The thesis concludes with chapter 8, which draws pertinent inferences from the 
findings. The chapter also looks at the implications for aid approaches to educational 
development in Ghana. In the final section, suggestions for further research are made.  
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Chapter 2  Context of Aid to Basic Education in Ghana  
2.1 Introduction 
Ghana is one of the highest recipients of education aid in sub-Saharan Africa (OECD 
2010).2 Foreign aid probably began to play a substantial role in educational 
development in Ghana in 1987, when reform was initiated as a component of the 
structural adjustment programme implemented by the World Bank. In the ensuing two 
decades, foreign assistance played a significant role in the implementation of 
educational reform in Ghana.  
 
This chapter aims to illuminate the context in which aid agencies have been involved in 
educational development in Ghana. The history of education reform is reviewed in 
relation to the involvement of aid agencies since 1987. Such an account may be 
divided into two periods: pre free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) (up 
to 1996) and post FCUBE (after 1996). Two bilaterally funded projects implemented 
under the auspices of the FCUBE programme are discussed in this study, namely the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) funded Quality 
Improvement in Primary Schools (QUIPS) programme and the British Department for 
International Development (DFID) funded Whole School Development (WSD) 
programme. This is followed by a brief consideration of the impact of FCUBE.  
 
 
2.2 Pre FCUBE Reform  
The Ghanaian education system was described as one of the best in Africa following its 
independence in 1957 (Foster, 1965). However, the country not only experienced an 
economic crisis in the early 1980s (Canagarajah and Mazumdar, 1997) but also a 
parallel crisis in education (Peil, 1995; Scadding, 1989). Government financing of 
education declined sharply from 6.4% to 1.4% of GDP between 1976 and1983, 
resulting in a decline in standards and quality of education (World Bank, 1996). By the 
early 1980s, the education system was facing severe administrative, performance and 
resource problems (Buchert, 2002; Sawyerr, 1997; Yeboah, 1990).  
 
In 1987, with World Bank support, education reform was initiated with the objective of 
improving the quality of service. Prior to the 1987 education reform act, there had been 
                                                     
2
 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm. 
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very little foreign assistance to education in Ghana. However the World Bank, having 
become “particularly influential among the development partners” (Buchert, 2002 p.73) 
was now in a position to mobilise the donor community in the assistance of the sector 
(van Donge et al., 2002 p.7). Subsequently, many international agencies – e.g. the 
UK‟s Overseas Development Administration (now DFID), United Nations Children‟s 
Fund (UNICEF), African Development Bank (AfDB), Norwegian Agency for 
Development Cooperation (NORAD), Swiss Agency for Development and 
Cooperation(SDC), German Technical Cooperation (GTZ ), Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA), the European Union and USAID – followed the 
Bank‟s lead in cofunding reform and started to become involved in education 
development in Ghana.  
 
Global official development assistance (ODA) and that allocated specifically to 
education was severely cut during the 1990s (Bennell and Furlong, 1998; Colclough et 
al., 2003); nonetheless, aid to the Ghanaian education sector does not seem to have 
been affected by  this trend. Rather, it was substantially increased from the outset of 
the 1990s, with assistance to basic education receiving the greater share, particularly 
from 1996. Between 1989 and 2000, combined World Bank assistance and bilateral 
support to the non-wage education sector ranged from between 24.8% and 174.7% of 
government expenditure, with an average 74% per year over the period (World Bank, 
2004a p.61). Indeed, it was observed that the “donor community has a massive 
presence in Ghana” (World Bank, 2004a pp.7-8).  
 
Under the conditions prevailing in Ghana in the early 1990s, aid agencies worked in 
their own fashion, leading to an increase in costs borne by the Ministry of Education 
(MoE). Senior officials, including the minister, had to deal with individual funding 
agencies on an ad hoc basis. Consequently, Harry Sawyerr, the then Minister of 
Education (1993–97) expressed the urgent need for donor coordination (1997). 
 
Regardless of the immense financial assistance from donors, education outcomes fell 
below expectations. There is evidence to indicate that despite the vast amounts of 
domestic and foreign resources that the Ghanaian education sector received from the 
mid–1980s to the mid–1990s, there were few effective improvements in the sector 
(Thompson and Casely-Hayford, 2008; World Bank, 2004a).  
 
At the same time, primary education was globally reinforced as an education 
development goal in the world declaration on „education for all‟ in 1990. Following this, 
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like many other countries that had developed national action programmes for the 
implementation of education for all (Verspoor, 1992), provision for basic education was 
embodied in the revised Ghanaian constitution in 1992.  
 
Meanwhile, during the 1990s, a shift began in donor strategy for education 
development, away from a discrete project approach towards the influencing of national 
education policy reform (King, 1992, 1999). Within this context, largely due to 
encouragement from the World Bank (Heyneman, 2003), a sector-wide approach 
evolved for implementing proactive coordination. As a result, the Ghanaian government 
adopted this programme and the MoE reached an agreement with the donors working 
in the country. Thus, the FCUBE programme can be seen as the manifestation of an 
international agenda of education for all (Colclough, 2005) and the result of an internal 
need for sector coordination, as well as a modality change in foreign assistance 
implementation (this sector-wide approach is discussed in detail in chapter 3). 
 
 
2.3 The FCUBE Programme  
In September 1995, the government embarked on a new education reform strategy, the 
FCUBE programme (GoG 1995), which had three main objectives:  
 To improve the quality of teaching and learning 
 To enhance access and participation  
 To improve management for efficiency  
 
It was envisaged that these objectives would be achieved through a decentralised 
management policy (GoG 1995). 
 
The FCUBE programme took on further characteristics of a sector-wide approach 
(Buchert, 2002), and the strategy and action plans for its execution were prepared in 
active cooperation with donors (Buchert, 2002; Gakiya, 1999). To implement FCUBE, 
the donors formulated individual projects or programmes3 that fitted in with the new 
                                                     
3
 The distinction between the terms, „programme‟ and „project‟ in international development is 
ambiguous as they are often used in the same way, although „programme‟ is more likely to be 
applied to a more comprehensive plan. Nevertheless, DFID refers to its sector/system-wide 
assistance programme approach, whereas USAID utilises both the terms „project‟ and 
„programme‟ in connection with its project assistance approach. In this thesis, QUIPS is 
principally referred to as a programme, in accordance with its official name, other than in direct 
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concerns of the FCUBE framework (World Bank, 2004b). Thus, stipulated government 
priorities were seen to be observed. 
 
In 1998, the implementation of the FCUBE programme was estimated to cost GBP 986 
million. The World Bank intended its assistance to be part of a multi-donor support 
programme to FCUBE (World Bank, 2004b) and contributed USD 50 million through its 
Basic Education Sector Improvement Programme (World Bank, 1996). The British 
government provided GBP 50 million, which was 5.3% of the total cost, and USAID 
donated USD 53 million. Correspondingly, the total amount that the donors pledged for 
basic education from 1996 to 2000 was 2.4 times as much as that of the period 1991 to 
1995 (calculation based on OECD online data4). The proportion allocated in grants 
increased considerably, surpassing that of loans, from 22% in 1990 to 71% in 1997, 
when DFID became the largest donor in the sector (calculation based on OECD online 
data).  
 
One of the motives behind the launch of FCUBE was an increasing need for 
development coordination to reduce “project proliferation” (Morss, 1984). However, 
despite the original intention, donor support did not materialise in this form (World 
Bank, 2004b p.2). In fact, no donors explicitly cofunded the programme with the World 
Bank (Al-Samarrai et al., 2002 p.57).  
 
Instead, the principal donors (the US and the UK) “did not join the programme but 
financed their own basic education activities” (World Bank, 2004b p.ix). The result was 
that the Government of Ghana had three large donors (the World Bank, the US and the 
UK) “with remarkably similar projects under different management systems with an 
increase in transaction costs for government” (World Bank, 2004b p.11).  
 
The Ghanaian state claimed ownership of them, but exerted little leadership in any (Al-
Samarrai et al., 2002 p.57). Likewise, other major donors,5 also “largely went their own 
way with programmes to finance basic education” (World Bank, 2004a p.26), albeit with 
an ostensible alignment to FCUBE.  
 
                                                                                                                                                           
quotations. However, in reference to the aid approach in general, including its application to 
QUIPS, the term „project‟ is used.  
4
 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/17/5037721.htm 
5
 For example, JICA, UNICEF, GTZ, UNESCO, the EU and the French Embassy. 
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As a result, the World Bank stated that the original Basic Education Sector 
Improvement Programme “design and financing plan had to be restructured and the 
BESIP became a traditional stand-alone investment project after the mid-term review” 
(World Bank, 2003a p.4). Consequently, three similar programmes were being 
implemented and even clashed with each other, and other key donors remained on the 
sidelines.  
 
The DFID 2003 evaluation report for the Education Sector Support Programme (1998–
2003) noted the following: 
 
Considerable support is provided to the education sector. However… there has been 
extremely poor donor co-ordination. With few donors committed to support a sector 
wide approach, the typical project approach is cost inefficient and leads to duplication 
of efforts and systems. (GoG/DFID 2003 section 4.9). 
 
It was also remarked that the fledgling structure for an education sector programme 
“appears to have foundered on donor competition” (World Bank, 2004a p.28). The 
Bank further argued that the spark that set in motion donor fragmentation in the 
education sector came from the UK‟s Overseas Development Administration (ODA, 
now DFID) in 1996: 
 
The crucial episode appears to have been a workshop in London [facilitated by the 
then ODA] to develop a sector strategy…despite the fact that a strategy already 
existed and that no other donors were invited to the meeting. From this time onward 
first DFID and then USAID went their own way with programmes to finance basic 
education (World Bank, 2004b pp.11-2). 
  
Casely-Hayford et al. (2007 p.22) describe the way FCUBE developed in that “its 
design as a GoG- [Government of Ghana] led national strategy whose initial design 
encompassed coordinated DP [development partner] support, [was] followed by its 
implementation, which was anything but coordinated in practice.” This resulted in 
confusion over exactly what the sector-wide approach was in relation to Ghanaian 
education policy (Sibbons and Seel, 2000 p.8). 
 
Buchert (2002 p.78) comments that during the 1990s, “partnerships…deteriorated” 
rather than grew. In fact, I was at the MoE during this period and can confirm that the 
tension between the donors and the Ghanaian side was almost unbearable, as was the 
friction among the donors. The relationship between the ministry and the donors had 
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deteriorated to such an extent that it was no longer possible to have a productive 
dialogue at the monthly meetings or biannual consultative panel meetings. 
 
Despite the fact that donor support to FCUBE was uncoordinated, they did at least 
design their individual projects and programmes to support the priority areas of FCUBE 
(Buchert, 2002), which suggests a degree of coherence. In so far as sectoral 
requirements were concerned with donor alignment of support to national agendas, this 
was at least implemented between the donors and FCUBE in the mid-1990s. However, 
Buchert (2002) goes on to comment that: 
 
There seemed to be common agreement that the agencies fully supported the 
framework for the government FCUBE programme, although… the framework was so 
generally defined that any agency could pursue its own objectives and still be seen to 
work within the framework (p.81). 
 
Among many donor-related interventions under the auspices of the FCUBE 
programme, two key programme/projects significant to this study are described in the 
following sections.  
 
 
2.4  Quality Improvement in Primary Schools  
USAID has been on the scene in the basic education sector in Ghana – with particular 
emphasis on primary education – since 1990, its intention being to assist the country to 
increase the effectiveness of its primary education system (USAID/Ghana, 2005a).  
 
USAID aimed to accomplish its objective through the establishment of „model schools‟, 
which were “designed to develop, demonstrate and replicate the conditions and 
processes that are required for improving school standards and ultimately, pupil 
learning throughout the education system” (USAID/Ghana, 1995 p.7).  
 
In promoting effective teaching, USAID has assisted the government to train teachers 
to use pupil-centred instructional methodology and assessment techniques, and to 
improve school supervision by both circuit supervisors and head teachers 
(USAID/Ghana, 1995 p.9). 
 
In conjunction with this strategy, USAID designed the QUIPS programme (1997–05) to 
support the FCUBE initiative (USAID/Ghana, 2005a). QUIPS has subsequently 
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combined project support and non-project (e.g. budgetary) assistance to the extent of 
USD 57.9 million of funding in total.  
 
QUIPS was designed to demonstrate the conditions necessary for effective and 
sustainable primary education in model „partnership schools‟ across Ghana. The 
QUIPS model simultaneously dealt with policy reform, and with school and community 
development, emphasising the following objectives:  
 
 To improve the quality of teaching and learning 
 To build capacity for decentralised school management 
 To increase community involvement in schools 
 To improve the physical learning environment 
 
The final amount of USD 51.8 million of project assistance provided extensive technical 
support and training for teaching staff and community members in 367 selected model 
school communities (QUIPS Programme Evaluation Team, 2005). The QUIPS 
programme was largely composed of two sub-projects: Improving Learning through 
Partnerships (ILP) and Community School Alliances (CSA). The QUIPS programme 
was administrated by education non-governmental organisations (NGOs) from the 
United States, its implementation being subcontracted through seven local NGOs 
(USAID/Ghana, 2005a). 
 
The administrators of the QUIPS programme noted great improvement in school 
performance among the selected schools during each two-year intervention cycle in 
comparison with neighbouring schools; and the community participation component 
has been regarded as being particularly successful (QUIPS Programme Evaluation 
Team, 2005). However, the programme has also been criticised for being 
comparatively isolated from the education sector as a whole (van Donge et al., 2002).  
 
 
2.5  Whole School Development  
Meanwhile, DFID saw management as the major focus for support, its main reasoning 
being that by this means, more funding would reach the grassroots and be well spent 
there (Riddell, 2007a p.14). The WSD programme was developed to delegate the 
responsibility for planning and budgeting to schools and districts. This was first piloted 
with support from DFID, and is the MoE‟s preferred implementation strategy for the 
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achievement of FCUBE throughout Ghana (Akyeampong, 2004b; Akyeampong and 
Furlong, 2000).  
 
DFID‟s Education Sector Support Programme (1998–2005) provided flexible budget 
support of GBP 50 million for the ministry‟s WSD programme and, as such, focused on 
district and school-level interventions. This implies not only a large component of 
technical assistance but also direct support for the districts; and the allocation was in 
fact GBP 40 million through budget support and GBP 10 million through technical 
cooperation. Thus, the WSD programme was implemented through the existing fabric 
of the Ghana Education Service6 (GES) (GES 2001b). 
 
WSD was an implementation programme of decentralisation, resourcing and the 
provision of support to districts and schools for the purpose of improving the quality of 
teaching and learning. It aimed to do this by promoting:  
 
Child-centred primary practice in literacy, numeracy and problem solving with the 
view to improve the quality of teaching and learning in basic schools, encouraging 
community participation in education delivery, and promoting the competencies of 
teaching and learning through school-based in-service training (MoE 1999a p.2). 
 
WSD was adopted as the Government of Ghana‟s strategy for achieving the FCUBE 
objectives (Akyeampong, 2004b; GES 2004b). In other words, WSD was a process of 
continuous provision of support to basic school head teachers and their staff.  
 
At the centre of the WSD programme were the „whole‟ schools, where it was hoped 
that high quality teaching provided by well-trained teachers would result in effective 
learning. In order for this to be achieved, the school required competent teachers and 
sufficient resources, as well as a head teacher with the capacity to manage the school 
efficiently (GES 1999).  
 
Moreover, there were to be continuous efforts to upgrade the skills of serving teachers. 
The cascade model of training and development was an important strategy used by 
WSD to promote education decentralisation in school improvement. Thus, under WSD, 
teachers themselves were responsible for identifying areas that needed improvement 
through school-based and cluster-based training.  
 
                                                     
6
 An implementing agency of the MoE responsible for pre-tertiary education. 
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WSD also attempted to improve partnerships in schools and enhance the participation 
and involvement of all key partners in planning and decision-making in school 
management. This has been described as a “process of effecting positive change in 
the classroom, to be owned by head teachers, teachers and the community” (GES 
1999 p.4).  
 
The performance of WSD has been varied. There is evidence that teachers and their 
pupils have benefited from the programme, and that literacy and numeracy are 
improving (Akyeampong, 2004b; GoG/DFID 2003). However, some of its greatest 
weaknesses have arisen from problems with central and district fiscal management, 
which was always likely to affect the smooth operation of the programme in both 
districts and schools (GoG/DFID 2003). 
 
 
2.6 Post FCUBE  
In spite of the lack of sectoral coordination, the FCUBE programme has had some 
positive impact on education outcomes. Several assessments of education reform in 
relation to FCUBE have been conducted by the Ghanaian government, the World 
Bank, other donors and researchers (Akyeampong, 2009; Akyeampong et al., 2007; 
MoE 2002; GoG/DFID 2003; QUIPS Programme Evaluation Team, 2005; Thompson 
and Casely-Hayford, 2008; World Bank, 2004a). They reveal that the education reform 
process has achieved some of its objectives in relation to enrolment and overall 
expansion of the public education sector, but has failed to make significant impact in 
terms of improving quality and learning outcomes for children.  
 
A 2004 evaluation of World Bank support to basic education in Ghana (1998–2003) 
notes that the effectiveness of development support to Ghana‟s education sector in the 
early 2000s had a long way to go: “Official development to assistance in education is 
substantial, but its transaction costs are high; it is poorly coordinated, rarely leads to 
genuine stakeholder-owned interventions, and has only a marginal impact on the 
sector” (World Bank, 2004a p.7).  
 
Finally, considering the sum total of financial resources that were sunk into the 
education sector during the FCUBE programme, any progress made is regarded as 
being disappointingly slow (Akyeampong, 2009; Thompson and Casely-Hayford, 2008; 
van Donge et al., 2002).  
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2.7 Conclusion 
The FCUBE programme was originally designed to be implemented as a sector-wide 
approach. However, although the donors shared FCUBE aspirations and designed 
their programmes within the parameters of its framework, they failed to coordinate or 
harmonise their approaches to the delivery of aid.  
 
The programmes that this thesis is concerned with were both designed to achieve 
FCUBE objectives, but adopted very different approaches to their achievement. The 
QUIPS programme concentrated on school level – particularly 367 partnership schools 
– while the WSD programme concentrated on district and school levels, aiming to 
improve the sector as a whole. Thus, a comparison of these two programmes can 
provide useful insight into which approach or what kinds of approaches might be the 
most effective in international assistance to educational development in Ghana.  
 
In this chapter, the context in which the WSD and QUIPS programmes were 
implemented was described. The next chapter reviews the associated literature in 
order to provide a conceptual framework. The philosophy and assumptions underlying 
the aid approaches that USAID and DFID adopted for the WSD and QUIPS 
programmes respectively are also examined.  
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Chapter 3 The Link between Aid Input and Development 
Outcomes  
3.1 Introduction 
Simply inputting external funds into the recipient country or sector alone does not 
always lead to the expected outcomes, let alone self-sustainable development. Figure 
3-1 depicts the flow of aid into the recipient government or sector. It illustrates the fact 
that the process in which aid resources are converted into activities on the ground, 
leading to development outcomes, takes place in a „black box‟, a phenomenon that has 
not been fully examined.    
 
Figure 3-1 Link between external funds and development outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the author. 
 
In examining the perceptions of Ghanaian actors at various levels, this study aims to 
explore how external funds are absorbed in this black box. Donors tend to think of the 
recipient government or sector as a single unified beneficiary, failing to appreciate its  
diversity.  
 
However, Ghanaian actors‟ perceptions formed through the experience of working on 
the free compulsory basic education (FCUBE) programme were shaped by differing 
convictions. Without capturing such views at the various levels, we miss the whole 
picture inside the black box.  
 
Donor agencies helped Ghana endeavour to achieve shared FCUBE objectives by 
adopting different approaches based on their aid policies and assumptions. Differences 
in aid delivery channels may have different influences on aid absorption and, 
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consequently, may lead to different outcomes. This thesis attempts to corroborate such 
a hypothesis from the viewpoint of Ghanaian actors in the particular setting of the basic 
education reform programme. 
 
Given this focus, the chapter first traces different aid approaches in order to attempt to 
comprehend the philosophy behind changes and continuity in aid modalities. This is 
followed by a more extensive examination of the aid approaches that the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and the UK Department for 
International Development (DFID) employ, with special reference to the advantages 
and challenges of each strategy.  
 
Next, several issues are reviewed that help explore the nature of aid absorption. These 
encompass the questions of who implements projects and why; and include 
assessments of types of USAID contractors and the practice of poaching when 
government officials are contracted to aid projects.  
 
The literature on monetary fungibility is then reviewed in order to reach an 
understanding of how aid funds are absorbed once they reach the recipient 
government. This is followed by a review of themes related to aid funding mechanisms, 
namely those of power and ownership. Finally, due to the importance of development 
gains being maintained and consolidated by recipient countries once development 
projects or programmes are completed, the literature on sustainability of development 
programmes is reviewed.  
 
 
3.2 Strategies for Delivering International Assistance 
Since the commencement of international assistance in the 1950s, the aid paradigm or 
theory has changed continuously in order to try and pursue better approaches (Collier, 
2007; Easterly, 2006; Sachs, 2008; Stiglitz, 2006). It is, however, economics 
considerations that retains pre-eminence in development thinking, not least because of 
its continued dominance of the World Bank (King and McGrath, 2004; McGrath, 
2010b). This paradigm shift has inevitably brought about changes in the nature of 
foreign aid to education and its practice, and vice versa (King, 1999; McGrath, 2010a).  
 
Different funding mechanisms have emerged over the years from various theories 
about development and the role of national governments and civil society in 
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channelling development funds (Bermingham et al., 2009). However, the choice of 
which mechanism to adopt needs to be grounded in a pragmatic consideration of what 
is most likely to yield the expected development outcomes (Riddell, 2007b). In other 
words, the choice of mechanism for providing assistance has evolved in response to 
changing perceptions of what constitutes effective development (Berg, 1993; Burnside 
and Dollar, 1997; Cassen and Associates, 1994; Easterly, 2006; Hyden, 1983; Muscat, 
1986; Peter, 2005; Riddell, 1987, 2007b; Roodman, 2007; Takahashi, 2002b; van de 
Walle, 1998; van de Walle and Johnston, 1996; World Bank, 1998). 
 
The importance of improving aid efficacy was recently enshrined in the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (Paris Declaration 2005), and also reflected in the 
Accra Action Agenda (AAA 2008). The driving force that led to the Paris Declaration is 
an interpretation of aid effectiveness in which the assumption is that aid can achieve 
important development outcomes, but only if it is used efficiently (Rogerson, 2005).  
 
In pursuit of aid effectiveness, many mechanisms for granting financial assistance have 
evolved over the years. In their study of US aid, Chapman and Dykstra (2006) divide 
these mechanisms into three principal phases: problem-focused, project-focused and 
programme-focused (ibid  p.28). The following three sections review aid approaches 
according to these categories.  
 
3.2.1  Problem Focused Assistance 
From the 1950s to the 1970s, the conventional approach to international assistance 
was to identify and locate a development problem (e.g. insufficient trained teachers; 
inadequate materials distribution to schools; or a shortage of electricity in a particular 
area), and a potential solution was designed in the form of a targeted project (e.g. the 
construction of a number of universities and teacher training colleges; the provision of 
textbooks; or the carrying out of labour market supply and demand studies). Arguably, 
this first phase of international assistance aimed to transfer technology and expertise 
through technical assistance and technical cooperation.  
 
Naturally, many of these efforts were input-oriented (Nurkse, 1953). Thus, the criteria 
for effectiveness were generally quite clear providing the inputs were delivered in the 
manner and time frame that had been promised (World Bank, 1998).      
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However, while often successful in the short term, these projects often failed to have 
the anticipated long-term impact (World Bank, 1998). Many of these initiatives operated 
as relatively discrete activities, only to disappear when the external funding ended.  
 
Moreover, in attempting to solve the target problem, other equally serious problems 
were often created, for example, excess of aid inflow, the complication of aid 
procedure, and the incompatibility of various equipment (Nurkse, 1953). Such failure 
did not necessarily arise because funding was poorly targeted or activities were badly 
implemented, but because planners failed to recognise the sector-wide implications of 
their interventions (Hyden, 1983).  
 
3.2.2  Project Assistance  
From the late 1970s, the emphasis shifted away from funding individual activities 
towards sector-wide planning and project-oriented funding (King, 1992; Verspoor, 
1993). Projects were designed to simultaneously address several key issues within a 
single sector, tackling multiple problems in a coordinated way, thereby improving the 
prospects for project success and sustainability.  
 
One consequence of such an approach, however, was that aid projects became more 
complicated, as attention was focused on the wider array of factors that needed to be 
taken into consideration in order to strengthen and expand education systems. Projects 
were typically highly prescriptive, specifying in considerable detail the activities for 
which donor money would be used, the schedule for the expenditure of these funds, 
and the role of donor representatives in overseeing the work.  
 
Projects often included technical assistance. Local staff and expatriate advisors worked 
closely together on very specific tasks, for example, curriculum development; 
distribution of teaching materials; and planning, budgeting and delivery of in-service 
training. While such projects arguably did much to build local capacity at the grassroots 
level (Smith, 2005) and were effective in getting the job done, they have been severely 
criticised for being far less effective in developing institutions or strengthening national 
capacity (Fukuda-Parr et al., 2002).  
 
Furthermore, until recently, most projects have concentrated heavily on input 
(DeStefano et al., 1995). The focus has been on ensuring that activities are undertaken 
on schedule and in the prescribed manner. However, results have been inconsistent or 
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difficult to evaluate, and often could not be fully documented (Chapman and Dykstra, 
2006). While the project approach has for the most part been effective in ensuring that 
resources are programmed and distributed as planned, it has not always been equally 
effective in ensuring the outcome of these efforts (Rahman and Knack, 2004; World 
Bank, 1998).  
 
The complexity of these sector development projects has often militated against the 
achievement of the very goals they seek to achieve (Muscat, 1986). All too often, 
neither the activities themselves nor the schedule for budget execution has matched 
the technical or absorptive capacity of personnel at local or national level (DeStefano et 
al., 1995).  
 
One of the means donors sometimes employ for securing the success of a project is to 
provide support for recurrent costs and staff engagement for virtually the entire duration 
of the initiative. This is intended to maximise the effectiveness of their input by 
providing aid-absorbing resources to the recipient (Takahashi, 2002b; 2002c). In this 
case, the project is outwardly artificially maintained, but cannot be sustained without 
aid. This is probably one of the typical failures of international aid: „flourishing‟ projects 
seemingly “islands of success in a sea of failure” (Harrold and Associates, 1995 p.iv) or 
“islands of excellence” (Ratcliffe and Macrae, 1999 p.32).  
 
Moreover, project design and implementation have often been donor-driven rather than 
responsive to local wishes or sensitivities. Governments lack control over certain 
aspects of their own state systems; complain about the heavy-handedness and 
overbearing behaviour of donors; and often resent the persistent expatriate presence 
(Muscat, 1986).   
 
When the flow of aid to Africa increased rapidly until reaching historically high levels in 
the early 1990s (World Bank, 2007), “aid bombardment” began to appear (Takahashi, 
2002b). This phenomenon occurs when foreign assistance is intensively parachuted 
into a particular recipient country that does not possess sufficient domestic resources 
to absorb the rapidly increasing resources, for example, recurrent budget 
implementation and the engagement of competent personnel, which results in the 
failure to make full use of the aid. 
 
Indeed, the median number of official donors to each recipient country in 2000 was 23 
(Acharya et al., 2003). In the typical African state, aid is provided by “some thirty official 
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donors in addition to several dozen international NGOs...through over a thousand 
distinct projects and several hundred resident foreign experts” (van de Walle, 2001 
p.58). Thousands of quarterly project reports are submitted to multiple overseeing 
agencies. Hundreds of missions monitor and evaluate these projects and programmes 
annually, and each mission expects to meet with key government officials and obtain 
comments on its reports (van de Walle and Johnston, 1996).  
 
The poor administrative capacity of recipient governments makes it impossible to 
coordinate multiple aid activities. Injecting too many innovations into the government 
system leads to a phenomenon commonly known as “innovation overload” (Hopkins et 
al., 1994 p.12) or “project proliferation” (Cassen and Associates, 1994; Morss, 1984), 
which leads to subsequent “donor fragmentation” (Knack and Rahman, 2004; Rahman 
and Knack, 2004), whereby too many isolated projects overlap one another in the 
recipient government or sector.  
 
It is widely and plausibly believed that this significantly reduces the value of aid by 
increasing direct and indirect transaction costs (Acharya et al., 2003; Acharya et al., 
2006). As several case studies note, this lack of coordination “can lead to severe waste 
of resources,” while also “complicating the aid management function of government” 
(Saasa and Carlsson, 1996 p.127).  
 
Donors engage in the practice of increasing the visibility of their efforts and the short-
term appearance of success for their individual projects at the expense of coherent 
policy-making and capacity building in the recipient country‟s public sector (Takahashi, 
2003; World Bank, 1998). It is also well-known that however successful a project 
appears to be on its own terms, it will have little or no sustained impact in an 
environment that lacks effective sectoral policy, and where it is not integrated into other 
donor-funded or government projects (Easterly, 2003; Kanbur and Sandler, 1999).  
 
As a result, when projects are „successfully‟ concluded and handed over for operation 
to the local authorities they frequently lack the necessary commitment, competence 
and resources to continue (World Bank, 1998). This is what causes project to be 
unsustainable after the donors have withdrawn.  
 
In terms of project success, where there are numerous donors, any one of them will 
gain only a small share of the total benefits from their efforts to improve administrative 
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capacity in the country, which in effect erodes the success of other donors‟ projects 
(Takahashi, 2005).  
 
Mosley argues that “the whole is less than the sum of its parts: the actions of many 
individuals each taking rational decisions in isolation may lead to an outcome which 
each was anxious to avoid” (1987 p.100). For example, in Ghana in the early 1990s, 
the widespread construction of primary schools for the improvement of access was 
under way in cooperation with many donors. However, JICA subsequently began a 
university construction project. If the total recurrent expenditure and staffing 
requirements of both primary education project and tertiary education project had 
substantially exceeded the existing human and non-renewable resources of the sector, 
it might have led to competition for scarce ministry resources between the two projects, 
each impeding the other.  
 
It appears that one of the most serious problems caused by aid bombardment is an 
incoherent development strategy among the donors. Providing assistance according to 
unilateral procedures and policies makes the input of aid and the management of 
domestic resources less effective. 
 
Throughout the 1990s, donors became increasingly frustrated by the lack of co-
ordination and ownership of ostensibly cooperative projects (NORAD, 1999a). 
Accordingly, the need for greater coordination of aid and a coherent development 
strategy in the education sector was widely recognised (Carlsson et al., 1997).  
 
3.2.3  Programme Assistance  
Over the last 20 years, large multilateral (e.g. the World Bank) and some bilateral 
assistance agencies have slowly moved away from the project-driven mode of 
development and made increasing use of programme assistance strategies (King, 
1992, 1999). 
 
Programme assistance is where funds are allocated to a government to spend in 
whatever way it chooses within a sector, as long as expenditure is aimed at achieving a 
set of policy goals agreed upon at the beginning of the funding cycle, and it lies within 
the framework agreement established with the donor. One effect of programme 
assistance is to disconnect the external funding from specific activities. It also tends to 
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shift responsibility for implementation more directly to the state and away from the 
specially created project teams that are often dominated by expatriates.  
 
Along with the policy of programme funding, since the mid-1990s, sector-wide 
approaches have emerged out of dissatisfaction with both top down and bottom up 
approaches to development assistance. Concerns about the probability of programme 
funding reaching the poor have led to a thrust for aid to move from the national level to 
the sectoral level, with its focus on the social sectors, for example, education and 
health. This has resulted in the urgency for a more coherent sectoral approach to donor 
assistance.  
 
Sector-wide approaches have brought with them many key concepts and terms (e.g. 
partnership, sector support agreement, ownership, aid coordination, aid coherence and 
harmonisation) (King, 1999). While McGinn (2000) questions whether many of the 
terms associated with the new modality are really original concepts, and whether they 
are necessarily engaged in the best interests of national governments, there is no 
doubt that there has been an increasing emphasis on development coordination 
geared towards the enhancement of aid effectiveness (Brown et al., 2001; Buchert, 
2000a; Cassels, 1997; Freedman, 1994; King, 1999; Mosley and Eeckhout, 2000; 
Rudner, 1996; Samoff, 2004; Wolfensohn, 1995); which led to the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness in 2005 and the subsequent Accra Agenda for Action in 2008 
(Bermingham et al., 2009). 
 
Although the term is frequently used, there is no common definition of „sector 
approach‟, and many different terms are used to communicate the concept.7 The 
nature of sector coordination may alter according to period or context; and it varies 
from author to author and from organisation to organisation (Buchert, 1999; Cassels, 
1997; Harrold and Associates, 1995; Jones, 1997; Ratcliffe and Macrae, 1999; Sack, 
1995; Stephen and Williams, 2002; World Bank, 2001). Thus, it is difficult to pin down 
with a definition.  
 
Nevertheless, there is general consensus that a sector programme is one in which: (i) 
the majority of stakeholders is comprised of members of the relevant government 
                                                     
7
 For example, the World Bank‟s sector investment programme; USAID and DFID‟s sector-wide 
approach; the Netherlands‟ sector approach; SIDA and DANIDA‟s sector programme support 
(Sweden and Denmark respectively); CIDA‟s sector-wide approach and sector approach 
(Canada); and the European Union‟s sector coordination and sector development programme.   
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authorities of the recipient country and the major donors; (ii) there is close alignment 
with national development policies, strategies and budgets; (iii) a consistent sector 
development policy is shared between all stakeholders; (iv) donors work together in the 
interests of coherent activities and resource inputs; and (v) local stakeholders drive the 
initiative (adapted from based on Harrold and Associates, 1995).  
 
Clearly, such a strategy indicates a holistic (sector-wide) approach, emphasising 
government ownership, partnership and outcomes rather than inputs (Foster and 
Naschold, 2000). It aims to establish a single policy and expenditure programme for a 
given sector under government leadership, eventually moving to an arrangement in 
which government systems and procedures are used for accounting for all funds and 
their disbursement.   
 
Having reviewed the three main approaches to the distribution of aid, the following 
sections consider the approaches adopted by USAID and DFID, and their strengths 
and challenges respectively.  
 
3.2.4  USAID Approach to Education Development Assistance 
While many donors have embraced the sector-wide approach, USAID has maintained 
its distance from this trend8 and relied mostly on project assistance (Chapman and 
Dykstra, 2006). At the same time, USAID experimented with programme assistance 
(budgetary support) during the 1990s (DeStefano et al., 1995), a practice referred to as 
non-project assistance (NPA).9  
 
The QUIPS programme was originally composed of both project assistance and NPA. 
However, as the 1990s drew to a close, NPA came in for a good deal of criticism 
particularly from US politicians, who pointed to the lack of accountability; the difficulty in 
                                                     
8
 Germany, France and Japan are also particularly adamant that the project will continue to form 
the core of their aid programmes. Canada‟s policy is that the majority of its aid will be provided 
through project support, at least in the short to medium term. While making the transition to 
programme support, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Norway will continue project 
support in certain areas. 
9
 NPA funding to African programmes is always directed at sector level reform; and is disbursed 
after sector level policy, and institutional and management reforms have taken place (Blumel, 
2004). It is generally deployed in conjunction with other types of aid, especially technical 
assistance; and is often equated with budget support, balance of payments support, programme 
assistance, or cash transfers. See the USAID policy paper Program Assistance (1996) for the 
distinction between NPA and other forms of assistance.  
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seeing results; the problems in linking aid to eventual changes in the education system; 
and the dilemma it tended to create of whether to satisfy oneself with fully meeting 
some of the goals or only partly meeting all of the goals (Chapman and Dykstra, 2006). 
In 1998, concerned about the lack of accountability of funds that were not directly tied 
to particular activities, the US Congress banned the continued funding of non-project 
assistance (Chapman and Dykstra, 2006).  
 
While the choice of mechanism is based on multiple considerations, most USAID 
funding is still allocated to sector-oriented projects. The QUIPS programme in Ghana is 
an example of this. The following is a discussion of the strengths and weakness of the 
project approach with special reference to USAID assistance.  
 
Potential Strengths 
Firstly, the emphasis on project funding has given USAID a relatively high level of 
control over the way in which its money is used by recipient countries.  
 
Secondly, the tracking of funds is thus relatively easy, ensuring greater accountability. 
In this regard, USAID often establishes semi-independent project implementation units, 
which enables it to maintain control over how the funds are spent.  
 
Thirdly, delegating responsibility to dedicated units ensures that projects are managed 
more effectively and thus deliver outputs in a timely matter. Controversially, such 
project implementation is often regarded as more efficient, as bureaucratic recipient 
institutions are not involved, and tangible and unhindered outcomes are more probable.  
 
Thus, project support is highly visible to both donor and the host countries. It is 
therefore easier to evaluate the impact of specific projects than other ODA10 modalities.  
 
Fourthly, contracted USAID facilitators work at the project sites; thus, it is argued that 
such projects do much to build local capacity, especially at school and community level 
(Smith, 2005).  
 
Fifthly, as a separate management structure is used, if host governments do not have 
sufficient capacity to manage programme support, project support can be used for 
capacity building (Yamada, 2002 7f).  
                                                     
10
 Official development assistance. 
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Sixthly, project support can allow USAID to act as innovators in development 
approaches through specific interventions. With its greater resources and ability to take 
risks, it can support pilot projects, which, if successful, can be used on a large scale.  
 
Seventhly, the cost of USAID‟s withdrawal of projects is smaller for the recipient 
governments. National development plans are not largely influenced by project support 
and the effects of support withdrawals are therefore not as serious as the withdrawal of 
programme support (Bandstein and Dietrichson, 2004). Thus, this can be also less 
intrusive than the other aid modalities, for example, budgetary support (Foster, 2004a; 
2004b).   
 
Weakness and challenges 
There is also criticism of the project approach. Firstly, USAID‟s level of control over the 
funds might ensure their efficient use, but the crucial point is whether donors and 
recipient fully share the project objectives with.  
 
If there is disagreement, as Morss (1984) argues, greater donor control does not 
necessarily mean that funds will be spent in a way that is more beneficial from the 
standpoint of the recipient‟s development prospects. In other words, what USAID 
perceives to be „effective‟ implementation is not automatically what the recipient 
considers to be effective implementation. 
 
A high level of control also highlights the challenge of how USAID is to ensure that 
project-oriented funding is converted into culturally appropriate, effective activities that 
yield the desired development outcomes (Chapman and Dykstra, 2006 p.30). 
 
Secondly, giving management responsibility to the implementing project office has its 
merits – e.g. greater accountability and timely service delivery by bypassing what were 
regarded as incompetent, bureaucratic, uncooperative government – but this approach 
can create obstacles to achieving greater ownership and sustainability. This point is 
forcibly made in the literature (Acharya et al., 2004; Mosley and Eeckhout, 2000; 
Takahashi, 2002b; van de Walle and Johnston, 1996; World Bank, 1998). For example, 
project implementation units effectively undermined the government departments they 
displaced and impeded capacity building in those institutions (Samoff, 2004 p.410). Al-
Samarrai et al. (2002 p.48) warn that problems are likely to increase in severity when 
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the project is subsequently absorbed into the wider public system if they are not tackled 
earlier on.  
 
Thirdly, and closely associated with accountability, attention is inevitably paid to input. 
Although sector-wide approaches urge donors to be content with system-wide 
monitoring and evaluation, USAID is more concerned with tracking project outputs – 
generally, merely the results of system inputs – (e.g. production of textbooks, teacher 
training, the data management system) than documenting system outputs (e.g. pupil 
learning and retention) (Chapman and Quijada, 2009).  
 
One apparent reason for this concentration on input is that converting project funds into 
educational inputs is most directly under the control of project staff (DeStefano et al., 
1995). Naturally, measuring investment is somewhat easier than assessing 
demonstrated effects. The focus on system inputs rather than on system outputs or 
outcomes is, in part, a response to USAID reporting requirements.  
 
Furthermore, as noted earlier, the sustainability of project funding has been severely 
questioned.  
 
Chapman and Quijada (2009) reviewed 236 documents drawn from 33 basic education 
projects sponsored by USAID from 1990 to 2005. According to their findings, the 
objectives of nearly all USAID projects were (1) to improve quality of education; (2) to 
increase access, retention and graduation rates; (3) to improve equity; and (4) to 
implement all these activities in a sustainable way. This is what QUIPS pursued as 
well.  
 
Their findings further indicate that USAID projects made important contributions to 
improving pupil access, retention and learning. Yet, they suggest that relatively few 
projects actually assessed the extent to which their activities led to the desired pupil 
learning outcomes, and fewer still were able to demonstrate success in increasing pupil 
learning (Chapman and Quijada, 2009).  
 
With regard to the question of whether an intervention is sustainable, the authors find it 
difficult to come to a substantive conclusion. This is because greater attention was 
given to tracking the extent to which system-level inputs were delivered than to 
assessing project accomplishments against documented objectives. Moreover, USAID 
project designs and evaluations have generally failed to either define or measure 
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sustainability (Chapman and Quijada, 2009).11 Consequently, the issue is left 
unexplored, although they find that across numerous projects, implementing personnel 
expressed strong doubts about the prospects for sustainability without continued 
external donor funding.  
 
3.2.5  DFID Approach to Education Development Assistance 
There was a significant turning point in the UK‟s aid programme when the new Labour 
government came to power in May 1997 (UK DFID, 2010a), changes to British aid 
policy being among the first measures it implemented (Morrissey, 2002). DFID was set 
up as a separate government department, making fighting world poverty its top priority; 
and its budget has subsequently grown significantly (UK DFID, 1997).12 To achieve its 
goal, DFID has explicitly aimed at meeting universal primary education (Millennium 
Development Goal 2) (UK DFID, 2010b; UK DFID and HM Treasury, 2006).   
 
Since 1997, British aid interventions have shifted from project assistance towards 
provision of broad financial aid to the sector as a whole. Indeed, DFID‟s commitment to 
the sector approach has expanded rapidly, to the extent that it is now the preferred 
mode of assistance to the social sector, and the UK has become a strong proponent of 
sector programmes and general budget support (Flint et al., 2002; Morrissey, 2002). 
 
This shift reflects DFID‟s dissatisfaction with the impact, ownership and sustainability of 
the traditional project approach (Morrissey, 2002). This dissatisfaction of aid impact 
was noted by the then Secretary of State for International Development, who was 
reported as saying that, “advances have not been uniform and poverty remains 
pervasive. We have gone forward and backward over the past 50 years” (Short cited in 
Ratcliffe and Macrae, 1999 p.4).  
 
It also signals the recognition that sector approach programmes can quickly absorb 
relatively large amounts of financial resources (Cassen and Associates, 1994 p.125; 
Ratcliffe and Macrae, 1999 p.32),13 and can provide effective support to policy reform 
                                                     
11
 Likewise, sustainability is not defined in the QUIPS final evaluation report.  
12
 DFID published its first white paper with a focus on eliminating world poverty in the autumn of 
1997. Three subsequent white papers (issued in 2000, 2006 and 2009 respectively) have 
reinforced the first document‟s message.  
13
 This is regarded as a particularly significant albeit variable factor. For McNeill (1981 p.10), “a 
major criterion of success of an aid agency is simply its ability to get money spent.” Thus, when 
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(ODI 1998). DFID‟s preference for sectoral funding and budget support is clearly 
expressed in statements such as the following: 
 
Direct Budget Support (DBS), either as support to the budget as a whole or as part of a 
SWAp [sector-wide approach], is potentially the most effective financial aid 
instrument in supporting the poverty reduction strategy (PRS) principles. (UK DFID, 
2000 p.1) 
 
The UK has supported the Ghanaian education sector since the mid-1980s.14 However, 
this support appears to have had limited success. It has been suggested that its impact 
on educational outcomes has been constrained because free-standing projects 
resulted in significant increases in recurrent costs, leading to unsustainability when 
DFID withdraws (MOE/DFID 1998). 
 
This experience, coupled with the international shift in approach to aid at the sectoral 
level, has led DFID to focus more upon the achievement of broad policy objectives than 
on the details of the project itself (Morrissey, 2002). This has tended to change the 
nature of negotiations between DFID and the recipient, which have turned towards 
policy dialogue on matters that affect the sector as a whole rather than the details of 
the project environment alone. One of the aid programmes implemented under the new 
UK aid initiative was Ghana‟s Education Sector Support Programme (ESSP).  
 
Potential Strengths 
The sector-wide approach has emerged in order to address the limitations of project 
assistance. The growing literature on the subject highlights the potential strengths of 
this approach (Al-Samarrai et al., 2002; Brown, 2001; Forss et al., 2000; Foster, 2000a; 
Foster, 2000b; Harrold and Associates, 1995; Ostrom et al., 2002a; Ratcliffe and 
Macrae, 1999; Riddell, 2002; Riddell, 2007b; Virture, 2003; World Bank, 1998, 2001). 
The views of these authors can be summarised as follows:  
 
                                                                                                                                                           
aid agencies find it difficult to spend their budgets, this may result in inappropriate projects. 
Conversely, for Mosley (1987 p.52), aid administrators and implementers have a common 
desire to expand their budgets, "since the larger the overall aid budget, the larger are the scale 
and importance of their own operations.” 
14
 Until the Basic Education Sector Improvement Programme element of FUCBE implemented 
in 1996, UK assistance had not focused on this sector. Some its previous interventions were 
projects in the areas of science, mathematics and English; JSSs; non-formal education; adult 
literacy; and support to teacher training.  
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Firstly, it is argued that this approach leads to a much greater level of government 
ownership, as an instrument through which broader participation in the achievement of 
sector objectives and strategies can be realised.  
 
Secondly, the use of government systems is potently more cost-effective and inherently 
leads to greater capacity building than the financing of numerous project management 
and implementation visits. 
 
Thirdly, as a result of using government systems, the approach is also seen to lead to a 
reduction in transaction costs for both donor and recipient. It is no longer necessary for 
donors to devote resources to project management, and the recipient is no longer 
required to negotiate and deal bilaterally with the donors. Financial management costs 
are also minimised because recipient government systems are used for procurement, 
reporting and auditing, thus removing the need to account separately for each donor‟s 
input.  
 
Moreover, focus on the sector makes monitoring and evaluation potentially easier and 
reduces the cost of these activities. Furthermore, performance against targets set out 
as part of a sector-wide approach can be judged against readily available data.  
 
Finally, the sector-wide approach focuses on output auditing rather than input 
accounting, whereby flexible, high volume budgetary support can be balanced with the 
achievement of agreed milestones and targets.  
 
Performance and Challenges 
Having listed the potential strengths of the sector-wide approach, the extent to which 
these alleged advantages with respect to the education sector are being realised is still 
difficult to assess (Al-Samarrai et al., 2002 p.58) and depends on a case by case 
evaluation. However, the key issues with respect to sector-wide type initiatives in 
education development can be summarised. The following discussion is structured 
around each of the main potential benefits of the approach.  
 
Firstly, with regard to project ownership by the recipient government and to donor 
coordination, it is reported that ownership of the education programme has been 
relatively high in India, Ethiopia and Uganda (Al-Samarrai et al., 2002 p.60; Brown et 
al., 2001; Buchert and Epskamp, 2000; Virture, 2003). In contrast, DFID and the World 
Bank have reportedly undertaken too much of a leadership role (at least initially) in 
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Ghana (GoG 2003; Sibbons and Seal, 2000; DFID 2001a). Donors have also led the 
process in Tanzania (Brown et al., 2001; Clarke-Okha, 2003; Cramer et al., 2006) and 
Bangladesh (Banham, 2001; Buchert, 2000a; 2000b; Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, 2006) 
 
Donors have been criticised for still wishing to maintain control and retain power 
themselves: “SWAPS [sector-wide approaches] processes have tended to be top down 
in character with little participation” (Brown et al., 2001 p.36). Additionally, partnerships 
are often one-sided, with recipient governments unable to exert sufficient leverage over 
donors (Clarke-Okha, 2003). Somewhat ironically, it is commented that, “the increased 
emphasis on ownership comes at a time when the role of the development agencies in 
shaping the international development agenda is more dominant than ever” (Al-
Samarrai et al., 2002 p.60).  
 
Associated to this point, the sector-wide approach tended to be dominated by the 
largest or strongest funding agencies (in each setting), while smaller agencies and 
other education sector organisations are largely excluded (Samoff, 2004 p.42).  
 
Secondly, the focus on developing well-designed strategies is undoubtedly a major 
advantage of the education sector-wide approach. Yet, they often concentrate more on 
input than output (Murphy, 2005). The development of an action plan with a set of 
clearly focused programmes of implementation is essential. However, in the case of 
Ghana, the translation of strategy into action plan has been particularly problematic in 
DFID‟s ESSP (Al-Samarrai et al., 2002 p.61).  
 
Moreover, many education sector programmes focus on the primary/basic education 
subsector, limiting overall coherence with respect to objectives and funding for the 
sector as a whole (Hayman, 2007; King, 2007), for example, the ESSP. Furthermore, 
there is frequently lack of agreement about realistic and achievable performance 
targets (Ratcliffe and Macrae, 1999 pp.35-7), with the result that the already 
overburdened capacity of the ministry is stretched still further.  
 
The sector-wide approach places tremendous responsibility on the capacity of recipient 
government systems and, therefore, whilst the potential benefits of the approach are 
greater than those accruing from conventional project-based support, the associated 
risks may also be greater.  
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Brown (2001) reviews the transition to a sector-wide approach in the health sectors of 
Zambia, Ghana and Bangladesh, and argues that there is the potential risk of reducing 
the impact of previously successful vertical health projects.15  
 
Moreover, weak national institutions may be unadvisedly induced to deliver technical 
and financial programmes through both central and decentralised government systems. 
In a review of absorption capacity in the education sector, Rose (2006) illustrates well 
the difficulty of making effective use of aid through sector-wide approaches and DBS 
due to implementation constraints. Institutional strengthening, therefore, should be 
designed as a key objective of any programme.  
 
Thirdly, with regard to transaction costs, the direct management of donor-supported 
interventions is expected to reduce the financial burden. Yet, lack of confidence in 
government and ministry financial management capacity and concern about 
accountability have deterred some funding agencies – including DFID – from full 
blanket (non-specific) funding of the education sector (Ratcliffe and Macrae, 1999 
p.35). In fact, whether employing the government system actually has a positive 
systemic effect and reduces transaction costs is as yet unknown (Killick, 2004).  
 
Al-Samarrai et al. (2002 p.61) argue that numbers of expatriate personnel have been 
appreciably reduced, since just one field manager is expected to monitor DFID support 
to the education sector in each country. However, a more sceptical view is also 
possible; for example, donors at a meeting in Oslo (NORAD, 1999b) voiced their 
concerns about an increase in expatriate staff under the sector-wide approach 
(NORAD, 1999b).  
 
Johanson (1999) quotes World Bank evidence that supervision costs to the Bank are 
50% higher in sector-wide approach programmes than projects. It thus seems feasible 
that staff are spending their time attempting to arrange as many meetings with the 
same government officer to discuss sector-wide programmes as they previously did to 
discuss projects (Brown et al., 2001). 
 
Indeed, another World Bank study concluded that more (donor) staff time was involved 
in monitoring and participating in sector-wide programmes; and a study of the 
                                                     
15
 Vertical projects focus linearly on specific issues or themes in a given sector, for example 
addressing malaria, in contrast to the „horizontal‟ sector-wide approach or countrywide model of 
aid.  
35 
 
Namibian education sector-wide approach concluded that the workload of the ministry 
was higher than before the programme commenced (West, 2003).  
 
Likewise, the Joint Evaluation of External Support to Basic Education in Developing 
Countries (Freeman and Faure, 2003) reveals that in some countries, the move 
towards a programme approach has either failed to lead to a reduction in administrative 
burdens for the host government or has even led to an increase.  
 
With a sector-wide approach, transaction costs may rise until new arrangements fully 
replace the old. It is not yet clear whether they actually fall once the sector-wide 
approach is under way, though a study shows that health officials in Mozambique, 
Uganda and Tanzania seemed confident that they would (Brown et al., 2001)16  
 
Brown et al. (2001) argue that even if transaction costs are unchanged, there should be 
a net benefit in so far as an increased proportion of ministry–donor contracts are now 
aimed at supporting the effectiveness of government systems rather than parallel 
project ones. It seems that this remains true even though one factor that keeps 
transaction costs high in most countries is the continuation of project support together 
with donor supported sector-wide programmes offering budget assistance. 
Consequently, in at least some instances, parallel reporting is required if projects are to 
continue. 
 
Fourthly, concentration on the sector as a whole can make some monitoring and 
evaluation easier, and joint review meetings may prompt a more coordinated and 
detailed monitoring and evaluation exercise. However, this presents a new challenge to 
the donors; that is, the task of identifying the impact of the contribution of an individual 
donor becomes almost impossible (Al-Samarrai et al., 2002).  
 
Therefore, theoretically, donors must content themselves with system-wide monitoring 
and evaluation. Yet, Marshall and Ofei-Aboagye (2004 p.48) found that some donors 
working in Ghana remained concerned about their ability to track the impact of „their‟ 
money, despite progress made on monitoring and harmonisation agreements.17  
                                                     
16
 High level African delegates at a workshop sponsored by the Danish organisation DANIDA in 
Harare in October 1998 felt that transaction costs had already fallen, at least for the recipient 
government (DANIDA, 1998b). 
17
 The issue is often not so much related to the donors as the parliamentarians at home, 
including those in the UK. In respect of this point, see also the UK Parliamentary International 
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Associated with monitoring and evaluation is concern about the quality of outcomes 
(Al-Samarrai et al., 2002). The trouble is that with the sector-wide approach, the purely 
quantitative and measurable factors – e.g. how many trainers and teachers are trained 
according to the cascade model – are insufficient to indicate whether the input has led 
to an improvement in the quality of education at classroom level.  
 
Furthermore, as a characteristic of the approach, the reliance on high levels of 
institutional capacity and commitment may involve building existing capacity at many 
different levels. Although this is intended to make funding more efficient and strengthen 
local ownership, it can stretch limited capacity (Smith, 2005). This focus on the system 
as a whole may have the effect of delaying benefits to recipients (Al-Samarrai et al., 
2002).  
 
 
3.3 Implementing Agents  
Having discussed the aid approaches employed by DFID and USAID for delivering 
assistance, this section examines the question of selecting local implementing agents 
for donor-funded programmes in order that foreign funding may be converted into on-
the-ground development activities. Whether funds lead to substantial or insignificant 
benefit depends heavily on the way such funds are spent and the people and 
organisations doing the spending. 
 
Figure 3-2 illustrates channels of bilateral international assistance to education. It 
shows the mechanisms for allocating funds and the selection of implementing agents, 
according to the three funding approaches (problem, project and programme) reviewed 
in the previous sections. The mechanism utilised in UK assistance to Ghana‟s FCUBE 
initiative was programme-focused funding, which channelled WSD funds through the 
GES under the MoE. The US mechanism was the project-focused channelling of 
QUIPS funds though US based international contractors, which subcontracted a 
commercial Ghanaian firm and local NGOs as field implementers.  
 
  
                                                                                                                                                           
Development Committee website (http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-
archive/international-development/ind0708an58/, accessed on 29/08/10).  
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Figure 3-2 Channelling bilateral international assistance to education 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Chapman (2006 p.31). 
 
The next section briefly discusses the merits and demerits of USAID project 
implementing agents, i.e. international contractors, national contractors, international 
NGOs (INGOs) and national NGOs. This is followed by a review of the literature on the 
„poaching‟ of development experts, in order to shed some light on the issues that arise 
when government officials are contracted to work for donor-funded projects.  
 
3.3.1 Project Implementing Agents 
3.3.1.1 International Contractors 
There are multiple benefits to be gained by outsourcing the implementation of 
education projects to international contractors. By doing so, USAID is able to secure 
the necessary technical expertise on an ad hoc basis without subjecting itself to the 
high overheads of maintaining a large team of specialists amongst its own staff.  
 
Secondly, contractors easily fulfil reporting requirements and comply with financial 
accounting procedures.  
 
Thirdly, they tend to have a good working relationship with USAID.  
 
Fourthly, the practice is politically required by Congress. USAID often hands over the 
funds to the American contractor and makes it responsible for further allocating them to 
Implementing agent Mechanism for 
allocating funds 
Approach to 
awarding aid  
Problem-
focused  Government agency 
 International contractor 
 National contractor 
 Multinational organisation 
 Conventional contract 
 Cooperative agreement 
Project-
focused 
 Direct budget transfer 
 Budget support to 
education ministries 
 Sector wide approach 
 Government 
  
Programme
-focused 
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other sub-contractors (USAID, 2004).18 This centralises the responsibility for oversight 
of project funds without burdening USAID staff with the task.  
 
As noted earlier, the biggest argument against this contractual style is the uncertainty 
of long-term sustainability. Moreover, its cost-effectiveness is also questionable, 
especially with regard to highly paid foreign specialists. Despite their technical 
expertise, it is sometimes argued that expatriates may not have sufficient 
understanding of local culture and decision-making processes, and that their very 
presence can lead to resentment on the recipient side (Leach, 1991, 1997).  
 
3.3.1.2 National Contractors 
Local personnel often have a better understanding of the strategies that are likely to be 
culturally appropriate and may be more effective in undertaking implementation 
activities than „outsiders‟. At the same time, using local contractors is one way of 
building local capacity and fostering local experience, and one that promotes 
sustainability. Some also argue that awarding national contracts promotes private 
sector development in the recipient country.  
 
The downside is that national contractors are less likely to be familiar with USAID 
accounting and reporting requirements. Additionally, the contracting of local agents has 
been criticised for not encouraging long-term sustainability.  
 
3.3.1.3 INGOs 
NGOs have long played an important role in delivering development assistance 
(Edwards, 1997, 1999). Their increased popularity as a mechanism for distributing 
development assistance originates from the early 1990s, largely for the following five 
reasons:  
 
Firstly, working through INGOs is a way of reaching the local population whilst at the 
same time circumventing state bureaucracy to a certain extent (Miller-Grandvaux et al., 
2002).  
 
                                                     
18
 USAID ties its aid securely to the utilisation of American companies. Of the top 100 firms used 
as consultants by USAID in 2000, more than 80 were from the US, accounting for 87% of the 
contract value; and the remainder were nearly all multinationals with offices in the US (USAID, 
2004). 
39 
 
Secondly, channelling development money through INGOs is a means of bypassing 
regimes that have a record of misappropriating international assistance funds.  
 
Thirdly, INGOs are believed to be more in touch with the real needs of ordinary people, 
and better structured to deliver services at the grassroots level (Edwards, 1997, 1999). 
Moreover, INGOs are often able to use new funding to build on activities and structures 
already in place. This is attractive to donors who are keen to avoid the high costs of 
establishing new management structures for project implementation, yet also want a 
clear chain of financial accountability (Chapman, 2001).  
 
The argument against the use of INGOs is similar to criticism of international 
contractors – sustainability and expatriates who may not be familiar with local contexts 
– although this is less of an issue with INGOs than with international contractors.  
 
3.3.1.4 National NGOs 
National NGOs enjoy many of the same advantages as INGOs. They typically have a 
local presence in the geographical area in which USAID wants to work; local 
knowledge and a local network they can draw upon to implement their activities; and 
staff with a commitment to local development that extends even beyond the provisions 
of external funding.  
 
As with national contractors, operating through national NGOs is often seen as a 
means of building local capacity, promoting local ownership and sustainability of ideas 
and activities. Moreover, working with local NGOs is often substantially more cost-
effective than working with their international counterparts (Miller-Grandvaux et al., 
2002).  
 
Nevertheless, the increased reliance on national and international NGOs is not without 
controversy (Edwards, 1997, 1999). For all their advantages, channelling development 
assistance funds through NGOs carries some risks. While NGOs and governments are 
not natural enemies, neither are they necessarily the best of friends (Miller-Grandvaux 
et al., 2002). Governments have frequently viewed NGOs as competitors for 
international development funds that would otherwise flow through their ministries. 
However, while this attitude may be self-serving on the part of the state, working 
outside official channels can result in a lack of coordination with the implementation of 
government policy.  
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NGO activities are often somewhat loosely (and sometimes not at all) connected to 
established government structures, putting sustainability of NGO initiated activities at 
risk (World Bank, 2003b). The state often has little sense of ownership or commitment 
to NGO activities; thus, while often effective at the operational level, work undertaken 
through NGOs has little chance of influencing national level government policy. 
Therefore, in operating outside the national policy framework, NGO development 
initiatives have often blossomed and died (Chapman and Dykstra, 2006).  
 
Another problem is that the rapid influx of development funds may overwhelm the 
NGO‟s absorptive capacity (World Bank, 2003b). Planning, supervision and accounting 
systems are sometimes unable to keep up with incoming funding, leading to a drop in 
the quality of service. 
 
Project implementers contracted by USAID are screened, but whatever agency (or 
combination of agencies) takes charge, public sector recipient personnel inevitably 
become involved in project implementation. This is not only true with regard to the 
QUIPS programme but any donor-related project.  
 
Unless assistance takes the form of the programme approach – in which government 
officials themselves take a leading role – the result is a kind of competition amongst 
skilled local staff in the recipient sector. The next section looks at this competition for 
scarce expertise, and what may happen to the recipient‟s bureaucratic system when 
specialist local officials are recruited for project implementation.  
 
3.3.2 Poaching 
Because donors need to demonstrate that they have obtained tangible results from 
their projects, they rely heavily on expatriates, especially long-term advisors. In that the 
donors must also work with counterparts in the local state bureaucracy, the same 
pressure commonly leads the former to pay salary supplements to specialist local staff. 
However, this practice induces civil servants to turn their attention away from their 
other responsibilities – even work with a potentially greater impact on development – 
towards the donor‟s project (Arndt, 2000).  
 
It also creates the incentive for officials to protect and extend aid projects from which 
they benefit regardless of the merit of such initiatives, and helps to perpetuate the 
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practice of spending aid funds in the form of independent projects rather than in the 
form of coordinated, sector-wide programmes or budget support (Acharya et al., 2003).  
 
The distinction between purely private consultation and semi-official engagement on 
donor projects is often blurred (Cohen and Wheeler, 1997b). Moreover: 
 
Control of salary and manpower policy is eroded as donors hire local staff for ‗their‘ 
projects or contract with them to meet donor needs. Dual salary and incentive 
structures undermine morale and commitment among public sector employees who are 
left out of donor-distributed assignments... This neglect or subversion of existing 
structures creates organisational confusion and contributes to the withering of 
government capacity (Berg, 1997).
19
  
 
Examples in the aid literature come primarily from sub-Saharan Africa: 
 
In Niger, for instance, the majority of NGOs appear to be operated by moonlighting 
civil servants and ex-ministers of cabinet. In several cases, high-level officials left 
government to create NGOs in order to receive donor support that had once gone to 
the official‘s ministry (van de Walle, 2001 p.165). 
 
Van de Walle and Johnston (1996) found that Master‟s level staff in government earn a 
fifth of what they could earn working for the resident mission of a donor agency in 
Kenya. In Ghana, a salary of a secretary to a JICA expert working in the MoE was 
higher than that of a MoE director.20   
 
Once engaged by project implementation units, generous salary packages for locally 
recruited staff are often supplemented with access to vehicles and foreign travel. It is 
thus perhaps unsurprising that many middle and high-level African managers have left 
the civil service to work directly for aid agencies, lured by salaries often five to ten 
times as much as they were earning in public service (Knack and Rahman, 2004).  
 
Many graduates of donor-funded training programmes leave the public sector to work 
for aid agencies or NGOs; and the most talented, ambitious and best trained are the 
most likely to leave (Knack and Rahman, 2004). Cohen and Wheeler (1997a p.142) 
concluded in their study of Kenya that “elite external Master‟s degrees are, in effect, 
passports out of the public sector”. Moreover, the high salaries paid by donors to locally 
                                                     
19
 See Cohen and Wheeler (1997a) for a more detailed discussion on the damaging effects of 
the „topping up‟ of officials‟ salaries by donors.  
20
 Information obtained from a JICA then education specialist in the MoE (9 August 2005).  
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recruited staff are further accelerating the exodus of skills from the very state 
institutions they are trying to strengthen (Riddell, 2007b).  
 
A World Bank report (1998) laments the fact that donors „unwittingly‟ ransack the civil 
service for its best and brightest talent to run their projects. However, this and other 
donor practices with potentially damaging effects are widely condoned by the donor 
agencies themselves (UNDP, 2003; World Bank, 2000, 2003c). Nevertheless, Fallon 
and Pereira da Silva (1994 p.98) report that in Mozambique, one of the most aid-
intensive countries: 
 
Donor-driven competition for skilled personnel is creating immense problems for 
government. The preoccupation of many donors with ensuring that their local 
administrations have a full complement of qualified staff and with securing, at all 
costs, the manpower required to implement their projects is depriving the government 
of the capacity to effectively manage its administration.  
 
In deciding whether to poach the better qualified civil servants to run their own projects, 
donors treat government bureaucracy as a common resource pool. Where there are 
relatively few donors – each with a large share of projects adversely affected by 
deteriorating administrative capacity – the external cost of poaching may be sufficiently 
high such that an individual donor is able to influence the decision to do so. However, 
even in this case there may be principal-agent problems within a donor agency, as 
officials with primary responsibility for the success of a particular project may have an 
incentive to recruit the best possible local staff at the expense of the agency‟s broader 
country objectives.21 
 
In principle, recipient governments could act to reduce the inefficiencies associated 
with competitive donor practices. They could always refuse some aid22 in an attempt to 
reduce the donors active in the country, or, at least, those active in each sector (OECD, 
2003). In practice, principal-agent problems within the recipient country – either 
between a government with limited time horizons and its citizens, or between line 
ministries and central ministries (van de Walle, 2001; Wuyts, 1996) – often reduce 
                                                     
21
 A principal–agent problem operating in aid is a well-established critique of aid (Easterly, 2006; 
Ellerman, 2005). Examples of intra-agency aid coordination problems are given in Wuyts (1996 
p.743); Mosley and Eeckhout (2000 p.141); and Calhoun and Whittington (1988 p.301). See 
also OECD (2003).     
22
 Uganda‟s stated policy is to decline all offers of stand-alone projects (OECD, 2003 p.121).  
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state ability and interest in curtailing donor activities that have a destructive effect on 
the long-term development of the country as a whole.  
 
Moreover, for political leaders without sufficiently far-reaching time horizons, the short-
term personal benefits of corruption and patronage practices often outweigh the long-
term costs of subverting administrative capacity (van de Walle, 2001).  
 
Thus far, approaches to delivering international assistance – USAID and DFID 
approaches to aid in particular – have been reviewed, including programme 
implementers and issues related to poaching, in order to shed some light on the 
mechanisms utilised to convert aid funds into activities on the ground. The following 
four sections review the literature on fungibility, power, ownership and sustainability in 
the context of international assistance, which provide the framework for an analysis of 
aid absorption.  
 
 
3.4 Fungibility 
Increasing aid flow alone cannot achieve development. Rather, how funds are spent 
and absorbed in the recipient government/sector is more important. This prompts 
several questions. What happens to aid once it is flowing into the sector/government? 
Do targeted resources reach the intended users or is foreign aid fungible? If they do, 
then to what extent does the funding reach its target and deliver the required services? 
Under what circumstances is funding well utilised, and under what circumstances is 
funding not spent as well as planned?  
 
This section reviews the literature on international assistance in the light of fungibility. 
Most research into fungibility takes the form of macroeconomic analysis. It is usually 
discussed from the point of view of how the recipient‟s public expenditure is affected by 
aid inflow. Although this thesis does not focus on public financial behaviour, a review of 
the implications of fungibility will enable us to gain an insight into what can happen to 
aid flow within the recipient government/sector.  
 
Aid is said to be fungible (World Bank, 1998). In principle, the government can secure 
donor funding for a particular purpose by reducing its own expenditure for the same 
purpose (Foster, 2004a; Foster and Leavy, 2001). Similarly, fungibility describes the 
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degree to which resources ostensibly allocated for one purpose may free up resources 
for other purposes (Collier, 2002; DFID 2001b).  
 
For example, donor funding earmarked for primary education will not result in any 
overall increase in expenditure on the sector if the government reduces its own 
spending on primary education and uses the funds thus released for some other 
purpose.23 In other words, fungibility implies the diversion of aid to expenditure in areas 
that donors do not wish to support.  
 
Research into the question of how fungible foreign aid is has resulted in various 
answers, depending on local context (Foster, 2004a; van de Walle and Cratty, 2007), 
but much analysis finds a significant degree of fungibility (World Bank, 1998).  
 
Conventionally, it is held that fungibility is not desirable and the term is applied in the 
negative sense of encouragement of corruption and expenditure in undesirable areas 
beyond those to which the aid is limited.  
 
However, Tsukahara (1988) makes a case in favour of fungibility by establishing the 
fact that recipient governments may identify projects whose rates of return are much 
higher than those targeted or designated by the donor.  
 
Conventional treatments of fungibility (e.g. World Bank, 1998) tend to assume – 
implicitly if not explicitly – that recipients intentionally divert aid to uses other than those 
intended by the donor.  
 
Such fungibility is easily explained if donors and recipients merely have different 
preferences regarding the allocation of public funds (Takahashi, 2002b; 2002c); in 
other words, malicious intent is not a given (McGillivray and Morrissey, 2000). Put 
simply, a person or country when given resources will logically reallocate their other 
expenditure (van de Walle and Cratty, 2007; World Bank, 1998). 
 
Closely related to this point, several studies have found that government expenditure 
may rise by more than the inflow of aid without apparently causing a simultaneous 
                                                     
23
 The share of actual recurrent expenditures on basic education was 67% in 1993, and then 
gradually decreased by 10% to 57% in 1999 (Ghana Ministry of Education, 1999b appendix 
4.7).  In contrast, teacher education and technical and vocational education as well as tertiary 
education showed the opposite trend. 
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increase in total government revenue (Feyzioglu et al., 1998; Khan and Hoshino, 1992; 
McGillivray, 2000; McGillivray and Ahmed, 1999; Pack and Pack, 1993; World Bank, 
1998). This may also be the case with the expenditure categories favoured by donors.  
 
McGillivray and Morrissey (2000; 2001) explain this by pointing out that there can be a 
communication breakdown between policy officers who set plans and allocate 
expenditure based on aid inflow on the one hand, and the officers implementing the 
plans on the other. The latter in particular suffer from so-called „aid illusion‟, meaning 
that they may not appreciate budget constraints and misperceive the real or nominal 
value of the funds available to them.  
 
This may lead to higher expenditure than planned by the policy officers. As a World 
Bank report (1998) points out, miscommunication within a bureaucracy leads to the 
unintentional diversion of aid flow rather than to its intentional diversion, which the 
fungibility literature seems to implicitly assume.  
 
Fungibility does not only pertain to the macroeconomic level. Rather, it can occur in 
intermediate subsectors too (Larsen, 2003). In fact, one of the weaknesses identified in 
the traditional project approach is fungibility (World Bank, 1998); thus, sectoral 
approaches are expected to reduce this weakness.  
 
It has therefore been argued that it does not generally make good economic sense to 
devise an education programme that only addresses a particular subsector (e.g. 
primary or secondary education) (Harrold and Associates, 1995). This would entail the 
risk of inter-sectoral fungibility if the programme led to increased government 
expenditure on tertiary education, this subsector typically not being a donor priority.  
 
This example shows that fungibility cannot automatically be eliminated through the 
application of a sectoral approach. However, fungibility is linked to the question of 
ownership and objectives (Takahashi, 2002b). Thus, it is only a problem if the donor 
and recipient‟s objectives differ.  
 
However, this situation has the potential to increase corruption associated with the 
management of aid funds (Collier, 2002) even if there is no malicious intent on the part 
of the recipient. There is even evidence to suggest that in cases of low government 
ownership of reform, aid significantly increases corruption (Knack, 2001). Collier (2002) 
points out that if a donor implements a project in which the government has little real 
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interest, public officials tend to devise means of diverting the resources; and that 
widespread accomplishment in these diversionary skills gradually leads to the problem 
of wholesale corruption.  
 
Indeed, many studies find leakage of public expenditure in basic service delivery 
systems to be a result of corruption (Ades and Di Tella, 1997, 1999; Di Tella and 
Schargrodsky, 2000; Fisman and Svensson, 2000; Mauro, 1995; Svensson, 2000a; 
2000b; Treisman, 2000).24 However, form and extent differ from case to case, 
depending on national financial structures, the degree to which the state is able to 
exercise budgetary control (Campos and Pradhan, 1996), and the extent of donor 
involvement (Easterly, 2003; van de Walle, 2001; van de Walle and Johnston, 1996).  
 
Implications of Fungibility in the Education Sector  
Considering the large proportions of state budgets spent on education and the amount 
of aid funding being pumped into the sector, there is no reason to suppose that the 
education sector is exempt from issues of fungibility.  
 
A survey of public primary schools in Uganda assessed the degree of leakage of public 
funds in education (Reinikka and Svensson, 2001). The survey data reveal that from 
1991 to 1995, on average schools received only 13% of central government‟s 
allocation of non-wage expenditure for the sector. The authors found that the bulk of 
the allocated funds had been used by public officials for administration or privately 
appropriated for other purposes unrelated to education.  
 
While there are numerous examples of large-scale corruption within education 
ministries (e.g. Hallak and Poisson, 2005; Heyneman, 2004; U4 Anti Corruption 
Resource Centre, 2006). Chapman (2002) argues that the most serious consequences 
arise from the pervasive, petty corruption that permeates day-to-day transactions at 
district, school and even classroom level. Reinikka and Svensson (2001) show that 
many of the various instances of corruption at the local level can be explained in terms 
                                                     
24
 For the effects of corruption on investment and growth, see Mauro (1995). On the 
determinants of corruption, see Ades and Di Tella (1997; 1999), Svensson (2000a), and 
Treisman (2000). A common theme in this literature is the use of subjective measures of 
corruption in a nationwide setting. Fisman and Svensson (2000), Svensson (2000b), and Di 
Tella and Schargrodsky (2000) are exceptions, utilising quantitative micro-level data on 
corruption. 
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of bargaining power over resources allocation and their utilisation among central 
government officers, and between local officials and end-users (schools).  
 
A similar tracking survey of public expenditure flow from line ministries to basic service 
provision facilities – including primary and junior secondary schools – was conducted in 
Ghana (Xiao Ye and Canagarajah, 2002). However, the objective of this survey was 
modified due to an inconsistency in the recording system, the initial objective having 
been to quantify the financial flow from central government to district offices, and from 
district offices to basic education facilities.  
 
Nevertheless, in the process, the authors learnt that an accurate estimate of public 
expenditure flow was impracticable in Ghana at that time. Rather, they needed to start 
from the distribution and recording systems that would allow accurate tracking. 
Although this survey tracked public expenditure and the results cannot be extrapolated 
to determine the nature of the use of external funds as a whole, the use of resources – 
external or domestic – would seem to be a somewhat opaque subject of investigation. 
 
Higher levels of expenditure are only part of the story; and whether a larger budget 
translates into better performance in the sector under investment is perhaps a more 
important part of the story. In order to achieve the desired outcome, it is crucial to 
ensure that resources allocated to social services are distributed efficiently to public 
service provision facilities, and that these facilities reach the service users. Again, this 
process is indefinite in the context of the Ghanaian education sector.  
 
  
3.5 Power  
There is a power relationship between donor agencies and recipient countries 
(horizontal), as well power relationships between the macro, meso and micro levels 
within recipient countries (vertical). Aid is absorbed within the dynamics of these power 
relationships. Disentangling the dynamics between these power relationships, 
therefore, is essential to understanding how aid is absorbed.   
 
The purpose of this section is not to review at length the tremendously wide-ranging 
literature on power, but to establish a working definition of the power relationship 
pertinent to this thesis. The ground is well covered (Dahl, 1957; Emerson, 1962; 
Hickson et al., 1971; Krackhardt, 1990; Levine and White, 1961; Pfeffer and Salancik, 
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1978). Here, I want to draw attention to the fact that a relationship between actor A and 
actor B is not equal in the context of international development. This can be most 
acutely observed in the imbalance of power between recipient and donor (Berg, 1993; 
Girgis, 2007; Hailey et al., 2005; Hyden, 2008).  
 
The precise meaning of power is contentious. Some refer to it as the ability to get 
things done despite the will and resistance of others, or as a capacity to out-manoeuvre 
the opposition (Bierstadt, 1950; Emerson, 1962). Emerson (1962) referred to power as 
a function of dependence, whose basic premise was that as one actor becomes 
dependent upon the other, the social relationship between actors becomes unbalanced 
resulting in a situation where the dominant actor has power over the dependent actor.  
 
When this sort of relationship exists, the more powerful actor will seek to maintain the 
dependence, whereas the less powerful actor will attempt to reduce the “cost” 
(Emerson, 1962 p.34) associated with the dependence and engage in behaviours such 
as withdrawal, extending the power network, coalition forming, and status emergence 
to attempt to balance the degree of depended in the relationship (Emerson, 1962).  
 
Others (e.g. Kanter, 1979; Roberts, 1986) emphasise the positive nature of power, 
suggesting that it is the ability to mobilise resources to accomplish some end (without 
specific reference to organised opposition). Some refer to power as the ability to control 
premises of action, such that power becomes almost unobservable (Lukes, 1974).  
 
Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) prefer to ignore these distinctions, noting that, while 
academics may quibble over the definition of power, those actually experiencing the 
effects of power in the real world seem to exhibit a consensus as to who has it.   
 
The majority of research on issues of power has focused on different types or bases of 
power. French and Raven (1968) posited six bases of power: “reward, coercion, 
legitimate, expert, referent, and informational” (Raven, 1993 p.246).  
 
Jones and George (2006 p.500) describe expert power as being “based on special 
knowledge, skills, and expertise”. Referent power is identified as coming from “respect, 
admiration, and loyalty” (Jones and George, 2006 p.501), towards those often might 
have charisma (Bryman, 1992).  
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Raven (1993 p.235) identifies information power as being “based on the information or 
logical argument that the influencing agent could present to the target in order to 
implement change”.  
 
Keohane and Nye (1998 p.86) classify power into two main categories: behavioural 
power and resource power. They further sub-divide behavioural power into two types of 
power – hard power and soft power.  
 
Behavioural power is defined as the ability of X to obtain outcomes that X wants. Hard 
power is characterised by X being able to get ABC  to do what ABC would not wish to 
do (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), achieving this through threats of punishment or offers 
of reward. Soft power, on the other hand, is characterised by X being able to achieve 
its goals through what Keohane and Nye describe as attraction rather than coercion. X 
is able to do this by convincing ABC “to follow or getting them to agree to norms and 
institutions that produce the desired behaviour” (p. 86). A positive outcome would 
depend on the appeal and persuasiveness of X‟s suggestions. 
 
Resource power refers to the base, means, scope and amount of power possessed by 
an actor that could be used to facilitate the exercise of either hard or soft power. 
Analysis of an actor‟s resource power with a particular situation thus identifies all 
important facilitating or constraining factors.  
 
Keohane and Nye‟s definition is based on an assumption that the power relationship is 
asymmetrical and what X wants is different from what ABC want.  
 
Lister (2000 p.230) describes the base of power as the resources that X can use to 
influence ABC‟s behaviour; the means of power as the specific actions by which X can 
make actual use of these resources; the scope of power as the set of specific actions 
that X – by using its means of power – can get ABC to perform; and the amount of 
power as the net increase in the probability that ABC will actually perform some 
specific action due to X using its means of power. 
 
The recipient side is not a homogeneous monolithic entity. Organisations such as 
MoE/GES are composed of actors (organisational employees), and these actors are 
divided into functional subunits (Hickson et al., 1971). To varying degrees, subunits 
(e.g. various divisions of GES, DEO or schools) within an organisation are dependent 
on other subunits to execute their organisational function or purpose. Furthermore, 
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organisations are dependent upon these actors. Aid is absorbed in this myriad of power 
relationships.   
 
As to the power relation between donor and recipient, one does not get a sense of any 
real power in the hands of recipient governments in the relationship that is shaped by 
the conditions that must be met before donors will provide (Cramer et al., 2006). In fact, 
recipient governments are rarely seen or heard to impose any serious conditions on the 
donors with regard to the aid they receive (Clarke-Okha, 2003).  
 
The reason for this can partially be found in the assertion that recipients are free to 
choose as long as their choices turn out to be what the donors want or what the donors 
are urging them to do, implicitly or otherwise. Echoing this assertion is Michael Wolfers‟ 
(1974) The Black Man’s Burden Revisited, in which he states that:  
 
A fundamental weakness of aid programmes is that aid is what the rich countries want 
to give rather than what the poor countries in their own best interest would choose... 
The grand notions of the givers may well accord with the grandiose notions of the 
recipients to nobody‘s positive advantage (p. 42). 
 
The recipient [institutions] are in the position of beggars grateful for what charity they 
receive. They are not in the strongest place to challenge the ideas of the donor 
government or agency (p. 47). 
 
In her study of capacity building, which defines individual relationships can work as the 
basis for capacity building, Girgis (2007) defines three sources of power in working 
relationships between donors and their recipients : financial resources, knowledge and 
experience, and outsider status. Of these, financial resources emerge as the 
predominant factor. Indeed, the literature increasingly cites this power imbalance as 
contributing to the failure of capacity building (Hailey et al., 2005).  
 
The individual or organisation with control of the project budget – usually an expatriate, 
national NGOs and/or a Western organisation – is perceived by themselves and by 
those with whom they work as holding the balance of power in decision-making. This 
reinforces a notion of „us and them‟ – one party holding the money and the other 
without it – and the donor‟s position as an outsider.  
 
In a very comprehensive and detailed analysis of three African countries (Burkina 
Faso, Ghana and Mozambique), Buchert (2002) shows how all three adhere to the 
concepts of partnership, local ownership and support for a sector-wide approach to 
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educational issues. However, she points out that there can be no blueprint for all 
contexts, concluding that, “the level of rhetoric concerning mutual respect, 
transparency and genuine partnerships cannot eliminate underlying differences and 
structural relationships between aid providers and aid recipients” (p. 83).  
 
Power asymmetry in donor–government relations is sometimes at the root of their 
dysfunctional nature, such that any talk of the recipient‟s ownership of its own 
development process becomes meaningless as it is often not in control of the agenda 
at hand (Clarke-Okha, 2003). Emotions run high when the issue of power asymmetry 
between donors and recipient countries and its implications are discussed. Elliot 
(quoted in Lister, 2000) contends that:  
 
This is a dialogue of the unequal, and however many claims are made for transparency 
of mutuality, the reality is – and is seen to be – that the donor can do to the recipient 
what the recipient cannot do to the donor. There is an asymmetry of power that no 
amount of well-intentioned dialogue can remove (p. 229). 
 
 
3.6 Ownership  
Closely related to the imbalance of power, in the first few decades of development 
assistance, the assumption was that the donors should take the lead in designing and 
implementing programmes and projects (Morss, 1984). However, by the early 1990s, it 
was realised that the heavy hand of the donor in the planning of development 
assistance was depriving recipients of ownership over programmes (Brunetti and 
Weder, 1990; Johnson and Wasty, 1993; OECD/DAC, 1992; van de Walle and 
Johnston, 1996; Wilson and Whitmore, 1995).  
 
Despite widespread acknowledgement of recipient country ownership of development 
programmes as of critical importance to sustainable development (DAC 1996; OECD, 
1996), debate continues as to whether ownership is shared with or transferred to 
recipients in reality or is just one of the current buzzwords in the vocabulary of 
development cooperation (Cassels, 1997; Foster, 2000b; Holmgren and Soludo, 2002; 
Schacter, 2001). 
 
Critics argue that without such ownership, recipients are unlikely to make the kind of 
commitment necessary to ensure the realisation of the intended long-term results of 
donor assistance. Thus, if institutional growth for the expansion of ownership is lacking, 
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development is considered to be unsustainable (Ostrom et al., 2002a). Moreover, 
empirical studies have demonstrated the authenticity of this relationship (Catterson and 
Lindahl, 1999). Sustainability is discussed in further detail in section 3.7.   
 
The current move away from project support to programme support in some donors 
may be seen as the epitome of international recognition of the importance of ownership 
(Brown, 2001; Brown et al., 2001). Underscoring the significance of this trend, national 
ownership has been recognised as the key to developmental success (UNDP, 2003).  
 
National ownership requires strong leadership and political commitment, yet the 
concept is complex and encompasses issues connected with the way power and 
leadership are exercised (UNDP et al., 2003). However, key arguments in support of 
the sector programme are that it increases the efficiency of aid agency funding and 
shifts the responsibility for planning and prioritising to the aid-receiving government, 
thereby strengthening ownership (UK DFID Programme Delivery Guidance Team, 
2003).  
 
Thus, ownership has even been regarded as a means of achieving capacity building 
without direct external support:  
 
The process of taking responsibility for one‘s own development will lead to 
strengthening national capacities. The learning process is part of designing, planning 
and guiding the programme—tasks which the countries must assume. 
This…trend…enjoins countries to ‗learn to build by building‘ (Ndoye, 2002 p.2).  
 
It seems that there is general agreement that although ownership of development 
strategies should be emphasised, there remain questions about exactly what is 
subsumed under ownership. As Brautigma (2000 p.32) notes, the question of what 
ownership in development assistance means is not clearly answered, either by 
academia or the donor agencies.  
 
Some donor agencies do not include themselves when speaking of ownership and 
owners. Others include all those involved in and affected by an aid activity (Catterson 
and Lindahl, 1999 p.77; Singh, 2001 p.29). Nevertheless, although the advantages of 
achieving recipient ownership are readily acknowledged, where or on what level 
ownership should be strengthened is less clear.  
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USAID cautions that concentration on national ownership (central government 
ownership) alone is to overemphasise the current aid trend (USAID Brief p.1 in Riddell, 
2002 p.4; USAID, 1996 para 2.22). However, a broad view of ownership is widely 
advocated. For example, Baser (2001) emphasises that properly defined local 
ownership should include all stakeholders operating at various levels in the recipient 
country, not just its government. A DANIDA policy paper states: 
 
National ownership is central to the Sector Programme Support (SPS) approach. 
National ownership should not only be at the central government level, but also at 
other levels involved in SPS-related activities, e.g. the private sector and civil society 
(DANIDA, 1998a). 
 
Furthermore, other donors outline their specific concerns of “ensuring that non-state 
stakeholders are consulted in developing a sector strategy and that their role as service 
delivery is recognised” (DFID Brief p.3 in Riddell 2002 P.5). A publication of the Dutch 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2000) is even more explicit: 
 
Ownership does not lie exclusively with the recipient government. In addition to 
political will, sustainable public support is also required for policy implementation. 
Both policymaking and implementation must therefore involve civil society (e.g. civil-
society organisations, business, politicians, experts, universities and research 
establishments). Ownership, therefore, lies with everyone involved in a given sector. 
A sectoral approach restricted exclusively to the capital city or national government 
would offer little prospect of yielding sustainable results (p.9). 
 
The literature on ownership generally comes firmly down in favour of involving 
recipients in problem diagnosis and solution design if the likelihood of follow-through in 
implementation is to be assured, since “this principle reinforces the importance or 
resisting the tendency to determine solutions in advance and of allowing those with a 
role in the policy implementation process to develop a situation-specific approach to 
what needs to be done” (Brinkerhoff, 1996 pp.14-5). Thus, ownership in a donor–
recipient relationship is the ability of the recipient to assume leadership and control of 
the local development agenda and process through strong commitment.  
 
In an OECD report on methods in aid evaluation (1986), results are evaluated 
according to five criteria, i.e. their relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and 
sustainability. In order to achieve four of these criteria, recipient ownership is 
necessary. Only the required degree of efficiency might be met without the need for the 
recipient to acquire ownership.  
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For aid related activities to be relevant, they need to be in accordance with the 
strategies and priorities of the recipient country. Ownership is also a prerequisite. 
However, it is argued that by itself, it is not a sufficient precondition for the positive 
impact and sustainability for an aid initiative (Bandstein and Dietrichson, 2004; Molund, 
2000; Ostrom et al., 2002a).  
 
Four criteria established by Ostrom et al. (2002a) are useful in order to make the 
concept of ownership operational. They identify four functions of ownership in the 
development assistance context (p.15): (1) enunciating demand; (2) making a tangible 
contribution; (3) obtaining benefits; and (4) sharing responsibility for either the long-
term continuation or the termination of a programme. They view ownership as 
incorporating the following processes:  
 
1. Participation in provision by articulating what assets a programme requires, and 
deciding how resources should be mobilised to provide such needs.  
2. Participation in production by making tangible contributions; time, effort and 
other resources contributing to production are consumption signals that 
beneficiaries expect to derive benefits from a project.  
3. Participation in consumption of the benefits if the programme is successful, and 
in a share of responsibility if the project fails.  
4. Participation in decisions related to the surrender of the rights to a programme 
(the decision to continue or discontinue a programme once it has been initiated) 
(emphasis in original 2002a p.15).  
 
In some projects, ownership is enhanced by having beneficiaries more actively engage 
in both provision and production processes. By investing in these processes, 
beneficiaries are not simply consumers of someone else‟s largesse, but must articulate 
their own preferences and allocate their own resources. Projects that require 
beneficiary participation in provision and production activities usually involve 
considerably more time and effort on the part of the staff of the implementing agency.  
 
If a donor is wiling to fully fund a project, it is easier and less time-consuming for the 
implementing agency to design it and arrange all aspects of production. However, once 
the implementing agency has gone to the trouble of designing and producing the 
project, it becomes more of an owner than the beneficiary (Catterson and Lindahl, 
1999).  
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Ownership theory is concerned with rights and responsibilities in a legal and cultural 
sense that is more germane to the business world (Mackin, 1996). Management–
employee relations best typify the theory of rights and responsibilities, and may result 
in perceived or actual ownership.  
 
Mackin locates this dichotomy in two domains: the organisational life of a business that 
involves people issues on the one hand; and the economic life of the enterprise that 
deals with business and money issues on the other. Businesses are subject to and 
driven by competition, but as legal entitles also assume the characteristics of an 
individual in a psychological sense, and the power and the complexities of personality 
that go with them.  
 
Mackin uses the management–employee split to illustrate the actual versus the 
perceived ownership dichotomy, which is concerned with issues of risk and reward, 
and the fact that with every right comes a responsibility. For example, employees value 
having a voice and exercising influence but need to balance this with their expertise; 
not only can they get, but they must also give. In other words, since the workplace 
exists in economic time, if employees expect a bonus or a share in the profits, they 
must be ready to earn it by innovating and investing.  
 
Mackin calls this balancing of rights with responsibilities and rewards with risks 
“positive ownership,” which is explained as follows:  
 
To illustrate, the rights-only and rewards-only folks are people who tend to look at 
ownership from an individualistic or egoistic perspective. They tend to ask, ―What‘s in 
it for me?‖ On the other hand, the responsibilities-only or risk-only people tend to see 
ownership in a paternalistic way. Those with a balanced perspective on ownership 
however, look at ownership as a ―membership‖ or ―partnership‖ concept (op. cit. page 
n/a) 
 
However, he notes that there are “ownership sceptics” who are outside these 
categories and do not declare themselves to be on one side or the other, but wait to 
see “genuine evidence of how leadership and management will treat this issue before 
they decide to get into the boat and begin to row” (op. cit. page n/a).  
 
Mackin‟s analysis has some implications for donor–recipient relationships if we 
substitute management for donor and employee for recipient. In the light of this, his 
research indicates that: 
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Management is generally negative about the rights of ownership but positive about 
responsibilities; they are positive about risks but negative about rewards. Their 
message to their workers can be characterised as the following: ―Act like an owner, sit 
down and be quiet.‖ Workers, on the other hand, are often positive about the rights of 
ownership but negative about the responsibilities; they are negative about risks but 
positive about rewards. Their message to management is: ―Reward me like an owner 
but treat me like an employee (op. cit. page n/a). 
 
Ownership as a rights issue in the context of international assistance pertains to the 
rights of aid recipients to make key decisions. These key decisions include the right to 
set the agenda, allocate resources from all sources including external avenues, and 
design and implement development programmes. The question is: who has these 
rights on the recipient side? Recipient ownership, properly defined, includes the various 
actors on a recipient side, not just its government (Baser and Morgan, 2001). Efforts 
are being made by donors and governments to move in this direction but the process is 
painfully slow (Brown et al., 2001; Buchert, 2000b; Development Assistance 
Committee, 1996; Samoff, 1999).  
 
 
3.7 Sustainability 
Lastly, this section examines the sustainability of aid interventions. The sustainability of 
donor assistance has been severely criticised, which has accelerated the shift from 
project funding to programme funding (Harrold and Associates, 1995). In other words, 
the emphasis on sustainability is, in part, an offshoot of its increased focus on 
outcome-based funding; for example, outcomes are of little value if they are merely 
transient (Boyd, 1999). In fact, the lack of sustainable impact is widely seen as a key 
threat to the continued flow of international development assistance (Nkansa and 
Chapman, 2006; Picard and Garrity, 1997).  
 
The term is frequently applied but less often adequately explained. A criterion of 
success in many programmes is that the intervention should be sustainable. However, 
what is meant by sustainability in international assistance projects is often poorly 
defined (Chapman and Quijada, 2009; Nkansa and Chapman, 2006).  
 
One of the challenges to defining and assessing sustainability is the diversity of views 
about what should be sustained. Thus, it is not clear whether the goal is (1) that 
specific organisational structures established by a project (e.g. a parent teacher 
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association) remain after the funding ends; (2) that the capacity of the participants is 
enhanced, regardless of the fate of particular structures; or (3) that the overall 
economic health of the country improves due to the aggregate impact of donor 
assistance (Center of Excellence for Sustainability, 2001; Dahl, 1995; Harris, 2003; 
Picard and Garrity, 1997). Needles to say, without a clear definition, it is difficult to 
determine the extent to which the donor project has actually been successful.  
 
In the context of donor assistance, in its simplest terms, sustainability can be defined 
as “the continuation of benefits after major assistance from a donor has been 
completed” (Young and Hampshire, 2000 p.1).  
 
In other words, as the broader literature indicates, sustainability is defined in terms of 
the extent to which specific activities and structures created during the lifetime of the 
project are likely to persist beyond the provision of funding (Nkansa and Chapman, 
2006); or, likewise, it has also been defined as the ability to sustain the persistence of 
an activity or system (Dempster, 1998).  
 
In this sense, the most persuasive assessment of sustainability would emerge from 
longitudinal or retrospective analyses of what actually endured after external funding 
ended.  
 
On a cautionary note, Berman and McLaughlin (1978) emphasise that the "meaning of 
continuation" can be misleading. For example, a district may officially decide to 
continue a project, but teachers may not implement it. Or a district may decide to 
discontinue the programme, but many of the teachers may have already been 
integrated into it. In other words, the programme may leave its mark on the district in 
ways that have been overlooked.  
 
A project might have a „successful‟ outcome but no lasting effect. Alternatively, the 
World Bank (1998 p.91) notes that a project could be deemed to have failed, but its 
efforts still lead to substantial institutional development. The Bank emphasises that the 
innovative approach may not work, but if it is systematically evaluated and the 
knowledge is fed into a broader reform programme, the project helps to improve the 
management of the sector:  
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Innovations may fail, but development assistance is strengthening the underlying 
institutions by assisting in the design and evaluation of new approaches and generation 
of knowledge (World Bank, 1998 p.91).  
 
Berman and McLaughlin (1978) find that projects that have not been implemented 
effectively are not sustained (as would be expected), but they also find that only a 
minority of those that are well implemented continue beyond the period of funding. 
Moreover, the reasons for termination are basically the same ones that influence 
implementation, except that their role becomes more sharply defined (Fullan, 2007 
pp.88-90).  
 
Such factors may comprise any or all of the following: effective leadership; interest; 
funds (or fundraising ability); the development of and support for staff and teachers 
(Fullan, 2007); management capacity; a sense of ownership (Chapman and Quijada, 
2009); consistency with local values; and compatibility with local needs and resources 
(Rogers, 2003).  
 
Huberman and Miles (1984) stress that the continuation or institutionalisation of 
innovations depends on whether or not the changes become built into the structure 
(through policy, budget, timetable, etc.).   
 
Yin et al. (1977 p.16) caution that district assistance from external agencies may be 
helpful for initial implementation; but when it comes to institutionalisation, the larger the 
external resource support, the less likely the effort will be continued after external funds 
are withdrawn, because the recipient will not be able to afford to incorporate the costs 
into its regular budget. Their point implies that assistance to district (local) level may 
not be sustained in the future unless central government takes over and continues to 
make efforts to institutionalise innovations.    
 
Sustainability is a continual process in implementation. The maintenance of support to 
administrative staff and teachers is crucial. In fact, one of the most powerful factors 
known to adversely affect sustainability is staff and administrative turnover (Berman 
and McLaughlin, 1978; Huberman and Miles, 1984). Nevertheless, very few 
programmes plan for the orientation of and in-service support for new members who 
arrive after the programme commences (Fullan, 2007). This factor should be taken into 
consideration from the beginning and continually revised. 
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3.8 Conclusion 
ODA for education usually starts as money which is intended to support education 
activities and institutions. But money by itself does not improve education. To be 
useful, these funds have to be converted into activities and materials, for example, 
textbooks, learning aids, in-service training, data systems, etc. Thus, an important role 
of donor agencies and recipient governments is to convert the inputs purchased 
through funding into educational processes and products that can lead to the intended 
outcomes. However, the different possible aid delivery mechanisms mean both donors 
and recipient governments are faced with a dilemma: which implementation 
mechanisms can best transform funds into the desired development outcomes, and 
eventually lead to sustainable development?  
 
This study is concerned with an investigation into the manner in which external funds 
are absorbed into the recipient sector to determine whether the claims made by each 
aid approach (i.e. project assistance and programme assistance) were realised.  
 
Figure 3-3 depicts the conceptual framework of the study. The literature review on the 
concepts and issues of implementers, fungibility, power and ownership shows that aid 
funds are absorbed within the dynamic context of the recipient government/sector 
where myriad factors affect how funds are absorbed. These factors are interwoven and 
intricate and link to the fundamental question concerning international assistance: how 
can development efforts be sustained? Programme assistance delivers external funds 
to a government agency while project assistance delivers funds to the targeted end 
users via a contracted implementing agency. The various factors affecting how aid 
funds are absorbed under the different aid mechanisms and how this leads to the 
sustainability of development efforts were investigated.  
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Figure 3-3 Conceptual framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the author.  
 
Although there seems to be a trend in a number of related fields regarding the socio-
cultural and economic contexts of international assistance, donors and writers on the 
subject of aid have remained at best slightly – and sometimes, signally – ignorant of 
what happens to external funds once they are transferred to the recipient country‟s 
government or a specific sector, like health, or in this case, education. It is amazing 
that in spite of the billions of dollars spent annually on programmes, so little research 
has been carried out into what actually goes on during the fund absorption process.  
 
Evaluations of donor-related projects usually reveal a one-sided view. This is invariably 
the official one put forward to the evaluation team primarily by resident expatriate 
personnel and senior national government officials, both of whom have a vested 
interest in portraying the project in a rosy light so as to assure further funding.  
 
The voices of the local staff (as opposed to senior government officials) who are largely 
responsible for implementing the project are rarely heard, let alone the voices of those 
actually working in schools. Such an analysis may, therefore, deal with only part of the 
complex chain of input to outcome, and not necessarily with the most important part of 
this chain.  
 
This is especially important because different approaches are advocated and adopted 
by different aid agencies without them having adequately explored or paid sufficient 
Programme 
assistance  
 
Project 
assistance 
 Sustainability of 
 organisational 
structures 
 organisational 
capacity 
 individual capacity 
 continuation of 
benefits 
 
Recipient sector 
Donor 
Implementing 
agent 
Government 
agency 
headquarters 
End users 
Factors affecting aid absorption 
 Monetary fungibility, transparency, accountability, corruption, 
management capacity 
 Implementing agent, poaching 
 Power relationships (between donor and recipient, within the system, 
resources power, behaviour power, hard, soft, actual, and perceived) 
 Ownership, right, responsibility, benefits, demand, contribution 
Outcomes 
Donor 
61 
 
attention to how aid funds are absorbed. There still seems to be limited literature that 
addresses the ways in which aid approach processes work or how aid support are 
perceived by local educational actors. Again, this is an area that has not been 
adequately explored in Ghana. 
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Chapter 4 Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter delineates my research methodology in terms of its orientation 
(interpretive), approach (phenomenological), strategy (case study), data collection 
methods (interviews and documents), and the process of data analysis. Designing a 
study involves the amalgamation of theoretical paradigms with strategies of inquiry, 
and translating the latter into specific approaches and methods for the collection and 
analysis of empirical material (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  
 
In essence, all these processes are governed by the research purpose (research 
questions), and the ontological and epistemological stance (research orientation) the 
researcher takes. As Guba and Lincoln (1994) argue, issues in social science must 
ultimately be engaged on a universal level: “questions of methods are secondary to 
questions of paradigm, which we define as the basic belief system or worldview that 
guides the investigator; not only in choices of method but in ontologically and 
epistemologically fundamental ways” (ibid p.105).  
 
Therefore, this chapter begins with a discussion of the research paradigm that led to 
the epistemological and ontological position at the philosophical core of my study. This 
is followed by a description of the strategies of the study, with reference to the research 
questions. Details of the methods of data collection during the fieldwork – including the 
selection of districts and schools for the case study – are explained in the fourth 
section. The fifth section describes data analysis methods. Concurrent issues of validity 
and reliability are clarified in the following section, and practical and ethical issues are 
discussed in the seventh section. The final section discusses the methodological 
limitations of this study.  
 
 
4.2 Orientation of the Research 
4.2.1  Research Orientation  
Basic beliefs about the nature of reality, and objectivity and subjectivity have significant 
implications for the authenticity and legitimacy of the study. Historically, social inquiry 
first adopted the methods used in the natural sciences, which are based on a belief in 
the existence of universal laws and objectively verifiable truth.  
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At the beginning of the 20th century, some researchers – notably Dilthey – contested 
such an application of natural science to the social sciences, which led to the 
emergence of new directions in social inquiry (Smith, 1984; Thines, 1972). These 
authors contend that reality is socially constructed; thus, the task of the social sciences 
is to comprehend the context-specific meanings of the people under study. These 
epistemological schools of thought are sometimes called 'paradigms', and they govern 
the way inquiry is conducted (Kuhn, 1996).  
 
Epistemology grounded in the natural sciences belongs to the school of positivism; 
while the study of concepts, which presumes the subjectivity of reality, is termed the 
„interpretive paradigm‟. Research within the positivistic paradigm aims to determine 
rules through measurement; thus, it is primarily quantitative. Conversely, research 
within the interpretive paradigm is concerned with process and meaning, the 
investigation of which usually takes a qualitative approach.  
 
Qualitative research enables the researcher to act as a human instrument of data 
collection; and, by the act of observation, to describe and interpret conditions as they 
are, paying attention to the structural or behavioural characteristics peculiar to an 
individual, group or organisation. The interpretive nature of qualitative research is 
especially well suited to the discovery of the meaning events hold for individuals or 
organisations that experience them, and the researcher‟s own interpretations of such 
meanings (Bogdan and Biklen, 1992; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Eisner and Peshkin, 
1991; Lincoln and Guba, 1985; Patton, 1990). 
 
I locate the present study within the interpretive paradigm. This is because it aims to 
reveal phenomena concerned with the education actor‟s experience of foreign 
assistance from “that person‟s point of view” (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975 p.14). My 
interest lies with such actors‟ own understanding of aid absorption, a perception I 
assume is subjectively constructed through individual experience within a specific 
context – in this case, the Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) 
programme. Thus, my study shares the tenet of the interpretive paradigm, in which “the 
important reality is what people perceive it to be” (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984 p.2) and its 
aim is to “understand the subjective world of human experience” (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979 p.253) that is constructed within a specific context.  
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The choice of the research approach was determined mainly by the purpose of the 
study, i.e. the research aim and the situation in which the inquiry was to be made 
(Bryman, 2001; Cohen et al., 2000; Creswell, 1998; Patton, 1990). Therefore, before 
proceeding to discuss the research approach, I present my research questions at this 
point.  
 
4.2.2  Research Questions 
The overall research question was: 
What are Ghanaian education actors‟ perceptions of international financial assistance 
to basic education in Ghana?   
 
The answer to the above question was sought in the contexts of the Whole School 
Development (WSD) and Quality Improvement in Primary Schools (QUIPS) 
programmes, the study being guided by the following five specific questions: 
 
Q1 What are the differences in approach to the use of external funds in theory 
and in practice between WSD and QUIPS?    
 
Q2 How do education actors perceive the contribution of WSD and QUIPS 
respectively, and what accounts for their perceptions?   
 
Q3 What do they consider to be the constraints to the efficient use of external 
resources (in enhancing the quality of education)?   
 
Q4 How do they perceive the efficiency of WSD and QUIPS respectively, and 
what factors explain differences in perception between the two 
programmes?  
 
Q5 What are the implications of the findings of this study for an approach to 
education development in terms of making the most of the available 
external funds?  
 
In order to answer these questions, the study sought Ghanaian education actors‟ own 
views. Question 1 refers to mechanisms for the delivery of aid funding under WSD and 
QUIPS, concentrating on the divergence between how it was planned to work in theory 
and how it worked in practice. Question 2 looks at the actors‟ perceived contributions of 
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WSD and QUIPS, while views on the efficiency of the two programmes are sought in 
question 3. Question 4 aims to explore the perceived obstacles to the use of external 
funds. Question 5 will be answered by an analysis of questions 1–4.  
 
4.2.3  Research Methodology 
The aim of this study was to investigate stakeholders‟ perceptions. The focus was on 
respective actors‟ unique conceptualisation of aid absorptiveness, which was 
presumably informed by their own experiences of working on WSD and/or QUIPS.  
 
Such an investigation is related to how the world is experienced and subjective reality 
is constructed, seeking answers from actors‟ own points of view. This focus on actors‟ 
interpretation and emphasis on their understanding of phenomena in a context-specific 
setting is best approached by a phenomenological inquiry.  
 
Phenomenology aims to reveal the essential meaning of an individual‟s experience 
from “that person‟s point of view” (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975 p.14; Ray, 1994 p.122). 
Such meaning is viewed as product of his or her interpretation of the world, which is the 
result of the assimilation of “a stock of knowledge composed of common-sense 
constructs and categories that are social in origin” (Holstein and Gubrium, 1998 p.139).  
 
Thus, the role of the study is to grasp this stock of knowledge by focusing on how 
people make sense of their everyday lives, while setting aside authorial preconceptions 
about the world (Bryman, 2001; Creswell, 1998; Holstein and Gubrium, 1998).  
 
Language acts as the central medium in this process of interpretation and explanation 
of human action and thought through descriptions of the fundamental structures of the 
reality (Schutz and Luckmann, 1974). Moreover, language becomes “the middle 
ground in which understanding and agreement concerning the objective takes place 
between two people” (Gadamer, 1975 p.345). Phenomenological research thus 
depends on narrative (conversation) (Morse, 1994; Ray, 1994).  
 
However, such a method was incompatible with my research setting; an approach that 
was sensitive to language would have been problematic because the language 
difference between respondent and researcher was significant. English – which is not 
my mother tongue – was used for gathering information; and for the people with whom 
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I worked, English was probably a second or third language, although most of them had 
a very fine command of it.  
 
As will be explained shortly, this study involves multiple sources of data and a large 
number of informants, partly in order to mitigate any ambiguity caused by the language 
barrier. Nevertheless, the orientation of the study is phenomenological, by which I 
mean it aims to view things from the actor‟s perspective. An awareness of the problem, 
however, has contributed to a sharpening of the reflexivity of the study.  
 
 
4.3 Research Design 
My research aimed to explore Ghanaian education actors‟ perceptions of financial 
assistance to basic education within the context of Ghana‟s FCUBE programme. To do 
this, I selected two programmes: WSD and QUIPS. This section describes how I set up 
the study for a multilevel analysis of WSD and QUIPS, starting with an explanation of 
why these two programmes were chosen for detailed study from the various donor-
founded FCUBE projects. This is followed by a description of the case study method. 
  
4.3.1 Selecting the Cases 
As described in the previous chapter, the FCUBE programme was launched in 
response to an increasing need for sector coordination. Although the initiative was 
originally considered to be one of the most successful examples of the sector-wide 
approach, it was subsequently generally recognised that neither the Ghanaian 
government nor its donor partners had fully succeeded in achieving the objectives of 
the programme (van Donge et al., 2002). In other words, although the major donors 
had designed projects that fitted into the FCUBE framework and all their aid activities 
were theoretically embedded in the programme, conflicting approaches to the 
achievement of FCUBE objectives were concurrently implemented.  
 
Figure 4-1 represents a conceptualisation of selected projects designed to facilitate 
FCUBE, together with the respective agencies in charge of implementation. The UK‟s 
Department for International Development (DFID) released funds under the Education 
Sector Support Programme (ESSP) to the Ghana Education Service (GES) to 
implement WSD, while other donor agencies agreed to work in particular areas and 
concentrate on individual projects.  
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Figure 4-1 A breakdown of donor-funded programmes implemented under the FCUBE 
programme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Note: see the list of acronyms on page xii for full names of organisations and projects. 
Source: the author. 
 
While DFID applied its funding on a subsector-wide basis, the other organisations 
adopted project-type initiatives. Thus, WSD was justly chosen for this study. For the 
purposes of a comparison with DFID, JICA was naturally considered to be a 
reasonable choice, given that the motive behind this study was to make a contribution 
to the question of aid effectiveness, especially of Japanese aid to Africa.  
 
Nevertheless, I eventually decided against such a comparison. One of the reasons was 
the different project phases WSD and the Science, Technology and Mathematics 
(STM) project supported by JICA were in at the time of my fieldwork: while ESSP –
under which WSD was implemented – had been completed, STM was still in progress. 
As the objective of this study was to explore education actors‟ realities through their 
own accounts, I was not certain how this temporal gap would affect their perceptions 
and, I thought it might be unfair to compare a completed programme with an ongoing 
one.  
 
Another reason was that I doubted that the JICA Ghana office would be willing to share 
information with an external student researcher, especially those details that concerned 
an ongoing programme. This was not because I was a complete outsider as far as 
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JICA was concerned; on the contrary, my concern was rooted in the very fact that I had 
had a glimpse that the organisation was not always open to constructive criticism.25  
 
Moreover, I was also concerned that my previous relationship with JICA would 
inevitably plunge me into the micro politics of the Ghana office. Although this might 
have been an interesting area to explore, I did not wish to expend my energy on 
matters other than data collection during the fieldwork. Thus, for all the above reasons, 
I chose not to include JICA in my study.  
 
In considering a project for comparison with WSD, QUIPS seemed the most relevant in 
terms of its scale and comprehensive approach to the improvement of education. 
Moreover, the fact that both DFID and USAID were bilateral donor agencies was 
another reason for selecting QUIPS.  
 
Thus, WSD and QUIPS were chosen as case studies for my exploration of the views of 
education actors on aid absorption because they exemplified different approaches to 
education development. I intended to investigate WSD and QUIPS separately before 
making a comparison. Therefore, I designed my programme of research as a multiple-
case study of international assistance to education. The reasons for this are explained 
more fully in the next section.  
 
4.3.2 The Case Study 
The definition of „case study‟ is contentious. Indeed, “while the literature is replete with 
reference to case studies and with examples of case study reports, there seems to be 
little agreement about what a case study is” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985 p.360). In other 
words, “every social scientific study is a case study or can be conceived as a case 
study, often from a variety of viewpoints, and at a minimum, every study is a case 
study” (Ragin, 1992a p.2).  
 
This is probably because a case study is an analysis of social phenomena specific to 
time and place (Ragin, 1992a). Social inquiry in general is conducted within a 
conceptually, geographically or temporally defined framework, and therefore in one 
sense all social research can be regarded as case study (Cronbach, 1982). Clearly the 
                                                     
25
 In fact, when I paid a visit to the JICA Ghana office, the then country representative told me 
that he had recently declined two requests from students at UK universities for permission to 
conduct studies of JICA projects.  
69 
 
term „case study‟ has a range of meanings (Bassey, 1999 p.27); nevertheless, the case 
study has some distinctive features and procedures to follow.   
 
Yin states that the case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context; especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (1994 p.13).  
 
Yin‟s emphasis on contemporaneousness is in accordance with the view of Adelman et 
al., who argue that the case study is “the study of an instance in action” (1980 p.49). 
Perhaps because of this contemporaneousness, the method of inquiry the case study 
most readily lends itself to is observation (Cohen et al., 2000). However, it is not limited 
to observation. In fact, different writers suggest the potential of using multiple data 
collection methods and a variety of sources of data as one of the strengths of the case 
study approach (Merriam, 1988; Stake, 1995; Sturman, 1994; Yin, 1994).  
 
This suggestion was useful to my research design, as my study sought to learn the 
views of individual actors about events that had taken place in the past. Consequently, 
it would not have been appropriate to make observation my main data collection 
method.  
 
For this reason, I sought various data sources in order to portray what it was like to be 
in a particular situation or capture reality at close quarters, by means of a „thick 
description‟ (Geertz, 1973; Stake, 1994 p.242) of the actors‟ actual experiences of, 
thoughts about and feelings for a situation. Looking at a phenomenon, education issue, 
or „instance‟ from different angles relates to the triangulation technique, which is 
described in more detail later in this chapter.  
 
Another feature of the case study is that it allows “interpretation in context” (Cronbach, 
1975 cited in Merriam, 1988 p.10), which refers to the notion that data collection from 
and interpretation of a case both involve investigation of context; the case may be 
context-specific and holistic yet still lend itself to rigorous interpretation. By focusing on 
a particular „case‟, one may study a phenomenon or series of issues in depth.  
 
The case study recognises the complexity and „embeddedness‟ of social truths. By 
carefully attending to social situations, the case study can reveal something of the 
discrepancy or conflict between viewpoints held by the participants (Cohen et al., 2000 
p.184). Therefore, it is important for events and situations to be allowed to speak for 
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themselves rather than simply to be interpreted, evaluated or judged by the researcher 
(Cohen et al., 2000 p.182). Moreover, the choice of case and the unit of analysis affect 
the outcome of the study.  
 
Defining „a case‟ is problematic. This is largely because a case can be any one (or a 
combination) of a phenomenon, a country, a group or an individual (Yin, 1994), and, 
therefore, the term „case‟ is used in many different ways. Definition also depends on 
the conceptualisation of the case. For example, cases can be regarded as empirically 
observable units or they can be conceived as theoretically constructed products (Ragin 
and Becker, 1992). The answers to the question “what is a case” are indeed diverse 
(Ragin, 1992b p.217; Ragin and Becker, 1992). Nevertheless, what this question 
actually asks is “what is this a case of” (Ragin, 1992a p.6) or, alternatively, “what it is 
you want to be able to say something about at the end of the study” (Patton, 1990 
p.229).  
 
Accordingly, my overarching case, which I wished to explore and be able to draw some 
conclusions about at the end of the study, is international assistance to education 
development. Considering a country to be an appropriate delimitation of a case, I 
chose Ghana as a context because of its unique experience of foreign aid. I chose the 
perceptions of Ghanaian education personnel because their views are not heard 
enough. I chose the QUIPS and WSD programmes for their marked differences from 
each other.  
 
A case comprises subcases that exist at different levels. Ultimately, WSD and QUIPS 
were cases of international assistance to education development, and, as such, 
consisted of several elements, such as context and components (Merriam, 1988 p.46; 
Yin, 1994 pp.21-5). At a more practical level, a decision had to be made about “what 
groups to observe…[and] when to observe them” (Burgess 1982 cited in Merriam, 1988 
p.47). In other words, it was necessary to select some research sites. Thus, my units of 
analysis are described in the next section. 
 
4.3.3  Units of Analysis and Multilevel Analysis 
This thesis documents a case study of international assistance to education 
development. I explored the QUIPS and WSD programmes in order to illuminate the 
subject of aid absorption in the education sector. My strategy was the use of embedded 
multiple-case designs with various units of analysis at different levels.  
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By adopting multilevel analysis, researchers are expected to provide a more 
comprehensive and balanced picture of education phenomena (Bray and Thomas, 
1995). Thus, in exploring the perceptions of education actors, the study basically 
conducted its analysis on three planes, whereby the macro level concerns the country 
as a whole, the meso level the district, and the micro level the school.  
 
On the macro level, the study addressed the Ministry of Education (MoE) and the GES 
national headquarters. With regard to the meso and micro levels, due to the extensive 
time requirement for a rigorous case study at district and school levels, two districts 
only were selected. In each district, six schools were chosen with which to conduct in-
depth interviews (selection procedures are discussed in detail in sections 4.4.3 and 
4.4.4). My case study is summarised in table 4-2 below.  
 
Table 4-1 Research design of case study  
Purpose  To explore education actors‟ perceptions of international assistance 
First level of Case International assistance to education development  
Second level of Case WSD and QUIPS  
Level of analysis Macro/national Meso/district Micro/school 
Site 
MoE and GES 
headquarters 
Twifu Henmang, Lower 
Denkyira District 
6 primary schools  
Upper Denkyira District  6 primary schools 
Actors HQ officials District education officials 
Head teachers 
Teachers  
SMC* 
* SMC = school management committee. 
Source: the author. 
 
As illustrated in the table, the purpose of this study was to explore perceptions of 
international assistance. Two divergent cases – WSD and QUIPS – were analysed in 
order to attempt to draw some conclusions around the themes of aid absorption, and to 
conduct a cross-case analysis of perceptions of international assistance.  
 
The WSD and QUIPS cases were each individually investigated before analysing their 
combined implications. This was conducted from the viewpoint of Ghanaian actors on 
three levels, the voices of whom were represented through personal experience of 
working on the FCUBE programme. Exploring the themes through firsthand accounts 
was invaluable, since their views were not only formed by their own experiences of 
donor-funded programmes, but they also behaved and reacted according to their own 
subjective understanding of reality. 
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As it explores perceptions, I consider the present study to be an intrinsic case study 
that may be classified within Stake‟s typology (1995; 2000). According to Stake (2000 
p.439), with an intrinsic case study, the researcher does not avoid generalisation; i.e. 
he or she extrapolates the findings and draws parallels between potential 
developments in his or her case in the future and other situations.   
 
Moreover, this type of research is naturalistic, its objective is to generate information 
and the intention is to provide a wealth of detail such that the uniqueness and 
individuality of each case can be represented. However, it may still be appropriate to 
extend an extrapolation of findings to other districts in the same region or even to other 
countries (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, pp.201-2).  
 
I assumed that the specific context would strongly influence the implementation of 
programmes and consequently the result of the study. Having said this, as both USAID 
and DFID work in many regions of the world, I also expected the outcomes of Ghana‟s 
experience to cut across other sites and other countries. For this reason, I hope that 
this study has been able to draw lessons, implications and insights from approaches to 
aid that are also relevant to other national contexts.   
 
Having laid out the theoretical framework of this study, the following section outlines my 
research methods.  
 
 
4.4 Research Methods  
The fieldwork was conducted from June 2005 to January 2006. A pilot was carried out 
in Greater Accra Region in July 2005; and the main data collection was conducted 
during the following October and November in two districts in Central Region, where a 
total of 12 primary schools were visited. This section describes the data collection 
processes. 
 
4.4.1  Preliminary Pilot Phase 
The pilot was conducted in Akwapeam South district, Greater Accra Region, to which I 
could commute from Accra every day. A couple of weeks beforehand, I made a 
preliminary visit to the District Education Office (DEO) to obtain permission from the 
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director and introduce myself to the district education authorities as a courtesy before   
conducting my research in their district.  
 
Initially, I had intended to send a letter of introduction written by the director general to 
the district director, but GES HQ officials had warned me that a letter might not arrive at 
the DEO at all, or if it did, it could take two to three months; or else the director might 
just put the letter aside even if it arrived in time. Therefore, they suggested that I deliver 
the letter myself. A former WSD zonal coordinator accompanied me on this preliminary 
visit.  
 
Having obtained permission to conduct my study from the director, a DEO official took 
us around the schools I wished to visit and introduced me to the head teachers. This 
preliminary visit was very useful because, in addition to serving the initial purpose, it 
helped me lessen my anxiety about collecting data in an unfamiliar location. Moreover, 
seeing the WSD zonal coordinator who accompanied me behaving and talking in this 
particular social and education setting reminded me of the local protocols I should bear 
in mind.  
 
I spent the first couple of days conducting interviews at the DEO and District Assembly 
(DA).26 I then allocated two days for each school, spending the first day interviewing 
teachers and the second day meeting SMC (school management committee) 
representatives. After this, I continued conducting interviews with district education 
officials.  
 
I visited three schools during the pilot phase. They were former QUIPS pilot schools 
(2002–04) as well as being supported by WSD. When WSD started in 1998, 20 schools 
in each district were chosen as pilot schools; and then gradually over the years, all 
primary schools throughout the country had been incorporated into the WSD 
programme. Therefore, in theory, all QUIPS schools also fell under the WSD 
programme.  
 
I had therefore assumed that the head teachers, teachers and SMC representatives 
could share their experiences of both WSD and QUIPS with me. However, this 
                                                     
26
 The District Assembly was formerly called the District Council. Indeed, the terms „council‟ and 
„assembly‟ were generally used interchangeably. In this thesis, „District Assembly‟ is principally 
used other than in direct quotations.  
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assumption did not turn out to reflect the reality. My interviewees all readily talked 
about their QUIPS experiences, but they had little to say about WSD. In fact, none of 
the SMC members had ever heard of WSD, and of the 12 teachers interviewed, only 
two were familiar with the programme, having been transferred from WSD initial pilot 
schools.  
 
One of the three head teachers knew nothing of WSD at all, while the other two said 
that they had once received an imprest (GBP 20) in order to organise school based in-
service training as a part of a WSD initiative; but they did not have anything particular 
to tell me about that. This was all the information I got about WSD from the school 
visits. It seemed that the QUIPS experience was so intense that it had eclipsed their 
memories of WSD (if there had been any in the first place).  
 
I realised that things might have been different if I had visited the initial WSD pilot 
schools. My original plan had been to collect information on both WSD and QUIPS by 
visiting QUIPS pilot schools, which automatically fell under the WSD programme as 
well. However, I realised that I would not obtain a balanced impression if I attempted to 
make a comparison between the two programmes by only visiting the QUIPS pilot 
schools. Thus, I decided to include the initial WSD pilot schools.  
 
4.4.2  Sampling  
This section explains the sampling selection: how case study districts were chosen and 
how a sample was drawn based on the findings of the preliminary pilot study.   
 
4.4.2.1  Selection of Districts 
The current education administrative structure consisted of the central GES, 10 
Regional Education Offices (REOs) and 138 DEOs. Under the decentralisation policy, 
the role of the REO was limited to a monitoring capacity, while the DEO was the key 
implementation unit and the main link between the central GES and the schools. 
Accordingly, the education budget was drawn up and spent by the DEO. For this 
reason, I considered the district to be a suitable basis. Two districts were selected 
according to a number of criteria. 
 
GES district capacity rating criteria 
First, I referred to the GES district rating assessment, which classified all 138 districts 
into three categories – „ready‟, „partially ready‟ and „non-ready – based on the financial 
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and administrative capacity of the district, This system had been introduced by the 
WSD programme. According to the rating, funds for „ready‟ districts were released 
directly to the DEO from the GES financial controller; while funds for „partially ready‟ 
and „non-ready‟ districts were released through their REOs.  
 
I selected districts from the above different rating categories. This tended not to confine 
data to a particular type of district and would enable me to gain a wider impression of 
how variations in administrative capacity and different procedures could affect 
programme implementation, and vice versa.  
  
Active involvement in education activities 
The second criterion was that a minimum number of Ghanaian officials had to be 
actively involved in education activities. The district in which there were very few 
education activities taking place could also be very intriguing to study; but obviously, 
the greater the number of individuals involved and the more raw data available, the 
more convincing the picture of education actors‟ views of aid and its absorption would 
be.  
 
Geographical accessibility and mobility 
Thirdly, the geographical accessibility of Accra from each case study district and the 
probability of adequate public transport within the district were taken into consideration. 
QUIPS project personnel used four-wheel drive vehicles to travel from school to school. 
However, if all three QUIPS schools had been in very isolated locations, I would have 
had difficulty in getting around. The nature of this study did not suit a prolonged stay in 
any single environment, and thus the accessibility by road to the site – ideally by public 
transport – was taken into account.  
 
QUIPS cohort 
The first cohort of the QUIPS programme was launched in 1998 and the last one 
(cohort 6) concluded its work in 2004 (Academy for Educational Development, n/a). A 
QUIPS team worked exclusively with three pilot schools per district for two years and 
then moved on to other districts. Of the six cohorts, it seemed sensible to concentrate 
on the latter ones because of the vividness of the experience and the high possibility of 
the presence of the staff who had experienced QUIPS in the DEO and schools.  
 
Although it would have been very interesting to listen to actors‟ talking about a project 
several years after its completion, there would have been a risk of failing to get 
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sufficient information due to the high turnover of staff. I also considered selecting 
cohorts from different districts. As sampling for variability in year of project inception 
provides a test of the process of change (Miles and Huberman, 1994), this would 
hopefully give me a more comprehensive impression of how complex programmes and 
practices were implemented and how they varied under varying conditions and the 
different school timetables according to district.  
 
QUIPS final evaluation sample districts 
The final evaluation of the QUIPS programme had taken place just before my arrival in 
Ghana. For the purposes of this, six districts were selected as samples: two in the 
South, two in the Middle  and two in the North. USAID kindly agreed to show me the 
raw data they had gathered as a basis of the evaluation. Although the QUIPS 
evaluation team had looked at the issues from different angles to those of my study, I 
judged that their rich data would be most useful for the deepening of my analysis. For 
this reason, the QUIPS evaluation sampling districts were taken seriously into 
consideration.  
 
Ease of access to staff 
As Spradley (1980) emphasises,  the need to select for the degree of access that 
potential informants provide, I considered ease of access to staff to be a crucial factor 
in selecting my case districts. After having identified the districts I thought would be 
potentially suitable for a detailed study, I was ready to conduct my initial interviews.  
 
I had decided that I might not be able to proceed if I met with aversion to my research 
at DEO director level, or if various impediments prevented me from conducting further 
interviews. Nevertheless, due to logistical difficulties, I was unable to enquire into the 
degree of amenability at the DEO in advance.  
 
In truth, my Ghanaian colleagues – even the director general – suggested that I go 
straight to the DEO and start gathering data immediately. GES HQ officials were 
confident that the DEO would welcome me without my having informed the director of 
my arrival in advance because of the letter of introduction I had obtained from the 
director general and other HQ authorities.  
 
The GES staff also told me that if the director was not happy with my presence, I 
should suspect that they had something to hide at the DEO. In the end, I took the risk 
of acting on their suggestions. I made one last check that the district directors were not 
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having a meeting at GES HQ at the time of my proposed fieldwork, and set off to 
conduct my district data collection.  
 
As a result, one of the district education directors was very cooperative, regarding my 
presence as an opportunity to have a foreigner see the efforts of his office to improve 
the state of education in the district. Consequently, all the staff were very helpful and 
the atmosphere was very welcoming.  
 
On the other hand, my experience at the second DEO turned out to be somewhat 
problematic. The Director was initially suspicious of my motives for collecting data in 
her district, and seemed to suspect me of having a hidden agenda assigned by GES 
HQ. Therefore, I had to spend a lot of time explaining my study and forming a 
relationship with the Director.  
 
However, all her staff – including the assistant directors and the chief account – were 
very cooperative from the very beginning and eager to talk about what was going on in 
the DEO. Nevertheless, there was an unmistakable tension in the office. Although the 
director‟s scrutinising gaze made me uneasy at first, I did not consider this to be an 
obstacle, but rather a rare chance to enrich the study (there is a detailed account of my 
interactions in the office in chapter 6).  
 
Having considered all these criteria in close consultation with GES officials – 
particularly in the Basic Education Division and the Teacher Education Division – I 
chose Twifu Henmang Lower Denkyira district (hereafter, Lower Denkyira for short) 
and Upper Denkyira district, in Central Region, as districts to study. A summary of the 
two districts is shown in table 4-3. 
 
Table 4-2 State of case study districts 
District Location GES Rating* QUIPS Cohort 
Twifu Henmang Lower Denkyira Central Region 
4 hours‟ drive from Accra 
Partially ready Cohort 4 
2000–2002 
Upper Denkyira Central Region 
7 hours‟ drive from Accra 
Non-ready Cohort 6 
2002–2004 
* District rating as of October 2005.  
 
4.4.2.2  Selection of Schools 
It is ultimately schools that education services are delivered to. Thus, a total of 12 (6 
QUIPS and 6 WSD) schools from the 2 districts were selected for in-depth interviews. I 
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utilised a combination of convenience sampling and purposive sampling – a form of 
non-probability sampling, by which the researcher chooses “information-rich cases for 
study in depth” (Patton, 2002 p.230). Indeed, what matters most is not 
representativeness but the particularity of the sample from which the researcher can 
learn most.  
 
The selection of QUIPS schools was straightforward, as all of its pilot schools were to 
be included in the study. The WSD schools were handpicked based on the following 
factors:  
 Among the 20 initial WSD pilot schools  
 Presence of the head teacher (i.e. the same head teacher in post since the 
introduction of WSD) 
 Geographical location (i.e. urban/rural, distance from DEO, access from 
main road, and availability/non-availability of public transport) 
 
The number of schools that fulfilled the first two criteria was surprisingly limited. Before 
considering the location, the number was already narrowed down to between three and 
five schools, mostly in towns, which were preferable to teachers.  
 
In order to grasp the wider picture of the state of WSD schools in both rural and urban 
location, I also had to consider the WSD pilot schools with relatively newly appointed 
head teachers and/or non-initial pilot schools. District officials – especially the head 
teachers‟ advisor, the deputy director (supervision) and the circuit supervisors – helped 
in the selection process by providing key information and giving their views on school 
performance. In fact, I relied heavily on them in making the selection, as there were no 
systematic school records of, for example, when a current head teacher had taken up 
his or her posting.  
 
Once the schools had been selected, I contacted the head teachers to arrange to visit 
them. In Lower Denkyira district, I managed to personally meet all the head teachers 
before the schools visits, either at the DEO or during my preliminary visits to their 
schools. In Upper Denkyira district, I was able to meet those attending a three-day 
district in-service training course for science and mathematics teachers, and I sent 
messages to their head teachers with them.  
 
Although some officials had suggested that I simply go to a school and start 
interviewing the teachers without informing them of my arrival in advance so that I 
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could see what was really going on, I insisted on contacting the head teachers 
beforehand. This was because I was aware from previous experience that the head 
teacher might not only arrive late, but could possibly not be in school at all if I had not 
informed him or her of my visit in advance. There was even less chance of meeting 
with SMC representatives without prior notice.  
 
Moreover, the teachers were only available in the mornings as they dashed off to their 
other jobs as soon as school finished at 1.30 p.m., so I did not want to end up 
wandering about the school just waiting for the arrival of the head and the other 
teachers. I also wanted to arrange to visit on community taboo days27 so that I could 
avoid disturbing SMC work as much as possible. As a result, all the head teachers 
were informed of my arrival in advance and the visits were scheduled for taboo days.  
 
4.4.2.3  Selection of Individuals 
In order to explore various actors‟ perceptions of how aid funds were spent at the three 
different levels, interviewees were selected by a combination of purposive and 
snowball sampling strategies. Interviews with SMC representatives took the form of 
group discussion, while other interviews were conducted individually.  
 
At the national level, I interviewed as many GES HQ officials and former personnel of 
the WSD and/or QUIPS programmes as I could locate. Initially I had assumed that MoE 
officials would be interesting to interview, but it turned out that they did not have much 
say about either WSD or QUIPS. Thus, only a couple of ministry officials in charge of 
planning and finance were interviewed, although I did have informal discussions with 
other ministry personnel.  
 
At the district level, DEO officials who worked for WSD and/or QUIPS were 
interviewed. Planning officers at the district assembly were also interviewed, as QUIPS 
released funds for a construction project through the former.  
 
At the school level, the following people were interviewed:  
 Head teachers  
 Representatives of the SMC 
 Teachers (if applicable) 
                                                     
27
 Days off for farming.  
80 
 
 
Teachers at the QUIPS schools were only interviewed if they had been in post at the 
time of QUIPS intervention. The sampling of SMC representatives was entrusted to the 
head teacher. When I paid a contact visit, I asked the head teacher to gather three or 
four SMC representatives who played an active part in school management. In some 
schools, all the SMC members got together to meet me; while in others none of them 
showed up.  
 
In addition to the interviews at these three main levels, I also sampled as many donor 
personnel as circumstances permitted. A summary of sampled individuals is shown in 
Table 4-4. 
 
Table 4-3 Interview Samples 
Level Number of informants 
National  
MoE 2 
GES 14 
District  
DEO 27 
District Assembly 2 
School  
Head teachers 
WSD 6 
QUIPS 6 
Teachers 
WSD 5 
QUIPS 5 
SMC 
WSD 23 
QUIPS 28 
Total 118 
 
Having explained the sampling procedure, I will now move on to discuss my 
investigation strategy.  
 
4.4.3  Data Collection Methods 
The qualitative researcher is able to use a variety of techniques for gathering 
information (Cohen et al., 2000), especially when employing a case study approach, 
whose strength lies in the use of multiple data collection methods and a variety of data 
sources (Merriam, 1988). In the present study, qualitative interviews and documentary 
analysis were used as indispensable techniques for this type of investigation. This 
section briefly explains the strengths and weaknesses of each method and how the 
study deployed these techniques for collecting field data.  
 
4.4.3.1  Interviews 
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Qualitative interviewing is a great adventure; every step of an interview brings new 
information and opens windows into the experiences of the people you meet. 
Qualitative interviewing is a way of finding out what others feel and think about their 
worlds. Through qualitative interviews, you can understand experiences and 
reconstruct events in which you did not participate. Through what you hear and learn, 
you can extend your intellectual and emotional reach across time, class, race, sex, and 
geographical divisions (Rubin and Rubin, 1995 p.1). 
 
An interview involves direct interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee. On 
the one hand, this enables the collection of in-depth data; but on the other hand, it may 
involve subjectivity and bias on the part of the interviewer (Cohen et al., 2000). 
However, this very subjectivity is an advantage in interpretive research, which aims to 
investigate subjective understandings of the world. Moreover, through interaction “the 
interviewer and interviewee actively construct some version of the world” (Silverman, 
1995 p.90).  
 
In fact, the interview is not exclusively either subjective or objective; it is intersubjective 
(Laing, 1967 p.66). As the title of Kvale‟s (1996) work InterView suggests, the interview 
provides an opportunity for the interviewer and the interviewee “to discuss their 
interpretations of the world in which they live, and to express how they regard 
situations from their own point of view” (Cohen et al., 2000 p.267). Indeed, after one 
interview, my interviewee commented: 
 
It has been a very interesting conversation with you because I think in the course of 
conversation it has given me the time to reflect on what we have done. This is a good 
opportunity for me to reflect (July 2005, an interviewee). 
 
There are various types of interview, which may be located on a continuum depending 
on the degree of structure, from the highly structured interview at one end to the 
unstructured conversational interview at the other, according to the purposes of the 
interview (Cohen et al., 2000). The highly structured interview can generate 
quantitative data, which facilitates simple statistical analysis but is not flexible enough 
to be adjusted to individual circumstances. Conversely, the unstructured interview 
allows situational and qualitative data collection, although the data obtained tend to be 
less systematic and lack comparability (Cohen et al., 2000; May, 2002; Patton, 1990).  
 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest that the structured interview is useful when the 
researcher is aware of what she does not know and is therefore in a position to frame 
questions that will supply the required information; whereas the unstructured interview 
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is useful when the researcher is not aware of what she does not know and must 
therefore rely on the respondent to tell her.  
 
After considering these strengths and weaknesses, I chose a semi-structured interview 
or an “interview guide approach” (Patton, 2002 p.349) to my data collection. In the 
interview guide approach, an interview schedule is prepared in advance, but it is 
sufficiently open-ended to enable the contents to be re-ordered; the sequence and 
wording of the questions to be decided on the spot; digressions and expansions to be 
made; new avenues to be included; and further probing to be undertaken. Thus, open-
ended questions offer more flexibility and the freedom to construct conversations 
based on the context while maintaining a question framework that allows comparison 
between responses and cases.  
 
If there are varied ways of asking a question, it follows there will be several ways in 
which it may be answered. Based on a semi-structured open-ended interview 
framework prepared in advance, I asked my questions with the aim of eliciting an 
“unstructured response” (Tuckman, 1972), which ensured that the respondent had the 
freedom to give his or her own answer as fully as he or she chose rather than being 
constrained in some way by the nature of the question.  
 
Although the chief disadvantage of the unstructured response concerns the matter of 
quantification, coding and analysis (Cohen et al., 2000), more importantly, flexibility of 
response can best explore the answers that the researcher is unaware of and allows 
events and situations to speak for themselves; thus, this fits my research design.  
 
Interviews can take place with individuals or a group of people. The group interview is 
particularly useful where a group of people have been working together for some time 
and/or with a common purpose (Watts and Ebbutt, 1987). This suited the 
circumstances of my interviews with SMCs. Moreover, the use of a group setting allows 
interaction between the members, yielding a wide range of responses (Cohen et al., 
2000), and thus the data collected are arguably less biased (Patton, 2002).  
 
On the more practical side, group interviews can be a low-cost and rapid method of 
collecting people‟s views and opinions. Interviewees can be more relaxed in a group 
than in a one-to-one situation. Thus, in order to mitigate SMC representatives‟ possible 
intimidation in being interviewed by a foreigner (and taking into account the limited time 
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available for my fieldwork), I decided to conduct group interviews instead of individual 
sessions with SMC representatives.  
 
The main purpose of the interview with regard to this study was to collect data from 
participants on their perceptions of (1) the mechanism for delivering aid funds; (2) its 
contribution; (3) its efficiency; and (4) the constraints of utilising aid funds. Standard 
interview questions were developed for each category, depending on the nature of the 
interviewee‟s involvement in WSD and/or QUIPS (a sample of the interview guides is 
included in appendix 2).  
 
4.4.3.2  Document Collection 
Given the limited time and resources for my study, documents were utilised to 
supplement the data collected from the interviews. Particularly at the national level, 
policy documents contain the official views of the government and in normal 
circumstances, it is easier to obtain a policy document than to interview high-ranking 
MoE officials.  
 
Documents may include any written or recorded material produced before the study at 
hand that constitute a stable source of data and can provide wide coverage at relatively 
low cost (Merriam, 1988). Moreover, documents are deemed to be “unobtrusive” 
(Lincoln and Guba, 1985 p.199) because they are typically composed of data collected 
by another person and, more importantly, are not the products of the present study 
(Yin, 1994). However, due to the fact that they are not prepared especially for the 
study, the data may lack continuity and may not meet the needs of the research 
(Merriam, 1988).  
 
Nevertheless, documents help us to explore societies because they are “media through 
which social power is expressed” (May, 2002 p.164). This means that by carefully 
examining what is included and what is left out of a policy document, we gain an insight 
into both explicit and implicit government intentions.  
 
In this respect, newspapers are also a good source of information, but their content 
necessitates careful treatment as they have relatively low credibility compared to 
official documents.  
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Thus, I expected to supplement the data collected through my interviews with the 
contents of various documents, supporting and sometimes even contradicting what 
interviewees told me. 
 
4.4.4  Data Collection Process 
Based on the discussion in the previous section, the following illustrates the data 
collection process during my fieldwork.  
 
4.4.4.1 Interviews 
At the central level, the interview was held at the participant‟s office, except in one case 
in which we met at the interviewee‟s residence as she was retired. All interviews were 
conducted in English and, in most cases, tape-recorded and transcribed.   
 
At the district level, all interviews were held at the workplace and conducted in English; 
most of them were tape-recorded and transcribed.  
 
At the school level, interviews with head teachers and their staff were held either in a 
classroom or in the head‟s office, and conducted in English. Some interviews were 
tape-recorded if circumstances allowed; that is, pupils were sometimes so curious that 
they came and clamoured around trying to see what was going on, and school 
compounds were often too noisy to use a tape recorder. Moreover, in addition to the 
practical difficulty of recording the interviews, I was told by the very first interviewee at 
the pilot that she would not allow me to use a tape recorder, and neither would the 
other teachers.  
 
This comment made me aware how stressful the interview could be for the interviewee 
and thereafter, I made a point of asking permission to record the conversation. If the 
participant showed any sign of nervousness about being interviewed, I did not even 
ask. However, I tried to explain sincerely why I wished to record our conversation and 
how helpful it would be for me as I was not a native speaker of English; most 
interviewees were then happy to grant my request.  
 
Group interviews with SMC representatives were held in the school compound, mostly 
either in the head teacher‟s office or a classroom, and conducted in English. Unlike the 
other interviews, a tape recorder was never used. This was partially because the 
microphone was not sensitive enough to capture voices from all directions unless I 
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passed the tape recorder from speaker to speaker, which not only distracted their 
attention but also hampered my note taking. It was also because I sensed that they 
were more intimidated in front of a tape recorder.  
 
Moreover, as one of the characteristics of the group interview, my questions often 
triggered a discussion between the participants. However, most of these conversations 
were conducted in the local language and I would not have been able to listen to this 
part of the tape later on unless I employed an interpreter. In weighing up the pros and 
cons, I thus decided not to tape-record interviews with the SMC representatives.  
 
My district and school visits were the most enlightening and valuable aspects of the 
research. If I was not going to a school, I usually arrived at the DEO before 8.00 a.m. 
and spent the whole day in the office, holding meetings from formal to very informal 
interviews. I soon found mentors in both DEOs who had long and rich experience of 
district education, and I might hurry to them at any time to ask about some aspect of 
their jurisdiction, which was of tremendous help to my understanding.  
 
During school visits, I usually arrived at school before morning assembly, which was 
supposed to start at about 8.15 a.m. Because I was not certain about the reliability of 
public transport, I often set off before dawn and consequently arrived in the village at 
6.30 a.m. on several occasions.  
 
On such occasions, the villagers – including SMC members – gathered around me, 
probably out of curiosity; but the SMC representatives kindly arrange to be interviewed 
at such an early hour. In many cases, I started interviewing SMC representatives first 
so that they could get on with their work.  
 
Visiting the 12 schools provided me with a clear idea of how they spent their external 
funding, and how they perceived the experience of doing so. Indeed, there was not a 
single school in which I did not discover something new; each school was different. 
 
None of the interviews were conducted with an assistant or interpreter, which meant 
that I did not have anybody with whom to share the exact moment of the interview 
except the interviewee him or herself.  
 
On one occasion, the responsible circuit supervisor accompanied me to the school; but 
he left the room when I was about to start the interview, although I had not asked him 
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to do so, and I appreciated his sensitivity. Afterwards, we talked about our school visit 
for a very long time. This exchange of opinion was an exhilarating experience and a 
very useful reflection on what I had learnt and seen at the school. I then realised that 
having somebody – possibly an assistant – to share the experience could have given 
me a different point of view and further insight, which might have enhanced the quality 
of my research.  
 
4.4.4.2 Documents 
In many developing countries, it is very difficult to obtain official documents such as 
policy papers and records of statistics, laws and registrations; worse still, sometimes 
they do not exist at all. Unfortunately, the education sector in Ghana is no exception. 
The following is an account of where and how I gained access to policy papers, 
implementation papers and other relevant materials.  
 
In my quest for education documents – in particular, records of policy and its 
implementation papers – the first place I went to was the headquarters of the 
MoE/GES. However, the policy documents were not kept systematically at the HQ; 
worse still, they were scattered across different offices.28  
 
There was a documentation centre at the ministry that had been commissioned by the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in 2004, so 
things were better than they had previously been; or at least there was somewhere to 
look now, although the documents had been merely stacked in piles and most of them 
dated back to before 2000.  
 
Having spent some time with me while I was digging into mountains of documents 
every day, a librarian shared her frustration with me in how the various departments of 
the MoE and GES ignored her requests to provide copies of the paperwork their 
departments produced. She added that she had no idea what kinds of documents were 
produced by individual sections or when they were written.  
 
                                                     
28
 With regard to the lack of a systematic filing system, I witnessed how documents were treated 
lightly and easily scattered. When the WSD office at GES HQ was closed, boxes of documents 
were removed to anywhere there was space. Some were kept in a GES storage room, some 
landed up in a corner of corridor, and some were taken to one of the GES annexes outside 
Accra; and nobody knew the location of any of them. 
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Therefore, the next place I decided to look for documents was in each department of 
the MoE and GES, especially those that played a central role in the implementation of 
the FCUBE programme. Once I targeted a particular person, presuming that this 
person must have kept some paperwork somewhere with him or her, I visited his or her 
office repeatedly to enquire about the availability of documents and to constantly 
remind them how earnest I was. By employing this strategy, I sometimes happened to 
get what I wanted.  
 
The other potential source of documents was the offices of the donor agencies. To 
some extent I had expected that paperwork would not be well kept on the Ghanaian 
side, yet I had naively assumed that DFID and USAID would have properly maintained 
filing systems.  
 
This assumption turned out to be half right. Both DFID and USAID were very 
cooperative and openly shared whatever information I asked for. In fact, both donors 
invited me to several meetings. USAID even gave me access to the raw data it had 
collected for the QUIPS final evaluation report. However, I found that DFID had not 
kept its old documents due to a move of office.  
 
I thus had to look into other donor agencies, including JICA and UNICEF. The fact that 
the MoE and GES had poorly maintained files was to some extent a given, but a 
situation in which documents were not properly maintained on the donors‟ side seemed 
a bit surprising.  
  
At the district level, some relevant documents – particularly district education budget 
plans – had been gathered at the DEO. However, again, the records were poorly 
maintained.  
 
In addition to official documents, reflecting the magnitude of public concern about 
education in Ghana, newspapers carried reports and features on education matters 
nearly every day. Such articles in English newspapers (e.g. The Ghanaian Times, The 
Chronicle, The Daily Graphic) were cut out for analysis.  
 
4.4.5  Data: Analysis 
This section explains the process of data analysis and its role in my case study.  
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4.4.5.1  Analytical Strategy 
As explained in section 4.3, this study is drawn from case studies of WSD and QUIPS, 
employing various components and multilevel analysis of each case. Yin (2003) 
suggests two ways of analysing case study material: to follow theoretical propositions, 
or to use a description as the starting point. Such a choice is related to the question 
„what is this a case of‟ (see section 4.3).  
 
The diagram in the next page illustrates the analytical strategy for the study. It shows 
the conceptual structure of the scheme and does not include all the processes and 
components. The initial analysis was conducted level by level in order to develop the 
case studies of WSD and QUIPS by means of multilevel analysis. At this stage, the 
analysis was largely descriptive. However, themes emerging from the cases were then 
developed into a theoretical analysis to form a case study of perceptions of 
international assistance.  
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Figure 4-2 Analytical strategy    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from Patton 1990 p.385 and 2002 p.448. 
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was unexpectedly helpful in making sense of what I had done and why I felt a certain 
way. Bennett (1998 pp.539-40) says that a writer does not always know what he or she 
knows, and writing is a way of finding out. The journal also helped me to retrieve the 
feelings I had had in the field when I read it again while writing up the thesis.  
 
The gathering of data seemed like an endless process and I knew that I would never 
be wholly satisfied, but when I felt that even the marginal headway I was making was 
diminishing, I knew it was time to call a halt. After almost eight months in Ghana, I felt 
that I needed to leave the field and start analysing my data more objectively. It was 
hard, but every researcher needs to decide when enough is enough.  
 
It is sensible to ask myself how I treated the cases in order to reach the conclusions I 
have come to. I began the study with an open mind about design, in the sense that I 
did not have a specific hypothesis or any analytical procedures to follow beforehand. 
Moreover, my conception of the research problem changed over the course of the 
study, as I let the data (the voices of the interviewees) guide me, although I did have 
some more general theoretical and methodological convictions. Nevertheless, what 
emerged from the fieldwork and developed into the central focus of my thesis only 
became apparent when I was engaged in the final analysis of my material.  
 
4.4.5.2  Analysis of Interviews  
The interview transcripts, interview notes and field memos (observation records) are 
the core data of this study. The interview transcripts were coded and analysed 
according to the emergent themes. Codes were developed from the key subjects that 
emerged while reading the transcripts; by attempting to categorise the interview data 
into a matrix according to key words and groups of informants; and the concepts that 
were embedded in the research questions.  
 
Typical and recurring issues raised by interviewees were duly recorded, while 
infrequent and unrepresentative but critical incidents or issues were also taken into 
account in an attempt to reach as comprehensive an understanding of the case as 
possible. This procedure was adopted because a subject might only demonstrate a 
particular behaviour trait once, but that one instance might be too important to be ruled 
out simply because it did not recur. Indeed, sometimes a single event may occur that 
offers a hugely important insight into a person or situation; it can be the key to 
understanding a situation (Flanagan, 1949 cited in Cohen et al., 2000 p.185).  
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On the subject of selectivity, Nisbet and Watt (1984) warn case study researchers to 
avoid selective reporting and blandness equally, in that the former means selecting 
only the evidence that will support a particular conclusion, thereby misrepresenting the 
whole case; and the latter implies unquestionable acceptance of the views of the 
respondents, or only including those aspects of the case study on which people concur, 
rather than areas in which they might disagree (ibid p.91). Bearing these 
recommendations in mind, this exercise enabled me to capture the emerging critical 
themes of my study.  
 
The data are categorised into three groups related to the research questions. I present 
the WSD and QUIPS case studies (as described in chapters 5 and 6) according to 
these three categorisations at each of three levels of aid implementation. These 
categorisations are:  
 Fungibility 
 Impact 
 Sustainability 
 
Interviewee Reference Codes 
Interviewees are also coded. As these codes are used to identify the sources of 
quotations in chapters 5 and 6, the system is briefly explained here.  
Table 4-4 Interviewee reference code  
 
National level 
Agency/site/status Code 
MoE M 
GES G 
USAID UQ 
USAID/QUIPS/ILP* UQI 
USAID/QUIPS/CSA** UQC 
DFID DW 
District level 
Lower Denkyira district code:  L 
Upper Denkyira district code:  U 
DEO Lower Denkyira L 
District Assembly Lower Denkyira L/D 
DEO Upper Denkyira U 
District Assembly Upper Denkyira U/D 
School level 
QUIPS school code: Q 
WSD school code: W 
SMC  SMC 
Head teacher HT 
Teacher T 
* Improving Learning through Partnerships (a sub-programme of QUIPS) 
** Community School Alliance (a sub-programme of QUIPS) 
92 
 
Basically, interviewee codes are derived from a combination of agency, site or status 
letter and the number assigned to each interviewee (or group in the case of an SMC). 
The letter represents the initial of the first word of the agency, group or individual.  
For example:  
 M1 First MoE official interviewed 
 G9 Ninth GES HQ official interviewed 
 UQI2 Second ILP project officer interviewed 
 L7 Seventh DEO official in Lower Denkyira district interviewed 
 
In the case of a school, a forward slash is used in each code thus: district code/school 
code/status/number, for example:  
 L/W2/HT Head teacher in the second WSD school visited in Lower Denkyira 
 U/Q3/SMC4 Fourth SMC representative in the third QUIPS school visited in  
  Upper Denkyira 
 
A list of interviewees with reference codes is attached in appendix 1. 
 
4.4.5.3  Documentary Analysis 
Document analyses were conducted for two main purposes. Firstly, this was in order to 
contextualise and draw conclusions with regard to the situation of basic education, 
particularly that subsequent to the introduction of the FCUBE programme. Literature on 
the development of the education system, and the political, financial and general 
administrative history forming the socio-cultural and political framework for education 
development in Ghana was analysed. Education budget data were also analysed to get 
a picture of the macro financial environment of the education sector. 
 
Secondly, official documents on education policies and administration; appraisal 
reports; and other research reports of foreign-funded projects – especially anything 
related to FCUBE, WSD and QUIPS – were examined with special reference to the 
fungibility, impact and sustainability aspects mentioned in the previous section. This 
was in order to identify the critical sectoral issues that warranted further investigation, 
and to cross-check the actuality of events referred to during the interviews.  
 
District–school census data were available for very recent years in education 
management Information system electronic form. The data were analysed in order to 
grasp the changes to and current levels of key education indicators, such as the 
number of schools, pupils and teachers in the two districts under study.  
 
The main documents analysed are as follows: 
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 QUIPS evaluation reports (midterm and final) 
 Education Sector Support Programme evaluation reports 
 FCUBE policy, implementation and evaluation reports 
 MoE and GES auditing reports (various years) 
 District work plans (various years) 
 
4.4.5.4  Synthesis and Writing Up 
Data from the national level were disaggregated and reorganised in terms of the 
aspects of fungibility, impact and sustainability. Meanwhile, data from the district and 
school levels were analysed using the same protocol. The results from all levels were 
then combined for analysis in accordance with the three aspects as they related to 
WSD and QUIPS. The results of the case studies of WSD and QUIPS were then 
amalgamated in order to analyse the themes that had emerged, i.e. power, trust, 
ownership, accountability and sustainability.  
 
Through the entire process of describing the case study, I have tried to ensure that my 
interpretations and analyses appear credible in terms of the data they present as 
evidence for my conclusions; and that, “the interpretations are presented in a way that 
allows readers to see why the research reached a certain conclusion based on the 
available data,” (Mehra, 2002) which was collected by various methods: field notes of 
experiences and shared experiences; journal records; interview transcripts; the 
observations of others; and documents of various types.  
 
Moreover, as Platt (1992) notes:  
One way, and a rhetorically very effective way, of reaching a conclusion and taking 
the reader with you to that conclusion is to tell the story of how you arrived there 
yourself. This almost certainly entails showing that you were initially wrong or were 
surprised by what you discovered (p.29).   
 
In this section, I have discussed the process I went through in reaching an 
understanding of and portraying actors‟ own constructions of reality. Inevitably, the 
question arises as to how far the story that emerged from the fieldwork can be asserted 
to be valid and reliable; thus, the issue of validity and reliability is discussed next.  
 
 
4.5 Validity and Reliability 
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All fieldwork done by a single field-worker invites the question, why should we 
believe it? (Bosk, 1979 p.193) 
 
Validity and reliability are paramount in research; if a piece of research is invalid, it is 
worthless. Validity is thus a requirement of both quantitative and qualitative research. 
The qualitative researcher relies – implicitly or explicitly – on a variety of 
understandings and corresponding types of validity in the process of describing, 
interpreting, and explaining phenomena of interest (Maxwell, 1992).  
 
The notions of validity and reliability are multifaceted, and different researchers have 
conceptualised them in many different ways (Angen, 2000; Cohen et al., 2000; 
Hammersley, 1987; Mishler, 1990). However, most importantly, the concepts of validity 
and reliability are defined by the ontological and epistemological paradigm on which the 
research is based (Kuhn, 1996).  
 
Positivists assume that there is absolute truth independent of human perception and 
the purpose of research is to find „the truth‟. Therefore, validity means the accuracy of 
the findings in relation to „the truth‟, while reliability is the quality of the research 
measured by the consistency and replicability of one‟s findings.  
 
On the other hand, interpretive inquiry rejects such foundationalism and advocates the 
existence of multiple subjective realities. The role of the researcher is thus to 
understand the realities constructed by the respondents through a process in which the 
data are generated and interpreted by means of interaction between the researcher 
and the respondents. In other words, the researcher “is part and parcel of the setting, 
context, and culture he/she is trying to understand and represent”‟ (Athleide and 
Johnson, 1998 p.486).  
 
Owing to the philosophical stance and the nature of this research approach, 
standardised prescriptions for validity and reliability are not applicable to interpretive 
research. Therefore, researchers try to establish alternative concepts of validity and 
reliability in the interpretive and naturalistic paradigm (Angen, 2000; Guba, 1981; 
Mishler, 1990; Silverman, 1995; Smith, 1984; Wolcott, 1990).  
 
In essence, validity and reliability mean making a judgement about the trustworthiness 
(Guba, 1981) of the research process and its findings. The basis on which 
„trustworthiness‟ is judged or claimed may be contentious; nevertheless, validity and 
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reliability are “more about broad principles that must be carefully considered in each 
specific instance” (Angen, 2000 p.387).  
 
The conceptualisation of validity propounded by Maxwell (1992) is helpful in this 
respect. In accordance with Wolcott‟s (1990) critique, he claims that “understanding is 
a more fundamental concept for qualitative research than validity” (1992 p.281). He 
goes on to suggest five kinds of validity in qualitative methodology that validate 
understanding. His typology follows a logical sequence of data analysis and is 
therefore useful for identifying the aspects to consider in the „specific instances‟ 
referred to in Angen (2000 p.387). 
 
Angen‟s notions of validity are as follows: 
 
Firstly, descriptive validity: the data accurately records the physical objects, acts, 
events, behaviours and narratives that took place.  
 
Secondly, interpretive validity: understanding of participants‟ perspectives is largely 
(although not necessarily wholly) based on their accounts. Maxwell notes that, 
“accounts of participants‟ meanings are never a matter of direct access, but are always 
constructed by the researcher(s) on the basis of participants‟ accounts and other 
evidence” (p.290).  
 
Thirdly, theoretical validity: the application of a certain theory is appropriate for 
explaining the phenomena. Theoretical validity differs from the first two in the sense 
that it refers to an explanation or theory of a given phenomenon as well as a 
description or interpretation of it. The issue is the legitimacy of the concepts that the 
theory employs as they are applied to the phenomena, and the postulated relationships 
between the concepts.  
 
Fourthly, generalisability: the theory generated is useful in understanding similar 
situations within the research setting (internal generalisability), or outside the case 
parameter (external generalisability). That is, generalisability extends the account of a 
particular situation or population either to persons, events and settings within the 
community group or institution under study, or to other communities groups or 
institutions.  
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Lastly, evaluative validity: judgement of the phenomena under study is based on an 
evaluative framework.  
 
As instruments for reflecting on the above aspects, Miles and Huberman (1994 p.263) 
list 13 techniques for checking the quality of the data and its interpretation. Among 
them, triangulation was used explicitly in this study.  
 
Triangulation is a research design as well as a strategy for using multiple data 
collection methods and sources of data, in order to assess and strengthen the validity 
of the research. According to Patton (1990 p.556), four types of triangulation are 
possible in qualitative research: (1) methods triangulation; (2) triangulation of sources; 
(3) analyst triangulation; and (4) theory/perspective triangulation.  
 
In this study, triangulation was used mainly in terms of methods and sources, by 
deploying two data collection methods (interview and documents) and choosing 
multiple data sources (GES HQ officials, DEO officials, head teachers, teachers, 
SMCs, etc).  
 
Validity of understanding in this research was ensured by the following means. For 
descriptive validity, whenever I engaged in fieldwork, I followed the procedure adopted 
by Wolcott (1990 p.128); i.e. I tried to record as much as possible, as accurately as 
possible, and in the respondent‟s precise words, what I judged to be important in what 
people did and said.  
 
Based on the information I recorded in this way – and in most cases, was corroborated 
by the transcript made afterwards – the factual accuracy of interviewee‟s accounts was 
triangulated with other respondents‟ accounts, as well as with documentary records. 
Finally, information was cross-checked by asking different stakeholders similar 
questions.  
 
Moreover, I asked for comments from the officers at the GES and DEO on my initial 
findings. Strictly speaking, this is not actual „member checking‟ (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985 p.219) because, although these education officials were the main components of 
the case, they could not confirm the picture emerging at the school level; that is, they 
could only confirmed the voices from the schools according to their own point of view 
as education officials.  
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The direct „member checking‟ of school voices would have helped to confirm the 
„reality‟ that the officials may not have been able to perceive. Nevertheless, since my 
findings included some policy issues, I was able to employ the above process to check 
for descriptive validity. To determine interpretive validity, I tried to be as conscious as 
possible of any preconceived perceptions and understandings my interviewees or I 
might have held, although I cannot claim to have eliminated them completely.  
 
Theoretical validity was ensured by comparing the findings of this study with the 
existing literature on international assistance, and other relevant literature (aid 
approaches, fungibility, power, accountability, ownership, trust, sustainability).  
 
In terms of generalisability, I did not explicitly attempt to apply the findings of this case 
study to either the region as a whole or to another country. Rather, both internal and 
external generalisability are limited to a review of the existing literature.  
 
Having said this, the present study expects its findings to be generalisable to some 
extent because similar (if not identical) aid approaches and modalities have been 
adopted to deliver international assistance to other countries. Although Maxwell (1992) 
claims that evaluative validity is not central to qualitative research, the present study 
may be seen to have an evaluative aspect because it implicitly aims to evaluate the 
efficiency of donor-funded programmes and corroborate the assumptions donor 
agencies or aid approaches make in terms of possible improvements, which, hopefully, 
other donors and policy-makers might consider.  
 
 
4.6 Practical and Ethical Considerations 
Several ethical considerations were explicitly taken into account in this study, i.e. 
protocol, consent, anonymity and confidentiality.29 As a matter of protocol, acquiring 
permission from the MoE and GES to conduct my research and gain access to their 
officers was the first thing I attended to after arriving in Ghana. As I was known to most 
of the officials at the HQ due to my previous work there, I was able to use both formal 
and informal channels to make appointments with potential informants.  
 
                                                     
29
 The study was conducted in accordance to the Sussex School of Education and Social Work 
Ethics Standards and Guidelines. 
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In terms of the district case studies, the MoE helped me get assistance from the district 
assemblies, which were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Local Government, 
while the GES introduced me to the DEOs. On my arrival at a DEO, I explained my 
research purposes and research plan to the district director and obtained his or her 
approval to conduct a study in the district.  
 
With regard to protocol at school level, I asked the head teacher for his or her consent 
to and cooperation in my research, and then the head teacher arranged all the 
interviews with SMC representatives and teachers (if applicable). At the beginning of 
each interview, I explained my position; the purpose of the research and interview; the 
anonymity of the respondent; and the confidentiality of the data I would collect, and 
sought his or her consent to proceed.  
 
I gave verbal feedback on my findings to the director of the DEO in the late afternoon 
after each school visit. In this respect, since the selection of schools was made with the 
help of the DEO, it was impossible to maintain the anonymity of the school and the 
informants I had visited. Nevertheless, although I did not obtain any information that 
seemed to be highly confidential, I omitted from my verbal report to the director some 
of the incidents I observed and heard about.  
 
Moreover, in writing this thesis, all the names of schools, individuals and groups are 
referred to by their positions or codes only.  
 
This study relied heavily on the cooperation of all the officials, head teachers, teachers 
and SMC representatives who made themselves available for interview. When 
conducting interviews at school, I was most concerned about taking the participants 
away from their work. I tried to interview SMC representatives as early in the day as 
possible – or as soon as they met – so that they could return to their farming work in 
good time afterwards, even though I might have scheduled my visit for a taboo day.  
 
I was also anxious about head teachers and teachers being away from their 
classrooms, particularly in the small schools in which there were insufficient staff. 
Inevitably, there were some occasions on which pupils were left unattended in the 
classroom while their teacher was being interviewed. To mitigate this situation, I asked 
the teachers if they could give their pupils some work to get on with during our 
interviews.  
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I did not offer any financial or material recompense to officers, head teachers, teachers 
or SMC representatives for cooperating with my research; I thus owe a deep debt of 
gratitude for information freely given. The most they received was my sincere 
acknowledgement of their hard work, along with whatever stimulus and encouragement 
our interviews offered, as many head teachers – particularly those in rural areas – were 
struggling on their own without much support from either the government or their 
colleagues.  
 
My visit seemed to mean something in itself. In several schools, I introduced head 
teachers and SMCs to the grassroots grants scheme facilitated by the Japanese 
embassy. I felt that QUIPS schools and those in towns were to a certain extent 
accustomed to writing funding proposals, while their rural colleagues seemed to have 
no idea how to fill in a blank application form. I thus offered to follow up their 
applications if they wished. Although communication in the rural areas was often very 
difficult, some schools contacted me of their own accord and I introduced them to the 
embassy, and helped them develop their initial plan. However, it seemed that where 
strong leadership existed, schools took the initiative to contact me and/or apply for 
funding, but they did not in schools that lacked such leadership.  
 
With regard to the DEO, one of the two districts impressed me by its commitment under 
the strong leadership of the director in close cooperation with the district assembly, 
which was not common to see. Therefore, I arranged for a JICA coordinator to discuss 
the potential posting of volunteer teachers with the director. The first volunteer teacher 
was posted to the district in 2007.  
 
 
4.7 Limitations of this Study 
There are some aspects of methodology that should be mentioned here as a limitation 
of the study. They are mostly associated with the collection of information and interview 
data.  
 
4.7.1 Imbalance of Power and an Unnatural Environment 
One concern that arose from the interviews at school level was the issue of the 
imbalance of power between the researcher and researched, i.e. the interview situation 
in this study constituted a wholly unnatural environment for school staff, especially 
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those teaching in very rural areas. In an area where oboroni (white people in the 
Ghanaian language, although I am not literally „white‟) were traditionally missionaries 
and, more recently, expatriate aid workers, people tended to associate them with 
concepts such as wealth and advanced technology.  
 
Thus, there was a potential perceived power imbalance between the interviewer and 
the interviewee. Moreover, an oboroni researcher asking questions could have affected 
the way in which the answers were constructed. In such cases, the interviewee might 
have tried to respond in a way calculated to best meet my expectations or to please 
me. 
 
Although I think few of them were particularly uncomfortable with this interview setting, 
some SMC representatives – e.g. a queen mother (local female leader) and a chief – 
came to the interview in traditional costume. This probably implies that they perceived 
the interview to be a formal or special occasion. 
 
4.7.2 Reliability of Interview Data 
In most cases, the head teacher arranged to get some SMC representatives together in 
response to my request in advance of my visit. Usually, the head informed the SMC 
chairperson, and then the chairperson arranged for some SMC members to meet me. 
At some schools, all the SMC representatives came to meet me, while at others, none 
of them appeared. Therefore, the representatives I met might have been relatively 
more enthusiastic and cooperative with the head teacher and/or SMC chairperson.  
 
Furthermore, there were occasions when I could not accurately observe the „reality‟ 
through the interview. For example, on interviewing a group of SMC representatives, 
they insisted that they visited the school almost every day to make sure it was running 
smoothly. I could not tell if or to what extent they were exaggerating their own diligence 
until the head teacher showed me the visitors‟ record, indicating that none of them had 
visited the school for nearly four months.  
 
In another school, an habitually tardy teacher claimed that he usually arrived on time 
and worked hard for his pupils. I could not detect his falsehood during the interview, 
and did not learn the truth until both SMC representatives and DEO officials told me a 
different story.  
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On another occasion, the head teacher explained that all the teachers were consulted 
in deciding what items the school imprest should be spent on. However, when I asked 
the head which teacher I could interview next, I was told not to enquire of the staff 
about the school imprest.  
 
Similarly, in another school, the head teacher explained about the school imprest. 
Then, when I asked if I could have a look at the record, he claimed that he had lost the 
key to the drawer in which it was kept that very morning, and could do nothing about it 
unless he called a carpenter to break it open.  
 
Although I could neither tell if this head had really lost the key, nor why the other did 
not want me to ask his staff about the school imprest, these incidents aroused my 
suspicion sufficiently to make me doubt the authenticity of anything they had told me 
during their interviews.  
 
Furthermore, when officials referred to education statistics back in the mid-1990s, or 
even in the 2000s, I am sure that they did not intend to provide incorrect information, 
but the statistics they gave were not necessarily correct either.  
 
Thus, the reliability of interview data needed to be checked through triangulation, using 
information from other people and factual data (if available). Despite these efforts, it 
should be noted that there has remained some difficulty in eliminating all intentionally 
or unintentionally inaccurate information.  
 
4.7.3 The Challenge of Accessing Information from Donors 
I should note here one of the most significant limitations of this study. My intention to 
compare aid approaches between project type assistance and sector-wide type 
assistance notwithstanding, the analysis did not include the principal donor agencies 
(DFID and USAID) as a specific level of analysis. Originally, data collection from the 
donors was included as an explicit source of information, and an analysis of their 
accounts was planned as a major level of analysis. However, this plan was ultimately 
dropped at the final writing stage. This was due to the difficulty in collecting sufficient 
financial information and arranging interviews with donors to enable me to present an 
in-depth analysis.  
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My intention in conducting analysis at the donor level was to examine WSD and QUIPS 
in financial terms. Although both USAID and DFID personnel generously allowed me 
access to programme information – e.g. USAID-related consultancy firms gave me 
access to raw data for the QUIPS final evaluation report – a breakdown of each 
programme budget was unobtainable. This was not for the same reason in the case of 
each agency, but rather reflected their different modalities. A breakdown of the QUIPS 
budget was literally not available to me, while DFID did not possess such a breakdown, 
as it did not require the GES to return it in such detail once the funds had been 
delivered.   
 
Moreover, in attempting to gain substantial data, it was a challenge to access donor 
personnel who had been with the respective programmes. Consultants who had 
worked for QUIPS were easily located as many of them continued to work for a new 
USAID-funded education programme; but DFID education expatriates were invariably 
no longer on hand and were difficult to trace. Additionally, since Ghanaian consultants 
who had worked for WSD were also GES officials, I reasoned that their views should 
be incorporated into the analysis of Ghanaian actors.  
 
For these reasons, I decided to concentrate on an exploration of Ghanaian actors‟ 
views, incorporating interviews and information obtained from donor personnel at the 
various levels of analysis to deepen my examination of these subjects‟ perceptions. 
Although this strategy allowed me insight into recipient perspectives on different aid 
approaches, an independent level of analysis of donors in contrast to recipient views 
could have contributed more to the capacity of this study to capture a more holistic 
picture. This point remains a shortcoming of the present study and further research in 
this area is necessary.  
 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the orientation and approach adopted in this study, as well as 
the details of the research design. The overarching epistemological and ontological 
framework that informed the study is interpretive, buttressed by a phenomenological 
approach, which is appropriate for the purpose of seeking to understand actors‟ 
perception of phenomena from their own points of view, and the construction of their 
own reality, in a context-specific setting.  
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With a phenomenological orientation, my research took the form of a case study; the 
case being perceptions of international assistance to the basic education sector in 
Ghana, and the aim to illustrate the diversity of multi-level actors‟ perceptions. Two 
cases were examined in depth in order to investigate the emerging implications of 
international assistance.  
 
The data were gathered using qualitative research tools such as the semi-structured 
open-ended interview and documentary analysis. In order to assure the validity and 
reliability of the data and their interpretation, a triangulation technique was utilised.  
 
In summary, this chapter is a guide to the first phase of the study: the preparation of 
the research proposal, the fieldwork and the data analysis. The think analytic 
description that emerged through this process are the subjects of the next two 
chapters: chapter 5 presents a case study of the QUIPS programme and chapter 6 
addresses the WSD programme.  
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Chapter 5  Quality Improvement in Primary Schools  
The Quality Improvement in Primary Schools (QUIPS) intervention was inaugurated in 
September in 1996, and concluded in 2005;30 and was designed to help meet the 
objectives of the Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) initiative 
(Bonner et al., 2001). QUIPS built upon USAID‟s previous aid (Primary Education 
Programme)31 to Ghana, which provided essential input such as textbooks, in-service 
teacher training and national assessment systems aimed at reinforcing the sector 
(USAID/Ghana, 1995).  
  
The total cost of QUIPS was USD 58 million, comprising USD 52 million in project 
assistance and USD 6 million in non-project assistance (NPA). The host country 
contribution was estimated to be USD 18 million (USAID/Ghana, 2005b).  
 
QUIPS was principally composed of two sub-projects: Improving Learning through 
Partnerships (ILP), and Community School Alliances (CSA). However, as the 
programme evolved, it mushroomed into a complex amalgam of several projects, some 
of which overlapped (USAID/Ghana, 2005b). As a result, the programme was 
administrated by eight national and international implementing agencies 
(USAID/Ghana, 2005a).32 
 
The primary focus of QUIPS was on the improvement of school quality standards by 
means of a model school programme, which was implemented through project 
assistance facilitating the delivery of high quality, cost-effective education that was 
replicable on a national scale. At the same time, QUIPS addressed national level policy 
and programme reform through NPA in order to create a more supportive environment 
for primary education.  
 
                                                     
30
 QUIPS activities were wound up in September 2004, but the programme was formally 
extended to 2005 in order to complete its evaluation.  
31
 The Primary Education Programme was a USD 35 million programme embarked upon in 
1991.  
32
 QUIPS implementing partners were Academy for Educational Development; Educational 
Development Centre; Catholic Relief Services; The Mitchell Group; Harvard Institute for 
International Development; International Foundation for Education and Self-Help; Education 
Assessment and Research Centre; and World Education (USAID/Ghana, 2005b).   
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The original key components of QUIPS comprised 1) the provision of training and 
support aimed at enhancing the practice of child-centred education, as well as school 
management; 2) the promotion of increased community involvement in education; and 
3) the improvement of education management (Bonner et al., 2001). QUIPS worked for 
two years per district, in each of which three primary schools were selected to form 
partnerships with their respective communities. 
 
This chapter explores how QUIPS funds were absorbed and utilised from the viewpoint 
of those involved in the project. The analysis is conducted according to the themes that 
emerged through data collection: monetary fungibility, impact and sustainability; and 
the findings with regard to each theme examined level by level, i.e. Ministry of 
Education (MoE)/Ghana Education Service (GES) HQ, district and school.  
 
 
5.1 Perceptions of QUIPS Fungibility  
This section explores the views of educational actors on QUIPS financial assistance.  
 
Figure 5-1 The flow of funds under the QUIPS programme 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Source: the author.  
 
The above diagram illustrates the flow of funds from UAID to the Ghanaian basic 
education sector under the QUIPS programme, the total budget being USD 58 million 
(USAID/Ghana, 2005b). QUIPS comprised non-project assistance (NPA) (1) and 
project assistance (2), whose budget allocation was 10.4% and 89.6% respectively. 
NPA was released to the MoE while project assistance was held by the QUIPS 
programme office. The NPA (1) was originally intended to be USD 18 million but 
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USAID decided to withdraw this funding in 2001 and total NPA was cut by a third to 
USD 6 million.  
 
Funding for project assistance (2) was handed over to the QUIPS programme office. 
Most of it was directed to the pilot schools, three of which were selected in each district 
(2a). The funds were delivered in kind, for example, in the form of training, teaching 
and learning materials, and school reading books. Along with this direct assistance, 
funding for construction projects (school compounds and teachers‟ quarters) was 
released to the district assembly (2b), and a micro grant was made available to school 
management committees (SMCs) to meet the needs of the schools (2c). Apart from the 
pilot schools, the District Education Office (DEO) received a district grant to expand the 
QUIPS programme to a further 15 schools (2d).  
 
As figure 5-1 indicates, the education personnel concerned in this study dealt with the 
allocation of the different funds under QUIPS. The only exception was MoE and GES 
HQ, which did not have access to any funds from USAID after its withdrawal of NPA.  
 
The following section firstly explores how the MoE/GES regarded USAID‟s method of 
providing financial support to the education sector. Secondly, the DEO‟s view of the 
district grant is explored. Thirdly, the section looks at those who were responsible for 
the micro grant at school level, paying particular attention to the views of the SMC, 
which was in charge of the grant‟s usage. The SMC formed its opinion of the micro 
grant through unconsciously comparing it to its experience of construction work, the 
funds for which were released to the district assembly. For this reason, the SMC‟s 
attitude towards the release of QUIPS funds to the district assembly is included in the 
last part of the school level analysis.  
 
5.1.1 Macro Level 
The MoE did not receive any funds associated with the QUIPS programme after the 
termination of NPA in 2001. As revealed through interviews with MoE/GES HQ officials, 
their view of QUIPS assistance was shaped by the fact that the other levels of the 
GES, i.e. the DEO and the schools, received direct QUIPS assistance but the HQ did 
not. For this reason, this section starts by providing the background to the termination 
of NPA and the view of the HQ with regard to this funding mechanism, especially in 
terms of accountability and efficiency.  
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5.1.1.1  Non-project Assistance 
NPA was originally intended to provide funding to the education sector by means of 
strengthening the capacity of the MoE/GES through quarterly released tranches, which 
were based on evidence that negotiated targets were being met. Conditions for the 
release of the tranches were to be determined annually by the MoE and USAID 
through a review process of mutually agreed targets. However, USAID found it difficult 
to justify its disbursal of the planned tranches to the MoE since the ministry‟s targets 
were too unrealistic – although USAID repeatedly suggested that they be set at a more 
achievable level – resulting in the inevitable suspension of the funds in 2000 (interview 
UQ1).33 
 
Moreover, a high turnover of MoE/GES division heads during the lifetime of the 
programme meant that the annual review process became non-functional and that 
senior staff were never fully cognisant of the conditions and requirements for the 
release of the tranches (USAID/Ghana, 2005b p.3). This led USAID to the conclusion 
that the “use of NPA is not an effective means of strengthening the policy/management 
environment of the MoE” (USAID/Ghana, 2005b p.7).  
 
Consequently, in 2001, USAID withdrew NPA to the MoE completely and added the 
remaining funds to QUIPS programme support (Bonner et al., 2001), which resulted in 
USAID funds becoming inaccessible to the HQ. This meant that national policy for the 
enhancement of the quality of education in primary schools – one of the main 
objectives of QUIPS – was severely weakened and had no particular means to 
influence the MoE. 
 
The termination of pledged instalments by USAID, which one high-ranking official 
called a “breach of contract” (interview G17), was a disappointment and resulted in 
damage to USAID‟s reputation in the MoE. This episode was bound to have made 
some officials sceptical of USAID‟s commitment to the education sector, leading them 
to regard the Americans as a capricious donor.  
 
                                                     
33
 At the time USAID broke off NPA, the imminent presidential election – in which the then ruling 
party eventually lost power – overshadowed the day-to-day operation of the MoE/GES, and 
there were widespread rumours of the alleged misapplication of donor funds to the election 
campaign. In fact, I myself heard the then MoE donor coordinator saying that the funds had 
disappeared somewhere in the ministry and that there was no way of tracing them. 
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Moreover, because of the nature of the programme, QUIPS assistance targeted pilot 
schools and DEOs, bypassing GES HQ. This, along with the NPA incident, convinced 
HQ officials that USAID was bypassing official MoE/GES channels.  
 
5.1.1.2  Accountability 
Concern over accountability was the central issue, and USAID was not prepared to 
enter into an agreement that might compromise its own accountability requirements. 
Moreover, it lacked confidence in the ability of the GES to manage project 
implementation funds. Thus, it awarded the grants to organisations that were familiar 
with USAID requirements and had financial procedures that were acceptable to the 
Americans.  
 
As a result, GES HQ implementers uniformly maintained that QUIPS financial 
information was not shared with them but was kept within USAID/QUIPS circles. 
Indeed, the officials I interviewed at HQ knew little about the funds and resources that 
QUIPS brought in to the education sector at district and school levels.  
 
A budget officer in the Teacher Education Division (TED) highlighted USAID/QUIPS‟ 
tendency to remain unaccountable for QUIPS funds to the Ghanaian side.  
 
If the donors hold the funds, where is [the] accountability? When other donors give us 
money, after we implement the activities, we have to account [for] the money to the 
donors. After we are given the funds, [the] donors monitor us and audit us. Donors 
come to our office to check the record, so there is a checking system. But USAID, 
they budget, they use, they monitor, they audit, everything by themselves; everything 
within their circle. Where is [the] accountability? They don‘t account for [the] money 
they spend. They may do [so] to USAID [internally], but not to us. We never know 
how they spend the money, how much they did (interview G6). 
 
The officials questioned to whom the programme should have been accountable, and 
came to the conclusion that QUIPS was not intended to be accountable to the GES for 
the funds it poured into the Ghanaian education sector, but only to USAID. 
 
This had serious consequences. Since information about QUIPS was not shared, the 
HQ was aware of few of the details of QUIPS assistance. In other words, the HQ 
officials failed to capture the whole financial and implementation picture at district level.   
 
5.1.1.3  Efficiency   
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Because they were kept in the dark with regard to the QUIPS budget, the officials 
harboured nagging doubts about whether QUIPS spent its funds efficiently. Some 
officials argued that the GES would have achieved more if the same amount had been 
granted to them to implement the activities. The deputy director of TED said:  
 
Do you know how much QUIPS spent? It‘s a really huge amount. With that amount, 
we could have achieved more. We could have worked more effectively, more 
efficiently, more wisely if the money had been granted to us (interview G13). 
 
Closely associated with this point, many officials voiced their doubts about providing 
substantial resources solely to three selected schools in each district, questioning the 
monetary efficiency of the programme in terms of the enhancement of the quality of 
education nationwide. A former officer of Basic Education Division said:  
 
They only concentrated on 3 schools; only 3 in each [of] 110 districts, so [a] total of 
330 schools [the actual number of pilot schools was 367]. How many schools do we 
have in Ghana? They may improve quality in these schools, but in …[the] wider 
picture, that is almost nothing. Considering the amount of money they spent, I think it 
is unwise. They can afford only to think about three schools, but we should think 
about all the schools in the country (interview G11).  
 
Another officer commented that QUIPS indulged in experimentation in targeting a 
limited number of pilot schools with a huge amount of input (interview G15). To these 
officials, such a strategy appeared to be an unrealistic approach to national education 
development.  
 
Conversely, several former GES directors who had been taken on as consultants by 
donor projects after retirement took a different position. They frankly revealed that the 
way in which GES officials managed money and resources was not always honest 
(interview G3; UQI4). Therefore, holding the programme funds at the QUIPS office was 
the inevitable and reasonable second best choice (interview UQ14).  
 
USAID and QUIPS staff were fully aware of the officials‟ dissatisfaction with this 
financial arrangement (interview UQ1; UQI1; UQC1; UQI4). However, the team leader 
of the Community–School Alliance (CSA, one of the subprojects of QUIPS) questioned 
their motives for complaining about their lack of access to funds.  
 
We are very well aware that GES complains that USAID doesn‘t release the funds to 
GES. Part of the reason that the US government will not do budgetary support here is 
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that they do not feel confident that the funds will be used appropriately here; and you 
see it, and it is pretty obvious.  
We will do a workshop and why should they care about who is handling the money, if 
it is happening? Why don‘t they take it as an opportunity, an opportunity to learn new 
things; improve their skills and knowledge? If the activity is actually happening, and 
they have been invited to participate in any way that they want to, why should it 
matter? What should the difference be, if we are paying the bill or they are paying the 
bill?  
Well, the difference is, if the money went to them, they will spend [it] differently. And 
you will see a lot more money going into peoples‘ pockets, and going to caterers who 
are preferred for reasons that we are aware [of], you know. So, I think that it is an 
argument that only highlights why we do not do it. You know, why do they care so 
much about money? Why don‘t they care that the activity is happening, you know, 
regardless of who is paying for it? (interview UQC2).  
 
As USAID/QUIPS could not entrust the funds to the GES, the QUIPS office  ensured 
accountability by taking charge of the funds itself. On their part, the Ghanaian officials 
accused USAID of not trusting them and that such concerns were simply a ploy to 
maintain control and retain power in the relationship (interview G12).  
 
5.1.1.4  Summary of Findings at the Macro Level 
QUIPS was designed to achieve the aims of the Ghanaian national education 
programme, objectives that, in theory, were shared by USAID and the MoE/GES 
(Bonner et al., 2001). However, the perceptions that emerged through interviews at the 
HQ revealed that mutual objectives were insufficient to build a working relationship 
based on trust between USAID/QUIPS and MoE/GES HQ. For USAID/QUIPS, 
maintaining control over the funds was a reasonable decision if it increased the 
efficiency of the use of programme resources. This arrangement also met the financial 
requirement imposed on the project office by the US government. However, the 
efficiency of the QUIPS approach was severely questioned by HQ officials, who felt 
that they had been excluded from the implementation of QUIPS.  
 
5.1.2 Meso Level 
Unlike GES HQ, the DEOs had greater involvement in the implementation of QUIPS, 
having been awarded a district grant to expand activities to a further 15 schools. This 
section explores the experiences of DEO officials – from their points of view – as they 
managed this grant, in order to find out how fungible and how efficient QUIPS funds 
were seen to be.  
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The aim of the grant was to build capacity at the district level by providing support to 
the DEOs. Accordingly, the two case study DEOs each received a total grant of about 
¢7.3 million (USD 10,000), which was dispersed in two tranches.  
 
5.1.2.1  Procedures   
A district management implementation team (DMIT)34 was formed to manage the grant 
and plan activities to support the 15 additional primary schools35 (Ahiadeke et al., 
2003). However, there were differences in the operation of the DMIT between the two 
DEOs.  
 
In Lower Denkyira district, the DMIT was quite active and functioned effectively. It held 
weekly meetings “in a friendly atmosphere, after which the entire directorate was 
briefed” (interview U7). The district chief executive of the district assembly was kept 
well informed by the DEO, and was aware that work was being carried out under 
QUIPS.  
 
On the other hand, the DMIT in the other district was not very active during the QUIPS 
intervention. In fact, the DMIT existed little more than in name only and met rarely 
(interview L13). No one from the district assembly was involved in planning and 
implementing the grant (interview L/D1).  
 
The DMIT was mandated by the DEO to plan activities in a participatory way, and 
QUIPS expected the DMIT to continue to do so after the end of the intervention 
(Ahiadeke et al., 2003). However, the DMIT was regarded by the DEO as having been 
established solely for the management of the district grant; and therefore, there 
seemed to be no doubt in the minds of the officials that the DMIT had completed its 
role with the termination of the grant (interview U7).  
 
Once DMIT work plans were approved by QUIPS, district grant funds were released to 
a dedicated account. Although the GES was also authorised to approve plans for the 
                                                     
34
 The DMT had nine mandated members: the director of district education; four frontline 
assistant directors; the community participation coordinator (CPC), a girl child officer, a budget 
officer; and a district education planning team (DEPT) member. 
35
 The grant was expended mainly on 1) in-service teacher training; 2) community mobilisation 
activities; 3) teaching English as a second language workshops; 4) the supervising of circuit 
supervisors and other DEO staff supporting QUIPS and non-QUIPS schools; and 5) the 
monitoring and evaluation of grant activities.  
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use of the grant (Ahiadeke et al., 2003 p.35), whether it actually did and, if so, at what 
level of the hierarchy, was not confirmed by DEO interviewees. All they would say was 
that they had had nothing to do with GES HQ with regard to the district grant scheme.  
 
The level of information sharing regarding the district grant also varied between offices. 
When funds were required for the implementation of approved activities, a 
memorandum was written and presented to the district director of education for 
approval before authorisation was given for the required amount to be withdrawn from 
the account. In Upper Denkyira, most officials were aware when a grant disbursement 
was received, while in Lower Denkyira, many of the DEO staff did not know when the 
funds were available (interview L5; L7). 
 
5.1.2.2  Accountability   
Once an activity was completed, a report was written to account for the use of the 
funds and submitted to the QUIPS programme office (interview L1; U7). These written 
reports were then vetted and had to be approved by QUIPS before the next tranche of 
funds was released.  
 
Indeed, there was a substantial amount of paperwork associated with the district grant 
mechanism (Ahiadeke et al., 2003). There were quarterly financial and programme 
reports that had to be completed, along with an account of each activity undertaken. 
This report form required information on the type of activity; its location; its duration and 
time frame; staff involved in its implementation; participants; its budget (estimate and 
actual expenditure); an overall assessment of the activity; the problems encountered in 
implementing the activity; and an evaluation consisting of lessons learnt from the 
activity, how it might be improved and a proposal for the follow-up.  
 
Filling out this form for all district grant-funded activities took up a significant amount of 
DEO officials‟ time (Ahiadeke et al., 2003 pp.35-8). However, although the process of 
accounting for the grant was “cumbersome” (interview L7), it was considered 
necessary and quite straightforward because the procedures required by QUIPS were 
not new (interview U5; U12). A senior officer who worked as a QUIPS district 
coordinator added: 
 
It was not difficult. It was rather straightforward. You see, it was not quite [very] 
different from DFID [Department for International Development]. If you are an 
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activity initiator, you will be given the money to implement your activity. When [the] 
QUIPS grant came, it followed the same procedure as DFID money (interview U7).  
 
The QUIPS procedure for allocating the grant was familiar to DEO officials, since it was 
basically the same as that of DFID‟s Whole School Development (WSD) programme, 
yet they found the attitude of QUIPS to be somewhat different. The officials felt that 
they were being urged to plan, implement and report back to QUIPS as quickly as 
possible. As soon as the financial report was completed, QUIPS staff came from Accra 
to collect the report from the DEO (interview U7). This means that accountability for the 
district grant was to the QUIPS programme office, unlike the DEO and GES HQ.  
 
5.1.2.3  A Donor-led Process  
DEO officials were unfamiliar with the short time frame for the completion of activities. 
In fact, one DEO failed to complete its planned activities by the date that “QUIPS [had] 
fixed” (interview U7). Instead of carrying plans over to the following term, the DEO was 
told that they “should use the money for different purposes for the 15 schools by giving 
up the initial plan [which they had agreed to] in order to use the rest right away” 
(interview U7). They were then forced to reset priorities and buy supplementary school 
reading books – after seeking due approval from the QUIPS office.  
 
The officials felt that meeting the deadline was regarded as more important than 
spending the funds in the district‟s best interest (interview U7; U8; U9). Moreover, in 
order to meet the deadline, the DEO had to suspend its other duties if it was to meet 
QUIPS requirements (interview U3). The whole process left the officials with the 
impression that their priorities were being compromised for the sake of complying with 
QUIPS regulations.  
 
5.1.2.4  Monitoring and Auditing   
Most of the officials also asserted that the use of the grant was strictly audited by 
QUIPS: “the auditors were always on us and all this while;” which meant that there was 
no possibility of the officials acting in a way that was “dishonest” (interview U7): 
 
They brought us the money, we did [carried out the] activities; we prepared the reports 
and they came and took all the receipts. If you can‘t find a receipt [for money] you 
spent, if you lose a receipt, you will be in trouble. QUIPS team will chase you. Chop 
the money [‗chop‘ meaning ‗to eat‘, a Ghanaian English term for embezzlement on 
any scale]; with QUIPS? No way (interview U7). 
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In general, the DEO officials I interviewed declared that the monetary fungibility of the 
QUIPS grant was extremely small – or presumably zero – because of the strict QUIPS 
monitoring. Yet, an assistant director of finance and administration said that the DEO 
should not be permitted to hold the money until the whole directorate was capable of 
managing the funds by itself. He went on to caution that things were not always as they 
were claimed to be: 
 
The donors should manage and get to the ground [field] to ensure that activities are 
really performed as stated. USAID often visited us, but they couldn‘t attend and check 
all the activities we organised. [The] only way they can find out is to visit the site. The 
work plan and the stringent reporting requirements – activities reported on – may not 
always have been undertaken as described in reports (interview U3).  
 
This seems to imply two things. Firstly, there was always a risk of monetary fungibility 
among the officials at the DEO. In fact, an audit of the QUIPS district grant accounts 
conducted by the internal GES internal Auditing Unit found some payment vouchers to 
be insufficiently accounted for in both case study districts.36  
 
Secondly, the fact that the assistant director – who was ultimately responsible for 
finance and administration at the DEO – preferred a QUIPS team to ensure that the 
DEO functioned properly and spent its funds as planned, may imply the lack of an 
internal checking system and suggest that the DEO did not function efficiently enough 
to manage its funds without being closely monitored by an outside body.  
 
I went to see the QUIPS/CSA project team leader and asked if she thought that the 
DEO could have managed its funds (not only the district grant, but also a bigger portion 
of the programme funds) if USAID had released the money to them. She replied:  
 
I think that, yes, they [the DEO] could have handled the money. They probably could 
have. But I am not sure, if they would have without so much, let‘s say, involvement 
from our side. I am not sure that they would have found the means of doing it as 
economically as we were doing it with them. We currently in this project deal with 
grants to districts and one of the big struggles is when they do the training, they spend 
a lot of money. They sort of are not willing or able to come up with cheaper 
alternatives for doing training (interview UQC2). 
                                                     
36
 The DEO submitted district grant financial reports to the QUIPS project office, but not to GES 
HQ. However, the GES HQ Auditing Unit audited the use of the second tranche of the grant in 
both districts. It reported that in Lower Denkyira ¢4.9 million, i.e. 10% of the second tranche of 
¢48 million (USD 6,900), were insufficiently accounted for (GES 2003). In Upper Denkyira, 
¢623,000 (USD 79) were found to be unaccounted for (GES 2004a).  
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USAID/QUIPS believed that the transaction costs of monitoring the funds, which were 
mostly borne by QUIPS, would have been higher if the funds were completely handed 
over to the DEO.  
 
5.1.2.5  Summary of Findings at the Meso Level 
The process of applying the district grant was strictly monitored by the QUIPS office. 
Indeed, its usage was considered to be largely driven by the QUIPS facilitators, leaving 
DEO officials with the impression that their priorities were compromised by the need to 
comply with QUIPS regulations.  
 
Owing to the high level of control imposed by QUIPS, the grant was spent efficiently. 
Nevertheless, the QUIPS grant was not completely free of potential fungibility. The 
DEO directorates themselves acknowledged that there was always a possibility that 
officials might misappropriate any available funds (interview U3; U7; L3), a view that 
was echoed by the QUIPS subproject leaders (interview UQC2; UQC1; UQI1) and 
other QUIPS staff (interview UQI3; UQI2). Until the internal monitoring function began 
to take effect and all officials gained the capacity to manage the funds efficiently, the 
DEO regarded close monitoring by QUIPS to be necessary.  
 
5.1.3 Micro Level 
This section explores how the funds dispersed to the pilot schools were viewed by the 
staff working in them. The pilot schools received extensive support from QUIPS during 
a two-year intervention period. They were given various forms of training (e.g. the 
instruction of teachers in pupil-centred teaching and assessment techniques; and 
training for the SMC in school management and community participation), teaching and 
learning materials, books, a school block or teachers‟ quarters, and the micro grant.  
 
The funds were managed by a QUIPS programme office in Accra, with the exception of 
the micro grant and construction project. The former was awarded to the SMC and the 
latter was released through the district assembly. In other words, the micro grant was 
the only fund that the pilot schools received and managed directly.  
 
Therefore, this section focuses on the views of head teachers, teachers and SMC 
members of the micro grant project. Through the interviews during school visits, it 
became obvious that respondents expressed their views about the micro grant – 
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wittingly or unwittingly – by comparing it with their experience of the construction 
project. For this reason, their views, in particular those of the SMC, of the funds for the 
infrastructure project were also explored.  
 
5.1.3.1  The Micro Grant  
The micro grant was awarded to all pilot schools, and to their SMCs in particular (CSA 
2004). It was intended to meet school needs by supporting school/community initiatives 
that had been identified in QUIPS workshops. Together with extensive training in 
school management, each SMC was asked to open a bank account for the grant, into 
which a total ¢12 million (USD 1,714) was  paid in three tranches, i.e. ¢4 million (USD 
571) for each instalment. The micro grant was accompanied by a „match‟ obligation, 
whereby the SMC had to find a minimum of ¢2 million (USD 286) to top up each 
tranche so that the final total was at least ¢18 million (USD 2,571).  
 
Firstly, the use to which the money should be put was discussed at a meeting of the 
SMC and parent teacher association (PTA), the head teacher, and some teachers. The 
items that arose were then put to a community meeting to discuss and approve (e.g. 
interview L/Q3/SMC2; U/Q1/SMC1). After the SMC had received approval from the 
QUIPS team, teaching and learning materials37 were purchased. Finally, the SMC 
wrote a financial report, which the QUIPS team came and collected together with all the 
receipts.  
 
5.1.3.1.1  Wider Participation in School Management 
The micro grant was seen as a great success by all interviewees. All  respondents – 
including four head teachers who had experienced the QUIPS intervention from the 
beginning – stated that community involvement in school planning and budgeting was a 
step in the right direction, and that the micro grant was instrumental in realising the 
plans they had all made together. One of the head teachers commented: 
 
QUIPS taught us how to make an action plan. It was the first time to get the 
community involved in school action plans. Resources needed [the necessary 
resources were identified], and action plans accompanied the resources. It is a big, big, 
big success (interview L/Q2/HT).  
 
                                                     
37
 School requirements varied, but most schools bought a mixture of the following items: sports 
jerseys, football equipment, table tennis balls, cups, textbooks, exercise books, pens, pencils, 
erasers, towels, clocks, scales, cardboard and calculators (interview with SMCs). 
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The role that head teachers and their staff played in the application of the micro grant 
was to identify the needs of the school at the SMC/PTA meeting and subsequent 
community meeting. Usually, teachers‟ involvement in the micro grant was limited to 
making sure that the school‟s needs were accurately communicated to the 
SMC/PTA/community through their head teacher. Head teachers participated in the 
planning stage but did not deal with the funds themselves, except in signing for the 
withdrawal of the money.  
 
When asked what they thought about the arrangement whereby the SMC received the 
grant on behalf of the school, the four heads who had been in post during the QUIPS 
period agreed that it was appropriate that the SMC should have been delegated this 
responsibility.  
 
5.1.3.1.2  Accessibility 
In order to access the grant, the SMC formulated an action plan and, working closely 
with the head teacher, drew up the budget, filled in the form and got the go ahead from 
the QUIPS team. The task of receiving and applying the funds did not seem to have 
troubled the SMC members much because they had received intensive training in the 
procedure. None of the SMC chairpersons complained about the process involved in 
accessing the funds. This was mainly because the grant was kept under the SMC‟s 
control at the bank, the three signatories required for the withdrawal of funds being the 
SMC chairperson, an SMC member and the head teacher.  
 
5.1.3.1.3  Prerequisites of the Micro Grant 
The difficulty some SMCs faced was in raising the supplementary „match‟ amount of 
money from the community within a limited period. Collecting the matching funds was a 
prerequisite to the release of the grant from QUIPS to the SMC. However, five out of 
six SMCs did not find the collection of the matching funds so very challenging because 
“the community came to understand and manage it” (interview U/Q2/SMC1).  
 
Unfortunately, not all schools–community relationships were so successful in the 
management of their grant. One of the schools failed to collect the match funds for the 
third tranche and was not granted the last instalment. This SMC emphasised that they 
did whatever they could to collect the money from the community, but eventually they 
failed because the community “was overwhelmed by the workload brought by the 
QUIPS at that time” (interview U/Q3/SMC1). A DEO official explained:  
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For the farmers, contributing the money is very difficult. When the collection of the 
money is in the harvest season, they have cash. But when the collection is just before 
the harvest season, practically they don‘t have any cash in the pocket. The 
communities where most of them work in town – working at the market – have daily 
cash, but farming communities, they don‘t (interview U7). 
 
As the amount of matching funds was uniform, some pilot schools and their 
communities were forced to stretch their financial capacity during the QUIPS period.  
 
After having met the preconditions for collecting the matching funds for each tranche, 
there was another pressure. This was the limited period during in which they were 
obliged to spend the grant. A town SMC said that this was “very stressful” (interview 
U/Q1/SMC1). However, again, this was an even more serious challenge to rural pilot 
schools, where the SMC had to make several trips to town to obtain invoices and 
purchase the items (interview U/Q3/SMC1).  
 
5.1.3.1.4  Transparency 
Although all the SMCs commented on the stress they were under, and complained 
about collecting the „match‟, and having to spend the grant within a short time, all six 
SMCs acknowledged that a community-based system of accounting for the match 
ensured the transparent management of the grant:  
 
The use of the micro grant wasn‘t a decision made by [the] SMC or PTA only. The 
community, the whole community, they themselves planned by themselves and paid 
for the school. So they want to know how their money was spent (interview 
U/Q2/SMC1). 
 
After it had been agreed which items to purchase, three invoices were presented at a 
community meeting to compare suppliers. Then the receipts and actual items were 
shown at another meeting after the purchases had been made. One SMC member 
said: 
 
The money was theirs, so they checked us. There was a checking system and it really 
worked (interview U/Q3/SMC1).  
 
Thus, the SMC was held accountable for its purchases to the whole community; and as 
the community had a vested interested in how its money was spent, the internal 
monitoring mechanism appeared to work well.  
 
5.1.3.1.5  Accountability   
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With regard to ensuring accountability to the QUIPS office, the SMC prepared a 
financial report to accompany the receipts tranche by tranche, and then “the QUIPS 
[staff] came and took all with them” (interview L/Q3/SMC2). SMCs were repeatedly 
informed of and received training in the correct procedure (interview U/Q2/SMC1). 
However, one SMC admitted that it had initially “messed up” by making mistakes with 
the receipts without having been fully aware that QUIPS would insist on such an 
accurate financial report (interview L/Q3/SMC2).  
 
Another SMC described the situation as a state of alert due to QUIPS‟ close monitoring 
(interview U/Q3/SMC1). Yet, there was no doubt among SMCs that a strict monitoring 
and reporting system along with internal community checks enabled the SMC to ensure 
that the management of the micro grant was both transparent and accountable. 
 
5.1.3.2  Infrastructure Project  
This study found that SMCs‟ high regard for the transparency and accountability of the 
micro grant could be attributed to some extent to experience gained through their 
involvement in the school building project, which was another QUIPS initiative.  
 
The construction project was a joint venture between QUIPS, the district assembly and 
the school/community. QUIPS made a 60% contribution (USD  21-24,000) (Academy 
for Educational Development, 2004). The assembly contributed 20% in the form of a 
top-up (more than 20% if necessary) and the community contributed 20%, providing 
materials and communal labour respectively. The QUIPS funds were paid to the district 
assembly, three signatories being required for the purchase of materials – the SMC 
chairperson, the director of the DEO and a district assembly financial officer. Lastly, it 
had to be approved by the district chief executive. 
 
Generally, most SMCs regarded the management of construction project funds to have 
been far from transparent. This was largely because the SMCs had not seen district 
assembly financial reports, although only one SMC had actually asked to see it 
(interview L/Q2/SMC1):  
 
If [the] DC [district council; the former name of the district assembly] top up the 
amount, we don‘t know. They said that they supported [us], but [the] DC didn‘t 
produce the whole project expenses. So we don‘t know. [It is] difficult to grasp the 
whole cost, whole picture, total figure, amount of expenses. [The] DC didn‘t disclose 
the amount; [the] DC [did] not account for the money. [The] money should come to 
the community or at least [the] community should know the amount. [The] DC should 
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give us [a] copy of the budget, expenses, who were paid, how much. Whoever the 
money was passed through, the community and the head should have been involved in 
it or at least informed (interview L/Q2/SMC1).  
 
The three signatories system for the purchase of materials was seen to increase 
transparency to some extent, although all SMCs tended to believe that the procedure 
was overly bureaucratic. Nevertheless, no matter how cumbersome this might have 
been, a cross-check was seen to be the only way to ensure the efficient and candid 
use of the funds, and avoid the possibility of “temptation” (interview U/Q2/SMC1).  
 
In some cases, this verification system did not work, which caused SMCs to be even 
more suspicious of the assembly (interview L/Q2/SMC1). Moreover, this led some to 
think that the SMC itself could have put up many more buildings. One SMC that had 
had a three-block school building constructed believed that it could have built six 
classrooms if the money had been channelled through the community (interview L/Q2/ 
SMC6). This might sound a little unrealistic, but lack of transparency had made them 
so suspicious that they could not help but question the efficiency of the project.  
 
5.1.3.3  Summary of Findings at the Micro Level 
The whole micro grant process was felt to be driven by QUIPS. However, accordingly, 
the grant tended to be spent in a transparent and efficient manner. This was achieved 
by a mechanism of internal community checks and external monitoring by the QUIPS 
facilitators. Sharing the preconditions set by QUIPS among the community enhanced 
the internal checking mechanism. In other words, the SMC was accountable not only to 
the QUIPS office, but also to the wider community.  
 
In contrast, the management of construction project funds was thought to be less 
transparent. Financial details were not shared with the schools, unlike the case with the 
micro grant. This resulted in a strained relationship between the school/community and 
the assembly, and led to the suspicion of those in charge of the funds, although the 
level of mistrust differed depending on relationships between and among the groups of 
actors.  
 
5.1.4 Summary of QUIPS Fungibility 
The whole process of QUIPS was seen to be led by USAID/QUIPS. QUIPS insisted on 
absolute propriety in the processing of recipients in order to ensure the accountability 
of the funds, since the QUIPS office was in turn obliged to account to USAID.  
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Consequently, while accountability of the grant to the QUIPS office was accentuated, 
accountability to the GES was downplayed. The micro grant was monitored internally 
by the community and externally by the QUIPS office. However, the success of this 
monitoring system, which ensured the transparency of grant management in the 
school/community, was again due to the considerable efforts of the QUIPS facilitators 
and the threat of the sanctions that would be imposed on defaulters.  
 
Where financial information was not shared, those who were excluded grew doubtful 
about the efficiency of funding management. Non-involvement in information sharing 
and financial processes resulted in damage to working relations between actors. This 
was observed at all levels.  
  
It can be safely asserted that under QUIPS control, the fungibility of funds was 
relatively low (or lower than in other cases). In other words, the QUIPS grant was seen 
as being spent efficiently. However, it seems that such a perception depended on the 
definition of „efficiency‟.  
 
USAID/QUIPS considered its grant mechanism to be efficient so long as it was under 
the strict control of the QUIPS office. In fact, control over the grant was considered to 
be a significant contribution to keeping down the cost of the overall USAID intervention, 
if it were compared to the cost of maintaining the same level of accountability had all 
the funds been handed over to the DEO. In other words, the control of funds by 
USAID/QUIPS was efficient, but not necessarily satisfactory from the point of view of 
the recipient.  
 
 
5.2 Perceptions of QUIPS Impact 
This section explores the impact of the QUIPS programme from the viewpoint of 
Ghanaian education actors at the three levels.  
 
5.2.1 Macro Level  
This section looks at the views of GES HQ officials on two main components of the 
QUIPS programme: SMC/PTA/community participation in school management, and 
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academic progress in pilot schools. This is followed by a discussion of their views on 
the QUIPS approach to nationwide education development.  
 
5.2.1.1  Impact on Community Participation in Pilot Schools 
Those interviewed at GES HQ recognised that QUIPS efforts generated community 
awareness, and that, as a result, SMCs and PTAs made a renewed contribution to the 
enhancement of the performance of pupils, teachers and the school as a whole. They 
also acknowledged that QUIPS had demonstrated that the activation and reinforcement 
of SMC initiatives allowed communities to overcome severe structural and 
environmental constraints to school improvement.  
 
Indeed, USAID/QUIPS regarded the impact of QUIPS-initiated community involvement 
to be “the best component, [which led to] …the great achievement” (interview UQ1). 
Such an impact was seen to “exceed the expectations of what we had laid out as what 
would happen with the project” (interview UQC2). Indeed, the former BED director in 
the GES HQ acknowledges that the innovations were so marked that they led HQ 
officials to recognise the effectiveness of community participation in school 
management (interview G3).  
 
5.2.1.2  Impact on Learning in Pilot Schools 
In contrast to the wider recognition of community level impact on pilot schools, many 
officials at GES HQ questioned the degree of impact on the academic improvement of 
pupils in the pilot schools. GES officials assumed that these schools would have 
demonstrated a high level of performance, as their teachers had received intensive 
training and substantial materials support (interview G3; G11). However, they were not 
certain that this was actually the case.  
 
In fact, USAID/QUIPS failed to present convincing evidence of academic progress in 
the pilot schools to the Ghanaian side. According to the assessment test that compared 
QUIPS schools with non-QUIPS schools, pupils in the former had a higher proficiency 
in reading than their counterparts in the latter, but the difference was not great (see the 
detail QUIPS Programme Evaluation Team, 2005, Chap.5). A USAID officer agreed 
that the margin was not significant in comparison to the resources that had been 
poured into these three schools (interview UQ1).  
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Consequently, the officials questioned the effectiveness of the QUIPS approach to the 
pilot schools and, by extension, the effectiveness of the whole QUIPS approach itself 
(interview G3). Moreover, the officials were certain that the state would have achieved 
more if a corresponding amount of funding had been available to the GES  (interview 
G1).  
 
5.2.1.3  Summary of Findings at the Macro Level 
The impact of community participation came to be widely acknowledged at GES HQ. In 
contrast, its officials were not convinced of academic improvement in the pilot schools. 
Considering the substantial amount of support the pilot had schools received, the 
progress made was regarded as being rather disappointing. The HQ officials ultimately 
called into question the effectiveness of the entire QUIPS approach.  
 
 
5.2.2 Meso Level 
QUIPS was quite conspicuous at the district level, a DEO officer noting that the 
programme “stood in the light” (interview U1). This section firstly explores DEO officials‟ 
views of QUIPS impact on the pilot schools, especially in terms of progress made in 
SMC/PTA/community participation training. Secondly, it explores their views of the 
impact the district grant scheme and QUIPS training made on administration capacity.  
 
5.2.2.1  Impact on Pilot Schools 
5.2.2.1.1  Impact on SMC/PTA/Community Participation 
 
Before QUIPS, SMC[s]  [and] PTA[s] had been set up in many schools, as required by 
[the] GES, but they were dormant. They were given little or no training. The head 
teachers or the chiefs and elders were often selected [as] the PTA members. There was 
often poor rapport between the community and the school before the QUIPS. 
Consultations to discuss problems were infrequent, and teachers made few visits to the 
communities (interview U4).  
 
SMC/PTA/community participation was believed to have had “a huge impact” on the 
pilot schools and communities (interview Q7). It was recognised that QUIPS support  
led to the increase of awareness, interest and commitment of communities in the 
process of education.  
 
5.2.2.1.1.1 Level of Input  
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DEO officials thought that there were several elements of the QUIPS programme that 
led to the successful mobilisation of the SMC/PTA/communities in the pilot schools. 
Firstly, intensive support and training were provided by the QUIPS facilitators; and they 
immediately transformed training to practice (interview U17). Secondly, the facilitators 
were very effective and well motivated (interview U2). Thirdly, the financial incentive 
(e.g. the micro grant, a school compound or teachers‟ quarters) was seen as 
instrumental in mobilising the SMC/PTA/community:  
 
QUIPS motivated the SMC and PTA. They could imagine what they would do with 
the money after the training. [The] GES might give them training, but funds to let 
them practice what they were taught will never come. So the training goes in vain – 
just theory, never practical. They never get any money to do whatever they are taught. 
But in [the] case of QUIPS, even [the] SMC were trained by QUIPS, [and] all the 
funds were provided. QUIPS motivated the community, drew the SPIP,
38
 followed by 
QUIPS monitoring. That is why the SMC, PTA, community, all became very active 
(interview U8).  
 
The level of mobilisation and its intensity, along with the input of the grant, was 
regarded as an unprecedented experience for those in the pilot schools and 
communities. 
 
5.2.2.1.1.2 Active Involvement  
Communities were encouraged to take part in school management; and SMCs grew 
more aware of their role and became proactive. One community began to pay their own 
volunteer teachers to fill vacant teaching positions (interview U/Q3). Another began 
buying storybooks and readers to ensure that their children had the necessary learning 
materials (interview U/Q1). Some SMCs started visiting the director every week to 
discuss the problems their schools faced (interview L13).  
 
Having seen how effective the QUIPS approach to SMC/PTA/community mobilisation 
was, an assistant director concluded that bypassing the bureaucratic state system and 
channelling support straight to schools and communities had more of an impact than all 
the efforts of the GES (interview L13).  
 
5.2.2.1.2  Impact on School Performance and Pupils’ Learning  
On the contrary, DEO officials‟ views on academic improvement in the pilot schools 
were not very clear.  
                                                     
38
 School performance improvement plan.   
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Nevertheless, they acknowledged several factors that should have or might have had a 
positive impact:  
 Intensive training in child-centred teaching for „all‟ teachers (interview U1)  
 Availability of teaching and learning materials  
 Concerted supervision by head teachers, the SMC and PTA (interview U1)  
 Strict monitoring and frequent visits from QUIPS facilitators (interview U4)  
 Enhanced support and monitoring from the DEO (interview L4)  
 
Thus, their inference was that academic performance must have improved (interview 
U1).  
 
However, the officials were generally more interested in behavioural changes, for 
example, whether pupils had become more studious; stayed at home in the evenings; 
read English; enjoyed learning; and went to school every day. DEO officials were 
reluctant to affirm that it was certain pupils had improved in these terms because of the 
lack of concrete and quantifiable evidence. One assistant director did acknowledge an 
upward trend in academic performance, especially in English, but conceded that such 
improvement was quite subtle (interview L13).  
 
5.2.2.1.3  Distortion of District Resources: An Unexpected Impact 
QUIPS pilot schools received frequent visits from DEO officials during the intervention, 
which provided effective monitoring (interview L1). However, it may be argued that a 
high level of support to a few schools created an imbalance in the district. Lack of funds 
at the district level restricted the frequency of DEO visits to non-QUIPS schools.39 
Since GES HQ did not regularly provide the DEO with adequate funds for supervision, 
QUIPS created an imbalance within the system by providing monitoring assistance 
(e.g. fuel) to the three pilot schools. However, it must be acknowledged that without 
such a disparity, the quality of instructional improvement seen under QUIPS would not 
have been possible.  
 
5.2.2.2  Impact of the District Grant Scheme on Extension Schools 
As seen earlier (section 5.1.2), the district grant was provided to the DEO to expand 
the QUIPS programme to 15 other selected schools.  
                                                     
39
 One official admitted: “often, visits to non-QUIPS schools were limited to just saying hello and 
signing in the log books to show the officer was present” (interview U2).  
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5.3.2.2.1  An Isolated Intervention 
In instances where GES HQ could not provide the DEO with a sufficient budget, the 
district grant came as a big relief (interview U5), and the further 15 selected schools 
benefited a great deal (interview U6). However, this was a one-off intervention, 
described as “fireworks” or a “festival” for them (interview U7). Thus, “expecting long-
term outcomes [was] unrealistic” (interview U7). Indeed, there were several factors that 
limited the impact of the district grant.   
 
5.3.2.2.2  Applicability  
From the beginning, aiming to apply QUIPS to another 15 schools as a way of 
extending the programme throughout the district (Academy for Educational 
Development, 2004) was seen as “too ambitious” (interview U3). There were 
insufficient resources to extend QUIPS model practices to the 15 new schools 
(interview L1; U7). Therefore, the strategy adopted with the grant scheme was to 
replicate only a selected few of the best practices to all the schools. Thus, the duration 
and intensity of teacher training and community sensitisation was limited compared to 
what had been provided to the pilot schools.  
 
5.3.2.2.3  DEO Officials as Facilitators 
Unlike the pilot schools, in which QUIPS facilitators from Accra took charge, DEO 
officials were trained to conduct activities in the expansion phase of the programme. 
However, since the officials themselves were left in charge of 15 schools, they claimed 
that the quality of the activities they were expected to facilitate was compromised,  
maintaining that they were not sufficiently well motivated in comparison with the QUIPS 
consultants. One official contended: 
 
You see, the QUIPS team was well paid, came from Accra with a four-wheel [drive] 
car. But we had other duties to do. When we did QUIPS works, we had to put our 
duties aside (interview L13).  
 
This implies that the DEO officials not only considered QUIPS facilitators to be more 
efficient in service delivery, but also that they saw their role as facilitators or trainers as 
extra work for the QUIPS project in addition to their usual duties.  
 
5.3.2.2.4  Lack of Relevancy and Donor-centricity 
Interviews with the DEO suggested that broader consultation was necessary to ensure 
that QUIPS design and implementation was both effective and relevant given the 
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contextual constraints throughout the district. However, they recollected that the 
programme was not embedded within these realities; if it were, it would have 
implemented its programmes in harmony, at a pace that took into consideration the 
realities of people on the ground (interview L1; U7). In fact, they felt constrained, had 
very little room to manoeuvre, and simply followed the lead of the QUIPS programme 
implementers‟ instruction (interview U7). 
 
5.3.2.2.5  Lack of Follow-up 
The district monitoring and evaluation team was responsible for monitoring the 
implementation and impact of the district grant. However, it did not actually know 
anything of the way in which teachers used materials or generally how effective the 
training in these 15 schools had proved to be afterwards, because they did not conduct 
a follow-up evaluation (interview L12; U10). Thus, the efficacy of the district grant was 
unknown to most DEO officials.  
 
5.2.2.3  Impact on District Education Offices 
During the QUIPS intervention, DEO officials attended various residential training 
courses. This last section briefly looks at how the ensuing impact on the DEO was 
viewed by its officials. During the two-year intervention, new bodies, i.e. the district 
management implementation team (DMIT); the monitoring and evaluation (ME) team; 
and the community participation coordinator (CPC), were put in place by QUIPS, and 
DEO officials attended the appropriate courses.40 Their capacity was enhanced through 
such training (interview L13; L4; U5). The skills imparted to the DEO through the 
QUIPS courses enabled it to carry out a great deal of in-service training for both 
teachers and communities, and helped it reform district administrative and decision-
making procedures (interview U7; U5).  
 
5.2.2.4  Summary of Findings at the Meso Level 
                                                     
40
 QUIPS district programmes centred on 1) training of district staff including statisticians, the 
inspectorate, girl child officers, circuit supervisors, and district monitoring assistants; 2) ME 
training for district statisticians and ME teams; 3) teacher training of trainers for circuit 
supervisors, the inspectorate division and girl child officers, all of whom were often members of 
the district teaching support team (DTST); and 4) management, planning and financial 
management training for the district director of education, four line assistant directors (AD of 
supervision, the inspectorate, finance and administration, and human resources development) 
and the accountant and budgeting officer. 
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The QUIPS pilot schools received intensive support from the QUIPS project office 
during a two-year intervention. This community-based programme was regarded as a 
great success, while its impact on the academic progress of pupils was thought to be 
relatively intangible considering the amount of assistance the QUIPS pilot schools had 
received, although many positive changes were also observed.  
 
Therefore, some officials questioned whether the QUIPS approach in the targeting of 
pilot schools was effective. Nevertheless, the delivery of funding and support from the 
project office directly to the schools was considered to be more efficient than 
channelling them via the GES bureaucracy. However, in the extension of the 
intervention, DEO officials were not keen on taking on the role and responsibility of 
QUIPS facilitators; and some DEO officials admitted that the training and service 
delivery that QUIPS facilitators provided was more efficient than that of the officials 
themselves.  
 
The impact of the district grant scheme on the 15 extension schools was regarded in 
terms of something of an isolated intervention. Additionally, it did not contribute to the 
application of all QUIPS practice to the 15 schools, much less to the whole district. The 
entire process of the distribution of the district grant was considered to be donor-
centric, and, moreover, not sensitive enough to the needs of the districts. However, the 
training that DEO officials received was thought to be very effective, and gave them a 
greater sense of competency.  
 
 
5.2.3 Micro Level 
This section explores how the impact of the QUIPS intervention was viewed by those in 
the schools (head teachers, teachers and SMC members). This is assessed in terms of 
the two main components that QUIPS focused on, i.e. SMC/PTA/community 
involvement and learning improvement.  
 
5.2.3.1  Impact of SMC/PTA/Community Training  
It was widely recognised in the QUIPS schools that QUIPS-initiated community 
involvement in school management had a huge impact on the school environment and 
the resulting improvement in the quality of education. The interviewees unanimously 
expressed their high regard for QUIPS, asserting how the programme had brought 
about positive changes in the pilot schools and communities. SMC members in 
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particular were most enthusiastic, as they had played a key role, and expressed their 
ardent desire for QUIPS to return. One of the SMC executives said: 
 
SMC Chairperson calls the meeting. SMC and the committee are involved in school 
management. We, including Head, plan what we want to do regarding school. 
Previously, [a] gong gong was beaten, [but] people didn‘t come (interview 
L/Q3/SMC1).  
 
Another SMC executive explained other positive changes brought by QUIPS: 
 
Vast changes, so many things changed. All things we‘ve learnt from QUIPS. A lot 
[has been] learnt from them: how to maintain and improve teaching and learning; how 
to contribute communal labour; how to consider teachers‘ welfare. [The] school and 
children are now very disciplined. [The] children speak English. Parents provide the 
needs of children (interview L/Q2/SMC1). 
 
These changes were also noticed by headteachers. One of the headteachers said: 
 
[The] SMC had been there – constitutional provision. But before QUIPS, [the] SMC 
had [only] existed on paper. QUIPS brought us the practical aspect of the whole thing. 
[The] SMC became dynamic and the whole thing started moving (interview 
L/Q2/HT). 
 
The key to this success was considered to be due to several factors. Firstly, there was 
intensive training for sensitisation and awareness of the roles of the SMC, PTA and 
community in school improvement, together with the provision of substantial resources 
for its realisation. Secondly, the effectiveness of the QUIPS facilitators was also raised 
in every school. In fact, SMCs in particular grew to trust the QUIPS facilitators implicitly. 
This was observed in all QUIPS schools, indicating a good working relationship. 
Thirdly, the financial incentive (i.e. the micro grant) was thought to be instrumental in 
mobilising the SMC and getting the community involved in the programme.  
 
5.2.3.2  Impact on Learning  
Unlike the uncertainty about the improvement in educational achievement observed 
among GES officials at HQ and at the DEO, all the head teachers41 and SMC members 
who had been in the pilot schools for the whole two-year intervention confirmed that 
great progress had been made in pupils‟ academic performance, especially in their 
                                                     
41
 Only four of six head teachers in the pilot schools had been in post throughout the QUIPS 
intervention.  
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spoken English. Indeed, one of the QUIPS schools (U/Q1) came top of its district in 
2005, while another (U/Q2) came top of the three primary schools in its junior 
secondary school (JSS) catchment area. This was considered to be due to great effort 
and substantial input from the QUIPS programme office (interview U/Q1/HT; 
U/Q1/SMC1; U/Q2/SMC1).  
 
Among the many teaching and learning materials supplied, the provision of English 
readers and textbooks was considered to be instrumental in helping pupils to 
understand and use English (interview L/Q3/T1).  
 
The QUIPS in-service training course, which focused on child-centred teaching, was 
considered to be vital. This course was regarded as the first thorough and effective 
training that many teachers had received (interview L/Q3/HT; U/Q2/HT), and a vast 
difference in comparison with the cascade model of in-service training advocated by 
the GES (interview L/Q2/HT). 
 
All the QUIPS-trained head teachers and teachers agreed wholeheartedly that the 
course was “extensive, intensive, excellent, rigorous, hands-on…[which] made us know 
exactly how to handle the subjects,” (interview L/Q2/HT) and how to prepare and use 
the teaching and learning materials (interview L/Q3/T1). This of course also made 
lessons easier to teach (interview L/Q3/HT3).  
 
Moreover, the teachers considered their QUIPS trainers to be very capable (interview 
L/Q2/HT; U/Q2/HT). As a result, the QUIPS-trained teachers were confident of their 
enhanced teaching skills.  
 
5.2.3.3  An Unexpected Impact on the Neighbourhood 
Because the QUIPS pilot schools quickly developed a reputation for being „good‟ 
schools, parents in surrounding communities began transferring their children from 
nearby schools to the QUIPS schools. This trend was mentioned in five out of six 
QUIPS schools.42  
 
Thus, although the improved access and increased enrolment resulting from the 
QUIPS programme was generally viewed favourably at school level, interviews at the 
                                                     
42
 One QUIPS school was not certain whether this was the case because all the QUIPS-trained 
teachers had left by the time of my visit.  
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DEO suggest that it presented systemic problems. In other words, the inflow of pupils 
from non-QUIPS schools to QUIPS schools produced an imbalance in enrolment 
distribution in those communities adjacent to the latter.  
 
As enrolment at nearby schools became depleted, the enthusiasm and general support 
for education in many surrounding schools began to diminish. Some GES HQ officials 
pointed out this imbalance in favour of the novel and “very exciting” QUIPS school as a 
negative outcome of the QUIPS programme (interview G4; G1; G3). In fact, it seems to 
have introduced unforeseen problems in the delivery and administration of local and 
district primary education.  
 
5.2.3.4  Summary of Findings at the Micro Level 
Interviews in the pilot schools revealed that the QUIPS programme was seen to have 
had a tremendously positive impact on school performance and pupils‟ learning.  
 
5.2.4 Summary of QUIPS Impact 
In general, the QUIPS programme had a visible impact at school and district levels, 
and on the pilot schools in particular. Community participation was regarded as being 
very successful in terms of improvement of school performance at all three levels. 
However, the positive impact of QUIPS on pupils‟ academic performance was 
perceived as more doubtful according to  HQ officials.  
 
Interviews with education actors in the pilot schools revealed that pupil attainment had 
improved as a result of the unprecedented support from QUIPS. However, considering 
the amount of support the QUIPS pilot schools had received, the impact on academic 
achievement was thought to be rather disappointing by GES officials, especially those 
at HQ. GES wanted to see clear and quantifiable evidence that a QUIPS approach had 
had an impact on pupils‟ academic performance nationwide, rather than anecdotal 
accounts from pilot schools. However, QUIPS failed to deliver a statistically convincing 
result. There was thus a perception gap over the impact of QUIPS on pupils‟ academic 
performance between the GES and the pilot schools. 
 
Concluding that QUIPS had failed to achieve substantial improvement in pupils‟ 
academic performance, even in the pilot schools, HQ officials questioned the 
effectiveness of the QUIPS approach to its pilot schools, and, more critically, to any 
policy for nationwide improvement in education. Indeed, the DEO had struggled to 
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replicate the QUIPS model to an additional 15 schools; it was therefore seemingly 
unrealistic to expect it to expand the initiative throughout the district.  
 
Nevertheless, the role of the  Ghanaian QUIPS facilitators was considered to be 
instrumental to the delivery of support to the schools. This view was echoed by DEO 
officials, who admitted that they did not have the capacity to deliver such support to the 
same degree of efficiency and efficacy under the prevailing GES system.  
 
The QUIPS programme was highly visible at district and school levels. In general, the 
impact of the programme was considered to be significant, especially at the school 
level.  
 
The challenge ahead was the question of whether this impact could continue to lead to 
development outcomes after the completion of interventions. The next section explores 
views of sustainability in this regard.  
 
 
5.3 Perceptions of QUIPS Sustainability 
One of the biggest challenges for any attempt at education development is how to 
sustain the impact and changes brought about by innovations, and the QUIPS 
programme was no exception. This section explores how Ghanaian education actors 
viewed the sustainability of the QUIPS programme.   
 
5.3.1 Macro Level 
 
[We have] no interest in QUIPS. Considering it is out of our system, it‘s nonsense that 
USAID expects [the] GES to take over QUIPS (interview G11).  
 
It became clear from interviews with the directorate and implementing officials at GES 
HQ that they were convinced that the QUIPS programme – or any combination of its 
individual components – could not easily be incorporated into the state education 
system, much less sustain it. At least, they did not regard themselves as being 
responsible for attempting such a task. The following is an examination of the 
reasoning that led to this view.  
 
5.3.1.1  Ownership  
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Ownership comprises a relation between the owned and the owner, and is considered 
to be a necessary prerequisite for the sustainability of any intervention (Molund, 2000 
pp.12-3; Ostrom et al., 2002b p.16). In this regard, the Ghanaian officials at HQ bitterly 
regretted their lack of ownership of the QUIPS programme, an attitude formed through 
the way the programme was designed and implemented, and how the Ghanaians were 
involved in it.  
 
As seen earlier (section 5.2), the QUIPS programme was administered from a 
programme office set up by USAID and had full control of its budget, which was outside 
the jurisdiction of the GES. Therefore, the officials believed that the state should not be 
expected to take over the QUIPS programme.  
 
More practically, the fact that the GES officials were kept in the dark about the finances 
meant that it was literally impossible for the GES to sustain QUIPS, even if they wished 
to do so. A GES budget officer explained: 
 
GES never [knew] how much USAID spent on the project. Then, when the project 
ends, GES is expected to take over, but how? Where are the funds? We don‘t even 
know how much the expenses were. How can we continue what they started? QUIPS 
is GES‘s – that is what USAID says. But I would say, ―no.‖ Nothing [was] left after 
the ending of the intervention; QUIPS is nil (interview G6).  
 
The entire QUIPS intervention process – from conception to completion – was 
regarded as having been driven by USAID/QUIPS. The MoE/GES failed to engage in 
full collaboration, or even reach an effective agreement on the programme details 
(interview M1; G4; G5; G12). This view was echoed by USAID/QUIPS personnel 
(interview UQ1; UQC1; UQC2). A former GES basic education officer recalled the way 
in which QUIPS was brought into the Basic Education division: 
 
USAID hired some consultants who were developing programmes, developing 
concepts and sending them to the GES [with the details of] what they wanted to do. 
So, GES personnel went along with what QUIPS had planned for basic education. So 
QUIPS was stimulated and ran [the programme] from the outside but involved the 
GES personnel in implementation (interview G11).  
 
5.3.1.2  Degree of involvement of GES officials 
Thus, the officials at GES HQ were „involved‟ in QUIPS implementation, but the extent 
to which they were engaged in the programme was regarded as being relegated to 
“manual labour” (interview G12). Another officer said, “QUIPS come only when they 
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need you, when they need signatures” (interview G13). This view was even echoed by 
the director general (interview G17).  
 
The fact that the programme was led by USAID and administered by the QUIPS office, 
made officials feel that their work schedules were being interrupted when they received 
requests from QUIPS. As QUIPS was not integrated into their work schedules, the 
officials felt that they did not know when or what they would be asked to do next 
(interview G11).  
 
The director of CRDD43 explained how much her work was interrupted by requests 
from USAID/QUIPS:  
 
They just come... They have a plan, and they send [the plan or letter] to you [the 
director herself] and tell you that they have funds and want to help you in this [plan]. 
You are not part of the planning, so it interferes with your work, because they [have] 
already fixed their dates. They expect that when they come, you [will] stop everything 
and work with them. It does not matter whether you are busy or not. We also have our 
own calendar of activities, and they just interrupt. [If] they are not satisfied with your 
way of work[ing] with them, they start complaining that you are not cooperative. It is 
like lording [it] over everybody. Me, I am getting fed up with them (interview G12). 
 
Because QUIPS was not integrated into the GES operation schedule, the officials felt 
that they were not paid to carry out work requested by the QUIPS programme office. 
They saw it as an extra burden put upon them by the agency, given that QUIPS was 
not their responsibility. Being well aware that QUIPS staff were much better paid than 
them, some officials felt that the donor was not sensitive to their needs (interview G8). 
When QUIPS refused to pay GES officers the same daily subsistence allowance as 
USAID paid even their drivers, they felt that they were not being respected (interview 
G6; G12; G13). 
 
5.3.1.3  Imbalance of Power 
Trust and understanding among partners in any working relationship are considered to 
be critical. When institutions work together towards a common goal, it is essential that 
they clearly understand the nature of the relationship and their respective roles and 
responsibilities, and express their views and listen to each other. However, such a 
relationship between the GES and QUIPS failed miserably. Although the CSA/QUIPS 
                                                     
43
 Curriculum, Research and Development division at GES. 
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team leader tried to assure the GES that they always tried to include the MoE in 
whatever they did (interview UQC2), the donor‟s efforts were not appreciated.  
 
Any mechanism for delivering assistance must be accompanied by a working 
relationship. However, the officials believed that their relationship was never equal and 
there was an obvious imbalance of power between USAID/QUIPS and the MoE/GES. 
The epitome of this inequity was seen in USAID‟s refusal to hand the funds over to the 
GES. Regardless of its reasons for taking such a stance, the money represented power 
(interview G6). Therefore, it appeared to the officials that USAID was refusing to 
relinquish some of its power and was clinging to total power by holding onto the funds. 
USAID claimed that they were “partners” with the Ghanaians sitting in “the driving 
seat,” but these words sounded to the officials like nothing more than “meaningless 
jargon” (interview G6).  
 
In an arrangement in which “only USAID controlled the programmes, determined what 
[was] to be done and kept the power” (interview G12), their working relationship was 
often strained. Moreover, the attitude of QUIPS facilitators was sometimes too 
objective-oriented for the officials to work with (interview G5). As long as QUIPS 
pursued tangible and immediate results, any working relationship with the GES was 
going to continue being damaged (interview G11), because QUIPS staff “behaved as 
though they had authority over GES personnel” (interview G11). As a result, one 
CSA/QUIPS team leader commented that there was a prevailing “resentment” at HQ, 
which had become “a huge, huge barrier to sustainability” (interview UQC2).  
 
5.3.1.4  Summary of Findings at the Macro Level 
It may be concluded that the officials at MoE/GES HQ did not consider the QUIPS 
component to be sustainable within the GES system. QUIPS was not owned by the 
MoE/GES, so they did not see it as their responsibility. There were a myriad of factors 
contributing to this conclusion, e.g. the donor-driven planning and implementation 
process; the fact that QUIPS had not been integrated into the GES sector plan; and the 
lack of GES control over the programme funds. Indeed, power was never handed over 
to the Ghanaians but kept by the donor alone. The sense of inequity that prevailed at 
the GES hampered the development of a good working relationship, causing a huge 
disparity between the two sides.  
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The sustainability of QUIPS practices was ultimately contingent upon the GES 
(interview UQC2). Only the GES, with the support of the MoE, could connect the 
successful outcomes achieved in the pilot schools and districts with a system of 
progressive good practice and eventual expansion to a national education policy. 
However, the officials did not think it was their responsibility.  
 
5.3.2 Meso Level 
 
QUIPS will die gradually, naturally. If the funds for keeping the project moving on are 
not in place, gradually it will die. It is [a] natural death. We are supposed to keep the 
QUIPS experience in those schools or even scale up, but there are no resources for 
doing that. All the QUIPS efforts QUIPS have made will go in vain. QUIPS brought a 
huge chunk of money, and have the schools accustomed to using and enjoying the 
money, and left. This is no good. The next time USAID [will/should] make sure that 
the Ghanaian government will take over the project (interview U7). 
 
The following section explores the views of district education officials on the 
sustainability of the QUIPS programme in their districts. The following section looks at 
how the officials saw the continuation of QUIPS practices in the pilot schools; the 
application of these practices for education improvement throughout the district; and 
the potential sustainability of DEO administrative innovations brought about by the 
QUIPS programme.  
 
5.3.2.1  Sustainability in Pilot Schools  
An officer in charge of the QUIPS intervention at the DEO commented:  
The benefits are not being sustained. The officers and teachers trained were hard 
working when they knew [that] people [from QUIPS] would come and see them. 
Supervision to schools came more frequently because they had money and fuel, and 
QUIPS people came. Now this is not happening and for many, it is easier to slip back 
into our old ways if no one is there to push (interview U7).  
 
Another officer confirmed: 
Without supervision, the outcomes, improvement caused by QUIPS wouldn‘t last 
long. QUIPS would die out soon without monitoring and supervision. QUIPS intended 
that [the] DEO would take over responsibility in terms of finance; [the] office is aware 
of it. But we [can‘t] afford to organise the workshops as often as QUIPS did 
(interview U10).  
 
The implementation of the QUIPS intervention in the pilot schools was directly 
administered by the QUIPS programme office; and officials were invited whenever the 
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QUIPS facilitator went to the district to organise workshops in the pilot schools. As 
seen earlier (section 5.2.3), the officials acknowledged that there had been huge 
positive changes in the pilot schools. However, they had serious reservations about the 
continuation of such innovations. In fact, none of the officers actually believed that the 
changes brought about by QUIPS would last long unless continuous support and 
supervision was provided by the DEO. An Assistant Director explained: 
 
Two years are not enough; not long enough to change the schools and communities 
fundamentally, because the mechanism to sustain [for sustainability] is needed. [A] 
support system is needed. Follow-up is more important than initiatives (interview U3).  
 
Circuit supervisors‟ school visits to support teachers were irregular or nonexistent after 
the end of the QUIPS programme (interview L5; U8). Despite officials‟ notion that extra 
monitoring was key to the maintenance of QUIPS practices, interviews with the district 
directors of education and budget officers revealed that the DEO had not allocated an 
extra budget for the pilot schools or 15 expansion schools since the completion of the 
intervention. District director in Uper Denkyira commented that the DEO could not 
afford to allocate extra resources to the QUIPS-related schools (interview U13).  
 
Nevertheless, even if it had been manageable, the DEO directorate did not have any 
intention of offering extra support, since it reasoned that the pilot schools had enjoyed 
disproportionate funding not only from QUIPS, but also from the DEO throughout the 
intervention (interview U5; U7; U9).  
 
QUIPS programme requirements placed heavy demands on DEOs, and the capacity of 
the district to respond to other needs was considered to have been compromised. 
Indeed, the professional time and energy required in supporting QUIPS innovations in 
the three pilots left as many as a hundred or more other schools with radically reduced 
support (interview L1).  
 
Thus, due in large part to the notion that existing district resources were being 
unevenly drained, it was believed that supporting the pilot schools in the sustenance of 
their QUIPS practices was not fair to other schools:  
 
We don‘t allocate [an] extra budget [to the QUIPS schools] to [conduct] follow-up. 
They enjoyed extra support, but others didn‘t. We have to look after all the schools in 
the district. QUIPS is over; we don‘t allocate any money to these schools. All schools 
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in the district should have fair treatment. All the schools should receive the same, 
equal support from [the] DEO (interview U7). 
 
It was argued that QUIPS should have taken the budgetary limitation of the DEO into 
consideration at the programme planning stage and given some thought to how it might 
be sustained after the termination of the intervention. From a practical point of view, it 
was suggested that QUIPS should have financed programme follow-up:  
 
In theory, it‘s [the] office‘s responsibility to monitor but in practice, it‘s impossible. 
QUIPS should provide resources to let us mobilise to supervise schools if they 
[QUIPS] are serious [about sustaining the programme]. Realistically, it is the only way 
to maintain QUIPS [practices] in schools (interview U2).  
 
Moreover, it was criticised that choosing and allocating substantial support to just three 
schools per district was a significant drawback (e.g. interview L4; L1; U7; U13). The 
district grant was provided in order to enable the district to assume more control over 
QUIPS interventions by equipping it to improve school quality and community 
participation. However, district directors contended that the 3 schools in the project and 
a grant to finance support to an additional 15 would not effect districtwide change 
because the resources of the QUIPS schools were so much greater than those of the 
average school (interview L10; U13; G15). It was thus thought to be practically 
impossible to apply QUIPS practices to schools throughout the district.  
 
Interviewees made it clear that supporting 3 schools per district during a mere 2-year 
intervention, and/or granting another 15 schools some support on a couple of isolated 
occasions, was insufficient to help the district move forward with new approaches to 
improving quality in the classroom, or effectively replicate good practice across the 
whole district (e.g. interview U7; U9; U8; L1; L4; L2; L3). The fundamental limiting 
factor was that the QUIPS approach did not convince district officials that it could be 
practically applicable to districtwide change.  
 
5.3.2.2  Sustainability of Administrative Changes at the DEO 
5.3.2.2.1  Organisational Structure 
QUIPS aimed to strengthen the administrative capacity of the DEO by introducing a 
consultative planning process, and by installing new functions such as DMIT, ME and 
CPC (QUIPS Programme Evaluation Team, 2005). The following briefly looks at how 
far these structures were maintained.  
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 DMIT   
By the time of this study, the DMIT had ceased to function in either district. Contrary to 
QUIPS objectives, officials contended that the DMIT was established to manage the 
QUIPS district grant, and thus its role concluded along with the completion of grant 
expenditure.  
 
 ME   
This had had also stopped functioning in both districts. Again, ME was regarded to 
have been established in order to monitor QUIPS grant activities; thus, the task was 
complete. Meanwhile, the existing oversight of schools, i.e. the duties of the circuit 
supervisor – headed by the assistant director (supervision) – continued to be carried 
out regardless of any wider notion of ME.  
 
 CPC    
Unlike ME and DMIT, a CPC was kept on in both districts. This was because GES HQ 
had decided to maintain the position in order to promote community participation in 
school management. It thus instructed all DEOs to retain their CPCs, financing the 
position from the district education budget, which was ultimately facilitated through 
funding from DFID.  
 
However, merely keeping on the CPCs did not necessarily mean that the position was 
functioning efficiently. The CPC in Upper Denkyira was the original postholder who had 
been trained by QUIPS, while the CPC at the other DEO was not. In fact, in the latter 
district, the postholder was a CPC in name only as there had been no activities 
organised in relation to the position since the officer had been appointed several years 
previously (interview L5).  
 
5.3.2.2.2  Professional Capacity 
Interviews with officials suggested that planning in the DEO was no longer consultative. 
In fact, it had only been so at the time when it had been necessary to make decisions 
on the usage of the district grant. However, it was asserted that professional skills 
acquired through QUIPS training remained useful at the individual level and officials 
could apply the benefits of their training in their daily work: 
 
The administrative skills we learnt from QUIPS enable us in some cases to effectively 
influence planning, because staff here have become more competent through the 
QUIPS [programme] (interview U7). 
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Nevertheless, some members of staff were transferred and others retired.44 When a 
QUIPS-trained officer left, the position was often filled by someone who had not been 
trained by QUIPS. The enhancement of individual professional competency and 
capability through QUIPS training was acknowledged, but it was also seen as being 
limited to the individual level – unless GES HQ provided continuous training.  
 
5.3.2.3  Lack of Government Planning  
Interviews with officials revealed that a lack of programme termination planning by the 
MoE/GES or USIAD/QUIPS was regarded as a fundamental obstacle to sustainability. 
This was especially significant because DEO officials considered that maintaining 
QUIPS practices in their districts was beyond their means and responsibility alone.  
 
In theory, the Ghanaian government should have taken over the programme, but it was 
believed that in practice, a more realistic arrangement was necessary at the design 
stage (interview U7). One director of district education argued that proper planning 
would have allowed additional support to the primary school sector when QUIPS was 
withdrawn (interview U13). However, without any provision for following this up, a 
negative view of sustainability prevailed at the DEOs. 
 
5.3.2.4  QUIPS Facilitators and the Effects of Poaching 
Ironically, some Ghanaian QUIPS facilitators were retired or former employees of the 
GES, while others were still employed by the state but were temporarily working for the 
QUIPS programme through the unpaid leave system. As is frequently the case in the 
development sector, the offer of better remuneration and conditions of service played a 
big part in attracting highly capable former and even current GES staff to the 
programme. By poaching education administrators and teachers from government 
institutions and offering higher salaries and a supportive working environment, these 
personnel were able to work at an optimum level in the best interests of the 
programme. Indeed, these „efficient‟ and „capable‟ facilitators were regarded by DEO 
officials, as well as those in the schools, as being instrumental in moving QUIPS 
                                                     
44
 The transfer or retirement of officials influenced all aspects of the QUIPS legacy. For 
example, the assistant director (statistics) in both districts, who had each received training in 
data analysis, were not in post at the time I conducted my fieldwork – one had retired and was 
yet to be replaced, and the other was on extended leave – and their absence affected efficient 
data analysis. 
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forward. However, there was no arrangement integrating their knowledge and skills into 
the GES system.  
 
5.3.2.5  Summary of Findings at the Meso Level 
The sustainability of QUIPS was considered to be beyond the responsibility of those at 
district level. Indeed, whether they could influence it all depended on the question of 
whether MoE/GES HQ provided the DEO with sufficient funds to continue QUIPS 
practices in the pilot and extension schools; as well as the necessary support and 
resources to extend the QUIPS approach throughout the district. The constraint of such 
a policy was that the officials were not convinced that QUIPS practices were relevant to 
education development in the districtwide context. Considering the limited resources 
available to them, the approach itself was not seen to be sufficiently practicable to 
ensure sustainability.  
 
5.3.3 Micro Level 
As seen in section 5.2.3, QUIPS had a huge impact on those in the pilot schools and 
communities. This section looks at the sustainability of the QUIPS initiative from the 
viewpoint of those in the schools. It explores this from two main angles, i.e. quality of 
education and community participation.  
 
5.3.3.1  Sustainability of Teaching Quality 
The degree to which teachers continued providing a high standard of education varied, 
depending on the school. However, the biggest challenge to sustainability in the pilot 
schools was the retention of QUIPS-trained teachers.  
 
Of a total of six QUIPS schools in the two districts, five head teachers remained in post 
after the end of the intervention.45 However, of approximately 36 teachers, only 5 
stayed in their posts afterwards. These five taught at schools in Upper Denkyira, while 
all the QUIPS-trained teachers in Lower Denkyira left the pilot schools.  
 
The QUIPS facilitators had asked teachers to stay at their schools for „a number‟ of 
years, but since no one had officially imposed such a requirement, they were under no 
obligation to comply with it. In truth, many of them waited for QUIPS to leave and then 
                                                     
45
 One was posted in the middle of the intervention, as the former head teacher was dismissed 
for misconduct. 
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“immediately” sought a transfer (interview L/Q2/HT). This was because many felt that 
the workload imposed on them had been unfair compared with that of their peers who 
were earning the same salary (interview L/Q1/SMC3; L/Q2/HT; L/Q3/HT).  
 
All the teachers I met condemned QUIPS‟ treatment of teachers, complaining that the 
economic opportunity cost of teaching was not factored into the implementation of the 
programme (e.g. interview L/Q3/T1; U/Q1/T1; U/Q2/T2; U/Q3/T1). Sometimes, they felt 
that they were not up to the demands that QUIPS made of them and resented the fact 
that they had been forced to join the programme (interview U/Q3/HT). They harboured 
the sense that teachers were the only ones who had not benefited from the project at 
all – except in the enhancement of their professional skills – while pupils and 
communities had reaped more tangible benefits. Several teachers told me, “We helped 
QUIPS people” (e.g. interview U/Q1/T2), which implies that they did not feel that they 
owned the programme.  
 
Many teachers complained bitterly about their lack of incentive to work harder; but the 
same people also said that they would have left in any case, even if incentives had 
been provided by QUIPS during the intervention (e.g. interview U/Q1/T3). One teacher 
added that he had worked hard throughout the programme and could not have worked 
any harder even if QUIPS had provided incentives (interview U/Q1/T4).  
 
As the extent of DEO supervision went back to the „usual‟ after the end of the 
programme, maintaining the high standard of teaching attained in the QUIPS schools 
was down to the head teacher alone (interview L/Q3/T1). In theory, it was essential that 
the head continued to offer teachers – especially newcomers – supervision and 
support, but in practice, the level of support that had been established was an 
impossible act to follow (interview U/Q1/HT; L/Q3/HT4).  
 
Although many teachers were keen to leave QUIPS schools for less demanding 
environments, they were definitely more confident and proud of their newly acquired 
professional knowledge and skills, claiming that they would attempt to apply their 
teaching skills as much as possible wherever they taught in future (interview U/Q1/HT; 
L/Q3/HT; L/Q2/HT).  
 
However, from point of view of the SMC, QUIPS practices would not be sustainable 
unless QUIPS-trained teachers remained in post. According to the SMCs, schools and 
communities ceased to benefit from the intervention when QUIPS-trained teachers left, 
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and this was exactly what was happening. It did not matter to them that teachers might 
take their new skills to other more deprived schools, thus benefiting the education 
sector as a whole. For the SMCs, the most important consideration was the issue of 
whether „their‟ children continued to benefit from the QUIPS teachers. Most SMCs were 
thus disappointed that so many teachers were leaving, a phenomenon that appeared to 
them to be ill fated.  
 
5.3.3.2  Sustainability of Community Involvement 
Cooperation of the community towards the school has drastically lessened in 
comparison to the time when QUIPS was here. They seem to wait for [an] outside 
intervention to boost them up again (interview L/Q3/T1).  
 
Five out of the six SMCs got together for me in response to my invitation through the 
head teachers. In three of the schools, all the SMC members came along. Such a 
response was a remarkable contrast to that of the non-QUIPS schools, which might 
indicate the greater interest of the former in their schools.  
 
Nevertheless, the sense of ownership of the school prevailing in schools and 
communities during the intervention period was considered to have dwindled; the 
enthusiasm of SMCs, which had prompted the success of their communities in the 
micro grant and construction projects, had waned.  
 
One of the QUIPS schools (L/Q3) was introduced to me by the district directorate as 
having grown to be the “most dynamic” community as a result of the QUIPS 
intervention. Interviews at the school confirmed this claim: in the CSA final evaluation, 
the community had been judged to be one in which there was a high probability of 
sustainability (CSA 2004).  
 
Nevertheless, it turned out that the gathering for me was the first SMC meeting in the 
two years or more since the completion of the QUIPS programme. This implies that 
communities described as engendering a high level of school–community interaction 
and strengthened community support during the intervention were not always able to 
sustain these outcomes.  
 
Similarly, at another school, all the SMC members assembled, expressing in unison 
how much they continued to support the school and its teachers, and how often they 
visited to monitor teaching quality (interview U/Q3/SMC1). Yet, interviews with the head 
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teacher and teachers (interview U/Q3/HT; U/Q3/T1), as well as the evidence of the 
visitors‟ book, revealed that nobody had visited the school for almost a year.  
 
According to the SMCs, the reason for their becoming so lax was that they no longer 
had the resources to manage schools properly. However, they emphasised that they 
would retain the knowledge and school management skills acquired through QUIPS 
training, to be exercised whenever the “extra resources” became available (interview 
U/Q2/SMC1; L/Q2/SMC1). This casts doubt on the role of the SMC and community in 
school management, as well as calling into question the meaning of ownership and 
sustainability.  
 
5.3.3.3  Summary of Findings at the Micro Level 
The findings at school level reveal to us how difficult it was to sustain such innovations 
beyond the lifetime of the programme. No matter how thoroughly the teachers were 
trained, most of them resigned from their posts, leaving the pilot schools with newly 
arrived non-QUIPS-trained teachers. This presented a significant challenge to head 
teachers in their attempts to keep up QUIPS practices as much as possible with scant 
support from the DEO, SMC, PTA or community.  
 
Though many SMCs became dormant, the QUIPS experience was seen as something 
that had changed their attitude towards the schools. It is possible that the SMC, PTA 
and community around pilot schools will have a greater receptivity to subsequent 
interventions, and that they are able to bring greater capacity to future development 
activities due to their experiences through the QUIPS programme.  
 
5.3.4 Summary of QUIPS Sustainability 
Whether the externally provided QUIPS programme is sustained depends on whether 
schools receive the continuous support and capacity building necessary to do so. After 
an intensive intervention period of two years, the DEO was the only agency that was in 
a position to do so. Therefore, responsibility for sustainability at the school level lies 
with the DEO.  
 
However, the DEO was unable to afford to provide practical support to the level that the 
pilot schools had become accustomed; neither did it have the capacity to extend 
QUIPS practices throughout the district. Moreover, given that there was an uneven 
distribution of resources among schools during the intervention period, the DEO did not 
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see any reason to maintain this inequitable situation afterwards. It was considered to 
be a challenge that should be resolved at national level.  
 
However, HQ did not consider sustainability to be its responsibility either, since the 
QUIPS programme was never integrated into the GES system. The fundamental 
stumbling block was that GES officials – both at the DEO and HQ – remained 
unconvinced that the QUIPS approach was an (or the most) appropriate approach to 
education development, either at district or national level. Without such a conviction, it 
would be difficult to envisage QUIPS activities being sustainable in the wider education 
sector.  
 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
The QUIPS programme was implemented under the general auspices of the FCUBE 
initiative. QUIPS was executed through an integrated programme of training and 
support that targeted improvement in teaching and school management; community 
involvement; and national education policy in education, with the aim of improving the 
quality of primary education. In order to do so, USAID set up the QUIPS programme 
office to direct its intervention outside the jurisdiction of the GES.  
 
QUIPS targeted three pilot schools in each district for two years, directly supplying 
teachers and communities with substantial resources and training. Along with this, 
grants were provided to DEOs and schools, as well as district assemblies.  
 
As a result, the impact of QUIPS during the intervention period was highly visible. 
Owing to QUIPS‟ strict control over the pilot schools and DEOs, there was little room 
for grant funds becoming fungible, although there was always a risk that they would do 
so.  
 
Because of the inherent risk of fungibility, QUIPS tightened its control over funds and 
implementation to ensure ultimate accountability to USAID. Thus, while pursuing a 
tangible and visible impact, the entire process – including the application of grants and 
the implementation of activities – was inevitably driven by QUIPS consultants.   
 
The fact that the programme was designed and implemented by USAID/QUIPS, and 
concurrent dismay at the cessation of NPA, caused considerable friction between HQ 
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officials and USIAD/QUIPS, which resulted in damage to their working relationship. 
Critically, this led GES HQ to form the opinion that it did not own the QUIPS 
programme.  
 
The absence of national ownership of the QUIPS programme might not have limited its 
impact at the district or school level in the short term; yet, since improvement in the 
quality of education and its sustainability was primarily the responsibility of the 
Ghanaian state, the absence of national ownership of QUIPS ultimately presented a 
huge obstacle to its sustainability in the long term.  
 
Since the conclusion of QUIPS, USAID has continued to help the Government of 
Ghana achieve the FCUBE objectives embedded in the nation‟s Education Strategic 
Plan (GoG 2009). Building on the QUIPS experience, the Education Quality for All 
(EQUALL) programme commenced in 2004 with the aim of continuing to support the 
basic education sector, primary education in particular. Like QUIPS, the EQUALL 
programme consists of project assistance that is carried out in partnership with the 
MOE/GES. Thus, it is implemented by a consortium of local and international partners 
led by Education Development Centre. However, unlike the nationwide aspiration of 
QUIPS, EQUALL concentrates on 30 districts. Programme activities have to date 
benefited more than 2,000 schools and 700 communities in the selected areas.46  
  
                                                     
46
 http://www.equall.com/ (accessed on 14/09/10).  
147 
 
Chapter 6  Whole School Development  
Implemented as an initiative of the UK‟s Department for International Development 
(DFID), the Whole School Development (WSD) programme was also designed to meet 
the goals of Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE). WSD was piloted 
with support from DFID; and, accordingly, the programme was adopted as the Ministry 
of Education (MoE)/Ghana Education Service (GES) framework for the achievement of 
comprehensive school development by means of the decentralisation of resource 
management in the education sector (GES 2001b).  
 
The WSD intervention mainly sought to promote 1) child-centred primary education; 2) 
community participation; 3) school-based in-service teacher training; and 4) improved 
efficiency of resource management (GES WSD Report 2004).  
 
Under WSD, districts and schools became responsible for their own planning and 
budgeting, and were made accountable for performance. Such decentralised education 
management is a move that has been replicated in many countries (Sayed, 1999). In 
fact, elements of WSD have been introduced into various development projects in, for 
example, South Africa (Sayed et al., 2000), Sri Lanka (GES 1999), Tanzania, Malawi, 
Nigeria (Piron and Watkins, 2004), Zambia, Kenya (Mattson, 2006) and Gansu province 
in China. In South Africa, a WSD approach has been taken in an in-service teacher 
training programme, as a holistic and systemic intervention to improve school 
performance at all levels (Sayed et al., 2000). In Kenya and Zambia, district education 
offices have been assigned to monitor school-based in-service teacher training 
(Mattson, 2006).  
 
Several structures were installed in order to meet these goals (GES 2000). A WSD 
national coordinator was appointed to oversee activities in various departments, for 
example Basic Education Division (BED), Teacher Education Division (TED) and the 
Inspectorate. At regional and district levels, zonal coordinators were engaged to 
provide support to the District Education Office (DEO) in the management of the 
intervention. At district level, district teacher support teams (DTSTs) offered 
instructional and managerial support to head teachers, while community participation 
coordinators (CPCs) promoted the involvement of the community in its children‟s 
education.  
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The WSD programme was implemented under the auspices of the UK‟s Education 
Sector Support Programme (ESSP), which ran from 1998 to 2005. The WSD budget 
was GBP 50 million, comprising GBP 40 million for financial support and GBP10 million 
for technical assistance. A breakdown of the budget for the 2002/03 fiscal year shows, 
for example, that the majority of ESSP funding was disbursed to the districts – 10% for 
divisional activities; 25% for readers; 2% for local technical assistance; and 7% for 
international technical assistance.47  
 
This chapter explores the findings of the study with regard to the WSD programme 
from the viewpoint of those who were involved in the intervention, especially in the use 
of WSD funds. The analysis is conducted according to the themes such as monetary 
fungibility, impact and sustainability at the three levels – HQ, district and school – 
presenting the findings in terms of each theme separately level by level. 
 
 
6.1. Perceptions of WSD Fungibility 
The figure below shows the flow of funds from DFID to the Ghanaian basic education 
sector through the WSD programme. DFID provided financial support to the sector by 
means of the existing GES financial system, supplying funds to GES HQ, which, in 
turn, released the budget to the DEO, either directly or through the Regional Office 
(RO). From the district budget, the DEO then distributed small payments, namely the 
head teachers‟ imprest (hereafter „imprest‟), to all basic schools in the district.  
 
Figure 6-1 The flow of funds under the WSD programme 
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: the author. 
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 Based on ESSP data obtained from the DFID education field office.  
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The following section firstly explores how HQ officials regarded financial support to the 
sector. This is followed by an account from district education officials‟ viewpoint. 
Thirdly, the section looks at the views of those were responsible for the imprest in the 
schools. To understand the situation surrounding the use of the imprest, the DEO‟s 
audit is included in the final part the school analysis.  
 
6.1.1 Macro Level 
During interviews with HQ officials, I often heard that the GES could not function 
without the financial support of DFID (e.g. interview G6; G8; G11; G14). In fact, HQ 
officials considered that DFID was a reliable supporter (e.g. interview G3; G13; G1). 
The prevailing positive view of the HQ officials might have partially arisen from chronic 
disappointment caused by the unreliable release of the government education budget. 
This section thus begins with the views of HQ officials on the education budget. 
  
6.1.1.1  Government Budget for Basic Education 
More than 70% of the government budget for basic education was allocated to 
personal remuneration, for example 73.3% in 2005.48 Consequently, there was not 
much left over for service and investment expenditure. This was likely to have 
undermined effective service delivery, as critical non-salary input (e.g. construction and 
maintenance of classrooms; desks and blackboards; and textbooks and teaching 
materials) could not be provided by the state (interview M1; M2).  
 
Budget officers at the GES were therefore understandably frustrated with attempting to 
budget for government funds that they might never receive (interview G6; G14). 
Indeed, few of them believed that they would receive more than a small fraction of the 
resources allocated to them for service delivery. Thus, there was little incentive to plan 
properly or manage education services on anything other than a “hand to mouth” basis 
(interview G2).  
 
It was under such circumstances that financial assistance was released to GES HQ 
from DFID in order to implement the WSD programme. Excluding funding for 
classroom construction, it was reported that DFID provided about 80% of all service 
and investment funds to the districts for the duration of the intervention (1998–2003) 
                                                     
48
 World Bank EdSttes calculation on 2006 PER vol.I p.15 from http://ddp-
ext.worldbank.org/ext/EdStates/ExpReport  (20 April 2010).  
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(GoG 2003 p. 42). By concentrating the flow of assistance on the basic education 
sector, it was not surprising that WSD had a major influence on education management 
at both GES HQ and district levels.  
 
6.1.1.2  GES HQ Funds from DFID  
Funds from DFID were released to the GES quarterly. In theory, DFID‟s financial 
support for the year ahead should have been agreed upon at the time of the 
consultative panel meeting in September, in order that the donor‟s funding might be 
integrated into the government budget cycle (interview M1; M2). However, in reality, 
this was not always the case. It appears that DFID support had hitherto been provided 
to coincide with the UK fiscal year, which resulted in reported delays to the WSD 
programme (GoG 2003 p.14). Despite this reported hold-up, none of the 17 HQ officials 
I interviewed argued that planned WSD activities were hampered by the late release of 
the money. Rather, the funding from DFID was considered to be substantial and indeed 
the only input that enabled them to conduct their activities (interview G14).  
 
6.1.1.3  DEO Budget from GES HQ   
One of the prerequisites of DFID assistance was that the existing GES structure should 
be used to implement the WSD programme (GES 2001b). Various officials, including 
budget officers of individual departments – e.g. TED – confirmed that existing GES 
financial procedures had been adopted and used throughout the GES system 
(interview G1; G2; G3; G6; G14). Interviews with officials also revealed that DFID‟s 
method of assisting the education sector enabled them (the officials) to take charge of 
programme implementation (interview G4; G11). 
 
DFID policy was to strengthen the financial and management capacity of the GES from 
HQ level through the whole system down to the schools. In actual fact, the programme 
focused on the administrative capacity of the DEO because this was the first time that 
the district had regularly received substantial external funds from GES HQ. This 
enabled the DEO to procure resources the necessity for which had been identified at 
district level. 
 
Districts were categorised according to administrative capacity (i.e. ready, partially 
ready and non-ready). Ready districts received funds directly from the financial 
controller at HQ. Funds for non-ready and partially ready districts were released after 
they had received the approval of budget plans from HQ and/or the RO.  
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As Canagarajah and Ye (2002) note, there are substantial differences between 
budgeted and actual outlays to administrative districts and to schools due to leakage 
and corruption. Accordingly, plenty of cases of the misapplication and misappropriation 
of WSD funds are cited in monitoring and auditing reports (Quao, various years). Many 
officials acknowledged how fragile the GES financial system was, and there was 
always a risk that funds would be misapplied and/or misappropriated whenever hitherto 
tight supervision was slackened. In fact, the capacity weakness in dealing with funds at 
HQ and the DEO was the biggest threat to the implementation of the programme 
(interview G14).  
 
Nevertheless, it was also widely acknowledged that a financial channel from GES HQ 
to the schools had at least been established under the WSD programme. (interview 
G1; G3; G4; G6; G8; G13; G14). For this reason, it was appreciated that DFID had 
taken a risk and entrusted GES to strengthen the system by letting it work 
independently. The deputy director of TED explained:  
 
That was the first time for the districts to receive substantial money. That was a huge 
challenge. I wouldn‘t say that all districts were capable enough to handle the huge 
amount coming into their districts. But I still remember what Michael [a pseudonym, a 
DFID field officer] told me at the time DFID decided to release the funds to districts. 
He said, ―Let them do [it] first. Let them budget their own plans by themselves. Some 
can cope. Some may not. We shouldn‘t wait until all the districts become ready. Let 
them do [it] and then find out what more we should do; otherwise, we can‘t move 
forwards.‖ I think we have come quite far. There are still so many problems. Money 
leaks. People chop money. There are so many misuses and misapplications. But 
without that initiative DFID took, the government couldn‘t release the capitation grant 
to the districts now (interview G13).  
 
Therefore, the WSD programme was considered to have contributed to the 
improvement of the means of channelling money throughout the GES, although the 
system was still very weak.  
  
6.1.1.4  The Extent of DFID Involvement 
One or sometimes two expatriates oversaw the UK‟s Education Sector Support 
Programme (ESSP) from the DFID Ghana Office. Although the field officer was often to 
be seen at the GES and was said to be close to its officials, DFID did not participate in 
the day-to-day operation of WSD (interview G8). Rather, once the outline had been 
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agreed, DFID entrusted the management of the programme to the GES (interview G3). 
The former implementing coordinator of FCUBE elaborated: 
 
They entrusted you… They didn‘t tell you what you should and shouldn‘t do. They let 
you plan and gave [you the] money to implement it. It is the first time to get funds in 
GES and it made you independent…. It is a grant given to the GoG [Government of 
Ghana]. We regarded DFID funds as our own money (interview G5). 
 
As they began to be entrusted with funds and programme implementation, the 
boundary between donor resources and GES resources became blurred in the eyes of 
the officials.   
 
6.1.1.5  Summary of Findings at the Macro Level 
This was the first time that the GES had been entrusted with donor funds for the 
implementation of a programme. Although DFID‟s intention with WSD was to 
strengthen GES financial capacity, monetary fungibility remained high. Nevertheless, 
thanks to the use of GES systems for the delivery of funds to district and school levels, 
along with the low profile of DFID personnel, HQ officials came to regard DFID funding 
as their own.  
 
6.1.2 Meso Level 
This section explores how WSD funds from GES HQ were spent at the DEO.  
 
6.1.2.1  HQ Funding of the DEO 
WSD funds for the two case study DEOs were transferred through the RO, as Lower 
Denkyira was classified as partially ready, while Upper Denkyira was deemed to be 
non-ready. In the former case, funds were transferred to the district through the RO in 
the form of a cheque. In the latter case, funds were transferred to a single account to 
be administrated by HQ on behalf of the districts, and were then distributed by cheque 
through the RO. In both cases, activities had to be approved by either RO, HQ or both 
before disbursement to the DEO, and the use of funds were also strictly monitored by 
the RO and HQ (interview L6; L9; U5; U12).   
 
A budget committee led by the district chief executive (of the district assembly) – and 
including the director of district education – was established to discuss plans submitted 
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by the DEO. In theory, final plans for investment (e.g. desks and chairs) and 
educational activities were drawn up and approved at a committee meeting.  
 
In reality, in Lower Denkyira, there was no budget committee and relevant matters were 
dealt with by the director and accountant only (interview L3; L5; L6; L7). The budget 
committee in Upper Denkyira held meetings to draw up the final budget plan. However, 
one of its members questioned the function of the committee. He considered that it did 
not have the authority to determine activities to be carried out and any decision it made 
was a mere formality, simply requiring committee members to sign and stamp the plan 
to demonstrate to HQ that that it had been drawn up collectively (interview U3).  
 
There was also the district education oversight committee; again led by the chief 
executive, it was installed in order to supervise funds and activities. However, in one 
district, it existed in name only, while in the other, it did not exist at all. It can thus only 
be concluded that the institutions installed under WSD to oversee financial affairs 
outside the DEO do not seem to have fully functioned.  
 
6.1.2.2  Unpredictable Amount and Timing of Disbursement 
The actual amount of funding that the DEO received often turned out to be lower than 
the minimum it had previously been guaranteed (interview U3). On being asked how 
costs were reduced to meet the actual funds available, budget officers in both districts 
replied that the number of participants in or the duration of an activity (e.g. from a 
three-day in-service training course to a two-day one) was curtailed rather than 
dropping certain activities altogether (interview L12; U5).  
 
In Upper Denkyira DEO, all eight action implementers (e.g. circuit supervisor, CPC, and 
DTST) I interviewed made similar comments, confirming the budget officer‟s 
explanation that activities were shrunk to fit the available budget (interview U1; U2; U4; 
U6; U7; U8; U9; U10). In Lower Denkyira DEO, some officers felt that the activities they 
had submitted were targeted by the director for removal from the budget plan (interview 
L5; L7). The consequent obvious tension at the DEO is discussed in further detail later 
in this section.  
 
Related to the fact that the DEOs were not informed in advance exactly how much they 
were to receive, they were also unaware of precisely when they would eventually 
receive the funds. In fact, one DEO had not received the second and third tranches by 
154 
 
the time I visited the district, which was well into the fourth tranche period. This was 
because the financial controller at HQ was suspending DFID funds until all the DEOs in 
Central Region had returned the receipts for expenditure during the previous 
accounting period (interview L6).  
 
Similar to the attitude of those at HQ, district officials acknowledged that no activities 
could be implemented without funding from DFID (interview L3; L6; U3; U5; U13). 
Although the actual disbursement often turned out lower than action-implementing 
officials had previously been informed and they were often still forced to curtail 
activities when they finally received the cheque, DFID funding was the only regular 
source for them to implement activities in districts (e.g. interview L1; L2; L4; L8; U1; U2; 
U6; U7; U10).  
 
The officials were aware that the funding for their activities originated from the UK 
government, and referred to the DEO budget in terms of both „WSD funds‟ and „DFID 
funds‟. However, their only contact in this regard was with GES HQ, to which DFID 
gave a free hand in the prioritising of activities at district level (interview DW1). 
 
6.1.2.3  Unauthorised Activities  
Perhaps as a result of late disbursement, there were some occasions on which the 
DEO (or its action implementers) undertook activities that had not been „officially‟ 
approved by the budget committee (interview L6), hence the expenditure of WSD funds 
on activities that had not been approved or authorised.  
 
There might have been a tacit understanding at the DEO that the budget committee 
would automatically approve activities already undertaken. However, this situation also 
implies that no matter how far it was insisted that funds were strictly applied to planned 
activities, GES guidelines were not strictly followed, thus indicating the fungibility of the 
DEO budget.  
 
In fact, the assistant director (Administration and Finance) who was ultimately in charge 
of monetary affairs at Upper Denkyira DEO was very cautious about the potential for 
monetary fungibility and the inherent risks associated with his office‟s handling of the 
funds on its own. He did not think the district should be upgraded to „ready‟ status, 
given how cumbersome and bureaucratic procedures then were, since “anything can 
happen when incapable people hold the funds” (interview U3). I later read a special 
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auditing report on this DEO issued in 2002, which uncovered numerous instances of 
the inappropriate use of funds (see Box 6-1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With regard to the activity budget referred to in an earlier section 6.1.2.3, in Lower 
Denkyira, officials commented that they had not received WSD funds in full for 
approved plans from the director. Some vehemently argued and others mildly pointed 
out that they were often granted only half the planned budget, and sometimes there 
were no funds at all (interview L5; L7). It perhaps did not help the situation that when 
appointed, the director brought an accountant with her and let him work on the DFID 
budget rather than the incumbent chief accountant.  
 
Coupled with the fact that the budget committee was non-existent, this lack of 
transparency and accountability left officials frustrated. Yet, all those who whispered to 
me of their nagging suspicions said that they had not challenged and would not 
challenge the director‟s authority but just continue to pray for her to leave.49 Rather, 
                                                     
49
 DEO staff may not have confronted the director openly but still made their dissatisfaction 
clear in many ways. For example, the director ordered the office driver to return to the office 
immediately after driving the circuit supervisor and me to a case study school. However, the 
driver did not intend to go back and the circuit supervisor had no intention of ordering him to do 
so. I asked the driver to return, being afraid that the director might think I was disobeying her. 
But they insisted on staying at the school with me, saying that they wanted to demonstrate their 
dissatisfaction to the director about her attitude towards me. They believed that she was treating 
Box6-1 Report on the audit investigation of the accounts of Upper Denkyira DEO 
Auditors investigated DFID and GoG funding and record keeping at Upper Denkyira 
DEO for the period January 2001 to June 2002. The report highlighted serious 
mismanagement, of which the following are some instances:  
 HQ-released funds were far in excess of the district‟s own budget. In the work 
plan for the first tranche, the district requested ¢18 million (USD 2,500) for 
service activities and ¢10 million (USD 1,400) for teaching and learning 
materials, but were given ¢61 million (USD 8,700) and ¢21 million (USD 
3,100) respectively. No reason could be given by the district for this excess 
income of ¢55 million (USD 7,900).  
 A cheque for ¢5 million (USD 760) was drawn on the DFID account for the 
personal use of the director and the accountant.  
 Refunds from advances made by schedule officers totalling ¢10 million (USD 
1,400) were misappropriated by the director and the accountant.  
 Advances totalling ¢29 million (USD 4,100) could not be accounted for by 
schedule officers.  
 Over ¢80 million (USD 11,600) earmarked for construction and rehabilitation 
works could not be properly accounted for.  
 Goods and services totalling ¢32 million (USD 4,700) were paid for but not 
supplied.  
 Various allowance totalling ¢15 million (USD 2,200) was not paid to 
beneficiaries (GES 2001a). 
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they suggested that I request the Auditing Office and financial controller at HQ to come 
down and investigate the problem. This culture of silence (Fobih et al. 1995) not only 
prevented officials from communicating information about problems up the hierarchy, 
but was also an impediment to the proper functioning of the DEO internal monitoring 
system.  
 
Finding out whether officials‟ suspicions about the alleged fraud had any factual basis 
was beyond the scope of my study, yet the point was that they believed they did and 
thus behaved accordingly, which inevitably seemed to cause friction among them and 
make the office operate less efficiently. Therefore, curtailing the approved budget 
without informing anyone of course not only led to a reduction in activities but also 
fuelled mistrust of the office directorate.  
 
6.1.2.4  Summary of Findings at the Meso Level 
DFID did not have a presence at the district level, although WSD funds were 
considered to be the sole means of financing DEO activities. As DFID had no control or 
influence over the funds, responsibility for ensuring that they were properly spent 
depended on GES HQ supervision and, most importantly, the DEO internal monitoring 
mechanism. However, neither functioned efficiently enough to prevent DEO funds from 
becoming fungible, which inevitably affected the successful implementation of 
activities.  
 
6.1.3 Micro Level 
Under WSD, a small amount of imprest was released from the DEO to the schools to 
enable head teachers to provide in-service training. This section examines the imprest, 
how often it was delivered, how it was spent and who was involved in deciding how it 
was spent. To understand how the DEO attempted to monitor the expenditure of the 
imprest, DEO auditing is also considered in the last part of this section.  
 
6.1.3.1  Imprest 
With the incorporation of their schools into the WSD programme, head teachers were 
instructed to open a bank account in order to receive the imprest. This was the first 
time that schools had received physical cash (interview L1). The imprest was intended 
                                                                                                                                                           
me unfairly because of her suspicion that I might have a hidden agenda assigned to me by GES 
HQ, which wanted revelations about the goings on at the DEO. 
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to help schools carry out their action plan, especially in terms of in-service training. 
Head teachers attended an initial three-day course on how to prepare an action plan 
with their teachers and the SMC.  
 
In order to draw cash from the imprest account, the head teacher and SMC 
chairperson were both required as signatories. All basic schools were gradually 
incorporated into WSD, 15 to 25 schools at a time. As the number of beneficiary 
schools increased, the amount of the imprest and DEO support to each school was 
necessarily reduced (interview L2; U9; L/W2/HT; L/W1/HT).  
 
6.1.3.1.1 Frequency and Amount of Imprest 
The frequency and amount of imprest that schools received differed between the two 
districts.  
 
Table 6-1 shows the frequency and amount of imprest at schools in Lower Denkyira, 
the district in which DEO officials complained about a lack of transparency in the office 
with regard to the management of funds.  
 
Table 6-1 School imprest in Lower Denkyira district   
School 2000/1 2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 Source 
L/W1 ¢150,000  ¢150,000 ¢200,000 ¢100,000 Verbal; accounts book 
L/W2 ¢120,000 ¢120,000    Verbal 
L/W3  ¢100,000  ¢100,000 ¢80,000 Verbal; accounts book 
Source: interviews with head teachers. 
 
The three schools represented in the above table were all in the first WSD cohort. 
According to the DEO, they were all entitled to the same amount of imprest at the same 
frequency (interview L1). However, one school (L/W2) had not received an imprest 
since the academic year 2001/2002. The other two schools had received it more 
recently (although not in every year), but the amount varied between them when it 
should have been identical. Head teachers did not usually compare their school‟s 
imprest with each other and were therefore unaware if they had received less than they 
were entitled to.  
 
Table 6-2 shows the total allocation of imprest, as drawn from official district records in 
Upper Denkyira. It was paid biannually, the amount having been fixed at ¢150,000 
(USD 21) per tranche at its introduction, rising to ¢220,000 (USD 31) with the final 
158 
 
instalment. When there were insufficient funds to provide each school with its 
entitlement, the imprest was distributed by cohort, e.g. 2002/3 and 2003/4.  
 
Table 6-2 Release of imprest in Upper Denkyira district  
Tranche 2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 
First * ¢150,000×37 ¢150,000 × 37 ¢150,000 × 114 ¢220,000 × 115  
Second * ¢150,000×37 ¢150,000 × 37  ¢150,000 × 115  
* Budget unavailable. 
Source: implementation of district education budget ESSP district work plan, Upper 
Denkyira, various years. 
 
Table 6-3 School imprest in Upper Denkyira district  
School 2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 2005/6 Source 
U/W1 ¢250,000     Verbal 
U/W2  ¢150,000 
¢150,000 
¢150,000 
¢150,000 
¢150,000 
¢150,000 
¢220,000 
 
Verbal 
U/W3  ¢300,000 ¢250,000 ¢150,000 
¢150,000 
¢220,000 
 
Verbal;  
accounts book 
Source: interviews with head teachers. 
 
Table 6-3 provides information about the frequency and amount of imprest. If tables 6-2 
and 6-3 are compared, it may be noted that two schools (U/W3 and U/W2) received 
their imprest quite regularly and as per the district budget plan (although the amount 
differed in 2003/04). In contrast, the other school (U/W1) received its imprest only 
once.  
 
The latter school‟s name was duly listed in the official disbursement record provided to 
the local bank. Nevertheless, the head teacher insisted that the school had not 
received anything since 2001/02. It was possible that the money was still in the bank 
account without having been withdrawn; otherwise, one can only conclude that it went 
astray somewhere between the DEO and the school.  
 
In comparing the two districts, it can be safely assumed that the question of how often 
the imprest was distributed depended heavily on the DEO. The head teachers of 
schools regularly receiving the imprest regarded it as a reliable income that facilitated 
the realisation of their action plans (interview U/W2/HT; U/W3/HT). In contrast, the 
heads who had not received the imprest regularly did not consider it to be of much use 
for this purpose; and in some cases, even stopped making action plans altogether soon 
after the funds started failing to materialise. One such head teacher commented:  
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We stopped making an action plan long ago because money doesn‘t come. What 
should we make it for? Why should we make it? (interview L/W2/HT).  
 
A district head teacher advisor at the DEO argued that attributing the cessation of the 
production of an action plan to the unreliable release of the imprest was merely a 
pretext, claiming: 
 
They [head teachers] said that they stopped making action plans because the funds 
hadn‘t come. Then, how can the office release the imprest to the schools in which 
there is no action plan prepared? It is a flimsy excuse (interview L1).  
 
This seemed like a vicious circle. The point was that the imprest was not delivered to 
schools according to national WSD principle. 
 
6.1.3.1.2 Extent of Teacher and SMC Involvement 
As to the number of WSD schools in which at least one teacher (in addition to the 
head) and one SMC member was aware of the imprest released from the DEO, over 
the two districts, only teachers in two schools knew about the imprest, and the SMC in 
only one school had been informed about it by the head teacher. There was no school 
in which both teachers and SMC members were aware of the imprest.  
 
This means that information about the imprest was seldom shared by the head among 
his or her teachers and the SMC members. For example, in one school that had 
received the imprest regularly (U/W3), it was managed solely by the head and SMC 
chairperson, from collecting the money to deciding what items to buy. On the other 
hand, none of the teachers were aware of the imprest, asserting that the school had 
never received funds from the DEO (interview U/W3/T1; U/W3/T2; U/W3/T3).  
 
The head teacher of this school claimed that the imprest was spent on materials for in-
service training, which took place twice a year (interview U/W3/HT), while all the other 
teachers informed me that they had never had any training organised by the head. 
Conversely, in another school (U/W2), although the imprest was handled by the head 
teacher alone, it was spent on teaching and learning materials for the provision of in-
service training for two hours every week.  
 
6.1.3.1.3 DEO Monitoring and Auditing of the Imprest 
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The DEO was supposed to monitor the imprest it allocated to schools. However, it was 
a challenging task considering the resources available to those such as auditors and 
circuit supervisors.  
 
In Upper Denkyira, an audit of the imprest took place each year. The following table 
shows the number of head teachers in both circuits who took part in the 2005 audit. It 
indicates that only half the head teachers were in attendance with their requisite 
records of purchase and receipts.  
 
Table 6-4 Head teachers of two circuits in Upper Denkyira district participating in the 
2005 audit  
Circuit A B 
Schools in circuit 26 15 
Schools represented 13 7 
Schools not represented 13 8 
Source: audit record, Upper Denkyira DEO.  
 
Moreover, the auditors suspected that not all receipts were sufficiently authentic to be 
regarded as genuine proof of purchase. Nevertheless, they were obliged to accept any 
type of receipt, even if there was no serial number, name of cashier or manager, or 
business address, because GES HQ had instructed the DEO to accept „honour 
certificates‟ as genuine proof of purchase.50 However: 
 
It is easy for heads to use the honour certificate and cover the fake ones...When the 
head puts [the] ‗quantity‘, ‗list‘ and ‗amount‘ down on the paper, this paper becomes 
[an] honour certificate and [is] treated as [a] genuine receipt (interview U11). 
 
Moreover, the auditors admitted that they had not been informed by the directorate of 
the items the imprest should have been spent on. Therefore, they could only check 
receipts; they did not know whether head teachers had spent the money on authorised 
items or not (interview U11). Furthermore, there did not seem to be any sanctions if 
any misuse of funds was revealed as the result of an audit. The auditor continued:  
 
We submitted the report to the director but we‘re not authorised, so I don‘t know if 
[any] action is taken [in the case of misuse] or not. The director is supposed to take 
action against the schools, but we don‘t know (interview U11). 
 
                                                     
50
 The GES authorised head teachers to produce such „honour certificates‟ when official 
receipts were not obtainable, e.g. in the hinterland where there were no proper shops or 
retailers to issue receipts.  
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As a result, if head teachers could produce „honour certificates‟ and no sanction was 
imposed, there was a danger that head teachers have liberty to use the funds as free 
money which is given to them as personal money (interview U9).  
 
Some head teachers expressed this opinion themselves, emphasising the need for 
tight monitoring because “receipts can be forged” (interview L/W3/HT). More 
importantly, a situation in which there were no guidelines, no instructions, no follow-up 
and no sanctions caused some head teachers to take the attitude that the DEO was 
not interested in whether the imprest was spent conscientiously or not (interview 
U/W3/HT; -L/W1/HT; U/W3/HT; U/W2/HT).  
 
6.1.3.2  Summary of Findings at the Micro Level 
The imprest was not distributed from the DEO to the schools as regularly as it should 
have been. The frequency and amount of imprest varied between the two DEOs, and, 
in some cases, even between schools in the same district. When the imprest was 
received by schools, information was not sufficiently shared amongst staff in order to 
manage it efficiently. Auditing was not strictly applied, and thus accountability of the 
imprest to the DEO was also lacking. Finally, since DEO supervision was also limited, 
the question of whether the imprest was effectively spent seemed to fall to the 
individual head teacher.  
 
6.1.4  Summary of WSD Fungibility 
DFID did not play a visible role in terms of delivering funding from GES HQ to the 
schools through the DEO since the existing MoE structure was used for this task. Thus, 
the entire process was the sole responsibility of the GES. In contrast to the positive 
view held by HQ officials of their independent management of the funds, what actually 
took place in the districts was far from adherence to the established mechanism, 
especially in terms of interaction between the DEO and the schools. In general, 
leakage and diversion of funds was highly probable, which inevitably affected the 
efficiency of programme implementation.  
 
 
6.2. Perceptions of WSD Impact 
This section explores Ghanaian education actors‟ views on the impact of the WSD 
programme. They are examined from three angles, namely, capacity building; teaching 
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and learning; and community participation. The discussion begins with a consideration 
of the views of those at HQ, followed by actors at the district level and, finally, those in 
the schools.  
 
6.2.1 Macro Level 
 
If Whole School Development had not been around, there could have been isolated 
projects and programmes. But the process, the system, would not have been 
strengthened. So, the success of Whole School Development depended on 
strengthening the existing systems to be able to perform. That is the measure of 
success that we see. We strengthened the existing structures to enable GES [to] 
perform (interview G4). 
 
6.2.1.1  Impact on the GES System 
GES officials at HQ acknowledged that the foremost impact of WSD was its 
strengthening of the state system. Accordingly, GES administration capacity was 
enhanced through its leading the entire intervention, i.e. from planning to budgeting, 
implementing and, finally, monitoring and evaluation.  
  
WSD made use of existing GES structures from HQ to the DEO down to the schools in 
order to implement the programme. Activities were planned and implemented by each 
division according to a WSD framework. Thus, each division took charge of its own 
activities (interview G8; G9; G11; G13). For example, WSD supported TED in its direct 
training of 2,200 head teachers and 1,100 DTST members (Seidu, 2003).  
 
The former director of BED said that WSD was internally generated and integrated into 
each department, going on to explain: 
 
What had to be done, what ought to be done, what is going to be done, all generate 
from inside various divisions in [the] GES. Whereas Teacher Education looked at 
teaching and learning aspects, Basic Education was taxed with [the] community 
involvement aspect. Then, [the] Inspectorate was charged with [the] assessment of 
children aspect of it, whilst Manpower was changed with [the] management aspect. 
So, you can see that GES as a whole unit had a hold on WSD, by division, by the 
structure itself. [The] GES system itself was in charge of WSD. WSD was generated 
from inside, created the structure (interview G11).  
 
GES HQ created new positions and bodies in order to strengthen administrative 
capacity at district level, and to shift more power and responsibility for school 
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improvement to the district and school levels; for example, the district head teacher 
advisor, the DTST, the budget committee, and the district education oversight 
committee. WSD coordinators mentioned that the creation of these bodies was crucial 
to the efficient use of funds and effective training delivery (interview G1; G4). Finally, 
with the advent of WSD, structures that would enable GES officials to carry out their 
duties professionally had been installed (interview G11). A district director – a former 
BED officer – commented: 
 
These structures are working in the districts and schools. And interestingly enough, 
other donors who are entering the education sector are now using those structures. So, 
the structures are in place (interview G3).  
 
6.2.1.2  Impact on the GES Financial System 
Through WSD implementation, the GES financial system was strengthened by 
targeting funding at administration capacity building in the districts. However, in 
practice, it was the first time that the DEOs had planned and drawn up their own 
budgets (interview G5). Thus, it was perhaps unsurprisingly a far from smooth 
operation and confusion reigned at the introduction of financial planning procedures, 
many DEOs facing repeated planning and budgeting problems (interview G3). The 
former coordinator of FCUBE recalled: 
 
There were so many problems. We delegated leadership, accountability, transparency 
to [the] district office. That was new to them. Some coped, some couldn‘t (interview 
G5).  
 
Nevertheless, over the years, the DEO grew accustomed to budgeting for itself 
(interview G6; G14). A budget officer commented: 
 
At the time of the introduction of Whole School, preparing a work plan with budget 
was an innovation for [the] district. It was a challenge for them, but this time it‘s 
normal… There are still misappropriated funds. We have measures in place but we 
still have a lot of problems. But what I am saying is that we have come so far, and at 
the time we started WSD, things were not as we are seeing now (interview G6).  
 
The deputy director of TED acknowledged that GES/WSD was taking the risk of funds 
being misused or misappropriated, but argued that this should not stop them from 
building capacity in the districts and schools: 
 
So, yes, we are running some risks, by putting both effective and non-effective people 
together – lumping them together. But if we are driven by sheer fear that our people 
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will misuse funds, misappropriate them, then our schools will never grow. Some 
districts perform well, some [do] not; some head teachers perform well, some [do] not. 
It will take time to encourage and motivate all the heads to come to perform well to do 
their jobs (interview G6).  
 
6.2.1.3  Impact on Schools 
A GES structure might have been put in place; the GES system might have been 
strengthened; and funds might have been delivered to schools through the DEO. 
However, the most important thing officials had to consider was how far WSD efforts 
had actually led to the achievement of planned outcomes and, ultimately, improvement 
in learning and the school environment: 
 
The present standard, which we are even saying is not good enough, without the 
WSD, we could not have achieved even that standard. We may not fulfil the promise, 
but I would say I am satisfied with the WSD outcomes. Without this, we could not 
reach even this point (interview G4).  
 
According to an evaluation of World Bank (2004) support to primary education in 
Ghana, which included an analysis of various inputs, the evidence appeared to show 
that WSD was having some impact in terms of test scores,51 although this could not be 
attributed to the effects of WSD alone.  
 
Officials admitted that the GES could not produce quantifiable evidence that WSD had 
made an impact in terms of primary school achievement:  
 
Since GES took [the] initiative, the journey has been very slow, yes, very slow. [The] 
GES system [has] become capable under Whole School, but if we measure the 
performance of the child, we would not say that we have succeeded so much. WSD is 
[a] more extensive arrangement because it concerns every school in Ghana. That is 
why the outcomes are ambiguous. The effect of WSD in terms of performance of 
school children is a very difficult thing to say. But we are happy to see some glimpse 
of success somewhere (interview G11). 
 
Despite the prevailing notion that the GES could not demonstrate tangible or statistical 
results to prove the impact of WSD, officials strongly believed that the WSD approach, 
which supported the GES system by releasing funds directly to the state, was “a better 
                                                     
51 The Criteria Reference Test (CRT), which was conducted by the MoE since 1992, confirmed 
the modest improvement: mean English score improved from 29.9% to 36.9% between 1992 
and 2000. However it also confirmed that standards were still very low: less than 10% children 
reached mastery level in math, and less than 5% did so in English (World Bank, 2004a pp.34-
6).  
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way,” (interview G12) or “the best in [the] long run” (interview G6). Moreover, being 
entrusted with funds and resources, the GES gained a sense of ownership of WSD 
(interview G11). 
 
Given the fact that the WSD intervention did not make a short-term tangible impact, it is 
arguable whether using the existing GES structure was an efficient channel for fund 
delivery. However, the officials were confident that this was the only road to eventual 
education development, maintaining the view that it would take time before the effects 
of macro impact indicators became apparent.  
 
Nevertheless, the weakness embedded in the system at the district level was well 
reported. In a GES WSD report (2003), a persistent problem was identified in that 
“most district directors are unwilling to co-operate in the provision of budgetary 
allocation for the operation of district structures” (p.25). This could affect all aspects of 
development at district and school levels (interview G4). It was thus probably not 
surprising that the impact had yet to be translated into significant improvements in 
terms of examination results, enrolment and dropout rates. 
 
6.2.1.4  Summary of Findings at the Macro Level 
A major impact of WSD was considered to be its strengthening of the system from HQ, 
to the DEO and schools by releasing funds to the GES and enabling officials to take 
responsibility for the overall implementation of the programme. 
 
Officials argued that WSD had a significant impact in terms of providing more cost-
efficient service delivery through direct support to GES structures. They also 
emphasised that this contributed to the promotion of Ghanaian ownership of WSD.  
 
The question of the extent to which WSD had made an impact on the improvement of 
education was not yet quantifiable. However, despite this lack of tangible results, HQ 
officials asserted that an approach in which GES took charge was the best way to 
achieve education development in Ghana.  
 
6.2.2 Meso Level 
The DEO played a central role in developing WSD by providing teachers with support 
and training, and enhancing community support to education. This section looks at how 
district education officers regarded the impact of WSD, firstly, in terms of DEO 
166 
 
management capacity; secondly, with regard to delivery of in-service training; and 
lastly, in the extent to which their efforts led to school improvement, especially in 
respect of learning outcomes and community participation.  
 
6.2.2.1  Impact on Capacity at the District Education Office 
With the introduction of WSD, DEOs began to receive a quarterly payment. This was 
the first time they had received a regular operational budget. As confirmed by the views 
of those at GES HQ, once the financial system was installed and began to function, 
DEOs gradually grew accustomed to WSD financial procedures . Budget officers and 
chief accountants in both districts stated that, as a result of the numerous training 
sessions organised by HQ, they had become competent and capable of drawing up the 
budget, and dealing with its daily management (interview L3; L9; U5; U12).  
 
The capitation grant, a financial mechanism for the channelling of funds from the DEO 
to the schools, was about to be released at the time of my fieldwork. The DEO provided 
head teachers with training in planning and budgeting for action plans, and how to 
manage the imprest on a daily basis. Although they expected teething problems, DEO 
officials believed that the procedure would be more confusing if WSD had not 
introduced the imprest and the action plan (interview U5; U3).  
 
The view of HQ was that the DEO had been delegated responsibility, leadership and 
accountability with the provision of an operational budget. This view was contested by 
some DEO officials (interview U5; U3). Budget officers in particular considered that 
authority had not actually been transferred because the DEO was not informed about 
the annual budget or even the amount of the next tranche. The actual disbursement 
was often lower than the minimum the DEO had been guaranteed, and plans for 
activities still needed to be approved by HQ and/or the RO. Thus, DEO officials argued 
that HQ still held the power and had not really delegated leadership to them.  
 
Conversely, some of the directorate considered that at least decentralised WSD 
planning and budgeting procedures promoted a better culture of information sharing 
and transparency among DEO staff due to their involvement in budgeting for activities. 
However, this arrangement was so far limited to the meso level, an assistant director 
admitting that such a culture was not the case between the DEO and the schools 
(interview U3).  
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Moreover, in terms of a sense of professional competency, many officials saw 
themselves as having become more competent and confident in their professional 
capacity. Through a series of training courses, they had been “equipped,” their 
individual capacity “lifted” (interview U9), and they felt “empowered” (interview L7). At 
the same time, they emphasised the importance of continuous support from the DEO 
directorate, because “old habits…easily come back” (interview L8).  
 
6.2.2.2  Impact on In-service Training  
The cascade model of teacher training and development was an important strategy 
employed by WSD to promote school improvement. Firstly, head teachers received 
training in pupil-centred teaching. Then, with supervision and support from district 
officials – including the district head teacher advisor, DTST and the circuit supervisors – 
the heads used the imprest to provide their teachers with on-site support and training. 
This took place at school as well as cluster level. This process was seen as “a first step 
towards the school itself carrying [out] their own in-service training” (interview L1). 
Moreover: 
 
Whole School brought the district systematic in-service training [for the] first time. 
Training was finally organised; INSET wasn‘t held regularly before Whole School. 
School-based training and cluster-based training became systematised; courses were 
held so many times (interview U8). 
 
Structures for supporting and training teachers, such as DTST, were established. WSD 
was considered to have facilitated teacher development in a cost-effective manner 
because training took place in a local setting and was organised by the DEO (interview 
U13; G15). However, officials also admitted that it lacked effectiveness and did not fully 
meet initial expectations (interview L1).  
 
They identified several reasons for this. Firstly, the success of training activities 
ultimately depended on the integrity and leadership of the head teacher (interview L4; 
L8; L12; U13; U7). Secondly, it also depended on the willingness of staff, especially in 
the absence of any reward or incentive (interview U9). Thirdly, support and supervision 
provided by HQ to the DEO, for example, through the zonal coordinator and DST, to 
facilitate training fell away over time (interview U8). Fourthly, related to this point, some 
officials questioned whether DEO personnel were actually capable of delivering 
effective training and introducing pupil-centred teaching (interview L13). Fifthly, there 
was the problem of retaining trained teachers (interview L4; U9).  
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Officials found themselves in a dilemma between incorporating all schools in the district 
into the WSD programme, and the physical limitations of providing adequate 
supervision and support to each one (interview L1; L13). However, given that retention 
of trained teachers was a serious problem, accommodating all the schools was thought 
to be the right approach, since teachers would cease to benefit from WSD training if 
they moved to non-WSD schools (interview L4). Therefore, the importance of 
continuous support was repeatedly emphasised.  
 
What was less evident was the extent to which WSD encouraged teachers to adopt a 
pupil-centred teaching and learning approach. But because it was disseminated 
through cluster and school-based in-service training, the question of whether this 
methodology was gaining ground at school level depended to a large extent on how 
regular and effective these training workshops were. Consequently, it was considered 
that there was a long way to go (interview L4; U7), and it would require prolonged and 
continuous effort before any reflection on academic performance in the classroom 
could be observed. 
 
6.2.2.3  Impact on Schools and Community Participation 
Apart from the training aspect, it was also considered that the school environment had 
improved under WSD, for example, chairs and desks labelled DFID/WSD were brought 
in; chalk, pens and books were procured; furniture and cupboards were put in place; 
and school compounds were renovated. However, officials were not certain that such 
inputs would lead to a tangible impact on academic performance; sometimes, 
environmental difficulties overwhelmed any efforts on the part of the DEO and 
teachers, especially in rural schools (interview L7).  
 
Community participation in school improvement was considered to be the weakest 
aspect of the WSD intervention. However, the standard framework of the SMC was at 
least in place in nearly all schools in response to DEO instructions (interview U2). In 
both districts, the DEO organised several workshops, but it was acknowledged that it 
would be a long time before SMCs were functioning at full capacity (interview L2; U2).  
 
6.2.2.4  Summary of Findings at the Meso Level 
A mechanism for the receipt of funds from HQ had to a certain extent been established. 
DEO capacity in terms of budgeting and planning was thus considered to have at least 
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been strengthened. Similarly, structures for providing in-service training – e.g. DTST, 
and school-based and cluster-based training – had been put in place. But these 
systems did not appear to be operating as effectively as officials had expected.  
 
Nevertheless, the cascade model of training was considered to be not only cost-
efficient, but also a relevant approach under circumstances in which the retention rate 
of teachers was low, since all schools were targeted. However, even these combined 
efforts had not yet made a tangible impact on the academic performance of pupils.  
 
In terms of community participation, the SMC had been standardised but was yet to 
function at full capacity.  
 
6.2.3 Micro Level  
This section explores how the impact of the programme was viewed in WSD schools.  
 
6.2.3.1  Impact on Teaching and Learning  
All six head teachers in the case study districts thought that there had been some 
positive changes since their schools had joined the WSD programme (interview 
L/W1/HT; L/W2/HT; L/W3/HT; U/W1/HT3; U/W2/HT; U/W3/HT).  
 
Head teachers attended residential and intensive school administration and pupil-
centred teaching workshops, for example one week in Accra. They then acted as 
facilitators for training back in their schools. Later, other teachers were appointed as 
facilitators or lead teachers. As DEO officials confirmed, the frequency of training 
events varied among schools.  
 
Three schools (L/W1, L/W3 and U/W2) had on-site training from time to time, and 
cluster-based training once a year (interview L/W1/HT1; L/W3/HT; U/W2/HT2). Of 
these, one head teacher provided a two-hour session each week. His efforts were 
highly appreciated by the community, as all the teachers at this school were untrained. 
There appeared to be a correlation between receipt of the imprest and initiation of a 
training event, with the exception of one case in which the school did not have training 
despite the fact that it had received the imprest.  
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In the remaining three schools (L/W2, U/W1, U/W3), teachers could not recall any 
training sessions in the previous two or three years, although two head teachers 
claimed that training was held twice a term (interview L/W2/HT; U/W3/HT).  
 
Some head teachers noted that the level of DEO supervision, especially that of the 
circuit supervisors, was higher than it had been before the advent of WSD (interview 
L/W2/HT; U/W3/HT). Head teachers and circuit supervisors tried to sit in on classes, 
and check teachers‟ lesson plans and their pupils‟ work. These efforts were mentioned 
by both head teachers and their staff in some schools.  
 
However, all the head teachers agreed that DEO support and supervision had latterly 
waned. Although they expressed some disappointment at this, they accepted it as 
inevitable because they knew that other schools had joined the programme cohort by 
cohort, necessitating the sharing of resources.  
 
With regard to the impact of such support, four out of six head teachers thought that 
their pupils had made a degree of progress. One head teacher emphasised that 
teaching style had changed markedly under WSD:  
 
[There were] vast changes after…the introduction of WSD – drastic changes in the 
teaching methods, from [the] abstract to ‗reality friendly‘. Teachers were instructed to 
show real materials to pupils to let them understand. Children are able to read, explain 
themselves and ask questions when they don‘t understand. Formerly, teachers taught 
and taught. Teachers asked them, ―Do you understand?‖ They said, ―Yes, madam.‖ 
That was all, when they may not understand something, but they fear to say so. They 
don‘t feel shy of asking questions now (interview L/W1/HT).  
 
This implies that the results of training had started to take root in some schools.  
 
The same four head teachers also identified an upward trend in enrolment in their 
schools:   
 
Enrolment is getting higher and higher. Before WSD, enrolment was not that high. 
After WSD, [it increased], maybe because textbooks and exercise books were supplied 
to the school. Parents around here are aware that this school is WSD and receive 
resources more than other schools do (interview L/W3/HT).  
 
The conviction that increased enrolment was a result of WSD support to the schools 
notwithstanding, it was again difficult to say if this could be attributed solely to WSD. 
Three out of the four schools were located in towns (L/W1, L/W3 and U/W3) and there 
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must have been many other factors affecting their increase in enrolment. The 
remaining  school was located in a remote rural setting but its head teacher displayed 
outstanding leadership qualities, which in all likelihood had just as great, if not greater, 
influence on enrolment.  
 
6.2.3.2  Impact on the SMC and Community Participation  
The SMC was established in all six schools. However, although their degree of 
involvement differed slightly, they were not playing an active role in school 
improvement.  
 
In one case (U/W3), the SMC members worked relatively closely with the head 
teacher, who counted on their support whenever there was an administrative problem, 
the teachers being somewhat excluded from school management. Thus, it was the 
SMC chairperson who accompanied the head teacher to the bank to withdraw the 
imprest.  
 
Conversely, some SMCs (L/W1/SMC1; L/W3/SMC1; U/W2/SMC1) remained ignorant 
of school finances, even though they helped collect levies. The reasons why SMCs did 
not press head teachers to include them in financial matters and/or involve them in 
school management varied.  
 
One SMC was aware that it ought to be more involved but was afraid that the teachers 
would leave if it intervened in school matters:  
 
I think that something is not clear. We don‘t know about grants, action plans or [the] 
budget. I think something [is] wrong. If we intervene [in] teachers‘ or [the] school‘s 
affairs, like checking if they are making action plans, if planned activities were done 
or not, they wouldn‘t like it and they will leave the school. So we don‘t bother them. 
Teachers would think that the community worry them; in order to avoid trouble, [we] 
just leave them [to] whatever they are doing (interview L/W2/SMC1).  
 
Another SMC asserted that financial matters were the head teacher‟s responsibility, 
saying that “The Head has been here for more than 10 years; we trust him” (interview 
U/W1/SMC1).  
 
Thus, whatever the reason, the SMC did not make an active contribution to school 
improvement.  
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6.2.3.3  Summary of Findings at the Micro Level 
The extent to which WSD had made an impact on the quality of teaching and learning 
was not clear. It  depended heavily on the character of the school or, to be more 
precise, the integrity of the head teacher. However, indications of positive change could 
be seen in schools and heard in the accounts of head teachers and their staff. There 
were some cases in which training sessions took place frequently, and teaching style 
had noticeably shifted to a much more pupil-centred approach in some schools. 
However, in terms of community participation, the SMC had not yet played a 
substantial role in school improvement.  
 
 
6.2.4 Summary of WSD Impact 
A major benefit of the WSD intervention was to strengthen existing GES institutions, for 
example TED, BED, the DEO and the schools themselves. Officials at HQ argued that 
WSD had made a significant impact in providing more cost-efficient service delivery 
through direct support to GES structures. They emphasised that the direct funding of 
the WSD programme had contributed to promoting Ghanaian ownership of the 
initiative. HQ officials also asserted that WSD had led to greater leadership, 
responsibility and accountability among district education officers, teachers and 
community members, through the delegation of financial responsibility to DEO and 
school levels.  
 
However, the latter claim was not so willingly acknowledged by DEO officials, much 
less the school and community. Nevertheless, officials at the district level considered 
that WSD had strengthened the administrative capacity of the DEO by granting it the 
means to independently budget for its activities.  
 
The cascade model of training and development was established. This was a pivotal 
WSD strategy to promote educational decentralisation and school improvement. 
However, it was generally agreed that it should be broadened in order to include as 
many teachers as possible and to organise training as often as possible. The problems 
identified were in the capability limitations of implementation. Likewise, many heads, 
teachers and SMC representatives believed WSD impact to be insubstantial except in 
the cases of a few schools that had benefited from the programme to a relatively 
greater extent.  
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Structures were put in place and the system was strengthened. However, although 
there were some noticeable positive changes in the schools, it was believed that it 
would take time to translate them into measurable outcomes, which would only be 
possible if WSD efforts were maintained and reinforced.  
 
 
6.3. Perceptions of WSD Sustainability 
The UK‟s ESSP, which facilitated WSD, came to an end in 2003.52 This section 
explores how the sustainability of WSD after the termination of the intervention was 
perceived by Ghanaian education actors.  
 
6.3.1 Macro Level 
Views on the sustainability of WSD at GES HQ varied considerably. This difference of 
opinion appears to have originated from the way an individual played his or her part in 
the WSD programme. Their views may thus be categorised according to three 
professional groups: Senior GES executives, WSD coordinators (national and zonal) 
and implementation officers (in various GES divisions). This section begins by looking 
at the different views of these groups in terms of the sustainability of WSD.      
 
6.3.1.1  Lack of Leadership and Commitment to WSD 
The highest-ranking GES executives, i.e. the director general and his deputy, lacked 
commitment to WSD, and did not exercise the leadership necessary to sustain it as a 
constituent part of national education policy. Rather, the director general regarded 
WSD as a completed programme within the FCUBE framework (interview G17).  
 
There was also a power struggle and tension at senior level at the time I was 
conducting the study. Consequently, for some reason that was not immediately 
apparent, WSD fell out of favour. In fact, on one occasion, the deputy director general 
abruptly told me that she did not know anything about WSD and did not want to be 
asked about it (interview G16), despite the fact that she had previously been a district 
director.53  
                                                     
52
 However, this disbursement of ESSP funding continued until 2005.  
53
 There was conflict over the appointment of the director general. Associated with this power 
struggle, there was an intense argument between the deputy director general and the WSD 
national coordinator, which contributed to the loss of the directorate‟s support for WSD.  
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As though reflecting this indifference towards WSD at the highest level, “there was [a] 
massive transfer of district directors and accountants without consultation with WSD, 
which created a new vacuum for capacity building and sustainability of the initiatives 
set in motion through WSD” (Seidu, 2003 p.25). This in turn cast doubt on GES 
ownership of WSD as a national framework. In the end, it may not have been 
sufficiently assimilated into the GES structure.  
 
Internal sidelining of WSD at senior GES level was to some extent accelerated by a 
change of DFID policy in its aid delivery, which shifted from sector assistance to wider 
financial assistance, for example, sector budget support. Consequently, the DFID 
Ghana office did not exercise any strong influence or put pressure on the MoE/GES to 
sustain WSD as a national framework when the ESSP came to an end (interview 
DW1). Things might have been different if DFID had demonstrated commitment and 
leadership to WSD. However, if WSD could not be sustained without applying external 
pressure on the GES, then the degree of ownership the GES had over WSD was 
questionable.   
 
6.3.1.2  Dissolution of WSD Coordinators 
When the ESSP came to an end, all WSD coordination positions (six zonal 
coordinators, headed by a national coordinator) were dissolved and their incumbents 
were reassigned to other positions (interview G1; G2; G4). Consequently, there was no 
one at HQ to act in the interests of WSD, especially with regard to the initiation of new 
activities to facilitate the programme. Accordingly, former coordinators were deeply 
pessimistic about the continuation of WSD (interview G1; G2; G4). One of them 
described their role as a driving force to move the programme forwards (interview G4). 
Thus, it was generally agreed that a fatal blow had been dealt to WSD with the 
dissolution of their positions.  
 
6.3.1.3  Assimilation into GES Operations 
However, the views of implementation officials that emerged through the interviews 
diverged from those of the WSD coordinators. Unlike the latter, the officials involved in 
WSD in the individual divisions – e.g. TED and the Inspectorate – saw themselves as 
continuing their work as usual, regardless of any politically initiated changes at a higher 
level. They did not believe that there was any difference between the time of the WSD 
intervention and the so-called „post-WSD‟ era.  
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The implementation officials did not interpret the dissolution of WSD Coordination 
positions as a symbolic gesture indicating that the GES was abandoning the 
programme. The deputy director of TED confirmed:  
 
[Because] a particular office named Whole School Development doesn‘t exist, [that] 
doesn‘t mean that Whole School doesn‘t exist at HQ anymore. It is not true. What we 
are doing is what we did under the Whole School. There is no difference (interview 
G13).  
 
As a result of the coordinated efforts of various divisions, WSD itself was considered to 
have been assimilated or become embedded in daily GES operations regardless of 
whether or not there were any WSD coordinators. Another deputy director emphasised:  
 
Whole School Development was an integrated effort. Within Whole School, all 
divisions were on board…. It was a concerted effort. We may not call it WSD 
anymore, but it doesn‘t matter what it‘s called. Whatever we call it, what we are doing 
is what we did under the Whole School (interview G9).  
 
With WSD, individual divisions formulated their own activities and carried them out. 
GES regulations and procedures were transformed in order to implement WSD and it 
became a GES operation (interview G11). Thus, it did not matter to the implementation 
officials whether there were still WSD advocates in senior positions at HQ or not 
(interview G3). Rather, the dissolution of the WSD coordination positions was seen as 
a sign that one of the main aims of the coordinators had been successfully 
accomplished: to reflect the WSD framework in the activities of various divisions. 
 
6.3.1.4  A Process rather than an Event 
One of the contributory factors to the sense of the incorporation of WSD into GES 
operations was the conception of the programme as a process rather than an event. 
The former WSD national coordinator explained this point: 
 
The implementation of FCUBE initially started with projects. When you have a 
project unit, it creates problems. We find out that as soon as funding for the project 
finishes, the project collapse. So, we tried to use the existing structure…. I integrated 
it into the system, for people to get used to and for them to use. It was being made to 
be part of the GES normal functions. That is the only reason why WSD is still there 
(interview G4). 
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In utilising the existing GES structure, WSD officials were able to develop their sense of 
ownership and also blur the boundary between a donor-related intervention and their 
own work (interview G5; G11). Thus, their views on the continuation of WSD as an 
element of GES operations did not primarily concern the situation at HQ, but were 
more concerned with the DEO. This was echoed by WSD coordinators.   
 
[The DEO] do not even know that the Whole School does not exist anymore at 
headquarters. The Whole Schools was virtually based in the district office. They 
continue doing the Whole School (interview G2).  
 
Although it was generally considered that the DEOs were continuing to work within the 
WSD framework, it was also acknowledged that whether WSD-related activities were 
effectively implemented ultimately depended heavily on the character and leadership of 
the individual district directors (interview G3).  
 
Moreover, the sense of the continuation of WSD among officials was perhaps related to 
budgetary security, i.e. financial assistance from DFID continued to flow into the GES 
regardless of the termination of the ESSP; hence, their sense of being part of a 
process that was still being enhanced as support from DFID continued.  
  
6.3.1.5  Extent of DFID Involvement 
As has already been seen, the degree to which DFID was involved in the 
implementation of WSD was considered to be limited. Similarly, according to the 
officials, WSD planning was not led by DFID, but by the GES. Many officials raised this 
point as a specific feature of WSD in comparison to other donor-related programmes 
(interview G5; G6). The former implementing coordinator of FCUBE recalled the 
inception of the WSD programme: 
 
GES asked DFID to help them, but not [to] be told to start the project… You [other 
donors] came and brought projects, told us what you wanted to do and told us what 
you wanted us to do. But DFID asked us what we wanted to do first. And then they 
[DFID] sent us Paul (DFID consultant, pseudonym) to help us to form the plan. But 
you [other donors] came without invitation. That is very different (interview G5).  
 
Whether the above view reflected the actual process is arguable, as it is recalled 
elsewhere that the process under FCUBE tended to be driven by the donors (Casely-
Hayford et al., 2007). However, the important thing is that senior GES officers held that 
the GES had taken the lead (e.g. interview G3; G6; G9; G15).  
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6.3.1.6  Extent of Consultants’  Involvement 
Six Ghanaian long-term technical assistants – mostly former or current GES officials – 
were posted to key line management positions in GES HQ, including the WSD national 
coordinator and the coordinator of FCUBE (GoG/DFID 2003). This was not poaching in 
the strictest sense, as they had been simply transferred within the GES system, 
wherein the expertise remained; yet, some officials saw these appointments as 
controversial.  
 
These contracted officials exercised strong leadership to orchestrate activities during 
the implementation of WSD. Yet, given their prominence at HQ, which enjoyed the 
substantial patronage of DFID, some officials imagined them to be linked to the donor 
rather than their being merely ordinary GES colleagues, as they were ultimately 
“consultants paid by DFID” (interview G12).  
 
The salary gap between these technical assistants and the other GES officials had an 
inevitable psychological impact, causing the latter to feel that the consultant staff 
should work harder as they were paid more (interview G4). During my time at the MoE,  
grievances over salary and the perceived imbalance in workload were mentioned 
repeatedly on both sides. 
 
At the time, their leadership seemed to me to be indispensable in moving the 
programme forward; yet, it is undeniable that in some cases the atmosphere of mistrust 
hampered team spirit and the development of a stronger sense of GES ownership of 
the WSD programme.  
 
6.3.1.7  Summary of Findings at the Macro Level 
In general, WSD was assimilated into GES operations at various divisional levels as a 
result of employing existing frameworks; and officials had strong senses of both the 
continuity and ownership of WSD. However, lack of commitment and leadership at 
senior level was a cause for concern and also cast doubt on GES ownership of WSD.  
 
6.3.2 Meso Level 
This section explores how district education officers regarded the sustainability of the 
WSD programme.  
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6.3.2.1  The Continuation of WSD in Each District 
As GES officials at HQ confirmed, the degree to which WSD was effectively 
implemented depended on the competency of each DEO and the leadership of its 
directorate. However, Lower Denkyira DEO asserted that it continued to implement 
WSD (interview L1; L10), while officials in Upper Denkyira declared WSD to have been 
completed, as the budget for it was no longer dispatched from HQ. 
 
However, the reality was rather the other way round. In Lower Denkyira DEO, WSD 
was theoretically a district framework for facilitating activities. In practice, only part of 
the budget was handed over to implementation officials to enable them to conduct 
planned and approved activities.  
 
For example, the DTST had ceased to function. In spite of the fact that it was said to be 
very active in the early stages of the WSD intervention, latterly, the DTST budget had 
not been allocated and no work had been carried out (interview L1; L13). Moreover, it 
seems that operations had generally become less effective and WSD virtually existed 
in name only (interview L3). Meanwhile, services that had been carried out before the 
intervention, for example the work of the circuit supervisors, continued as usual.   
 
In Upper Denkyira DEO, in spite of the official assertion that the WSD programme had 
been completed along with the withdrawal of funds, the office made certain that it 
continued WSD activities with the use of the continued DFID funding. A district training 
officer elaborated:  
 
WSD money is not coming anymore… About two weeks ago, training was organised 
with funds of DFID. We are doing the same work. We use the funds of DFID to do 
our activities now. There is no difference between activities using WSD money and 
activities using DFID money (interview U8).  
 
Accordingly, in the District Education Work Plan (2005/06), there is a category listing 
„benchmark activities‟ instead of WSD activities; yet, activities categorised as 
benchmark activities were virtually the same as those that used to be known as WSD 
activities.54  
                                                     
54
 According to the 2002/03 District Education Work Plan, WSD activities comprised 
school/cluster in-service training and the operations of DTST; the Girl Child Education Unit; the 
District Education Planning Team; the Needy Children operation; and the School Health 
Education Project. These six operations plus CPC activities were the „benchmark activities‟ 
listed in the 2005/06 plan. 
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This implies that Upper Denkyira DEO continued to implement WSD activities with the 
funds they received from HQ regardless of the line item on the budget or the names of 
the activities in the work plan. It did not matter to DEO officials where the funds 
originated from, whether the government, DFID or any other agency; all that mattered 
to them was that they should be able to carry out their activities as efficiently as 
possible (interview L7). Theoretically, this was what GES HQ officials expected to 
happen in all districts, but I only observed it in Upper Denkyira DEO.   
 
6.3.2.2  Supervision from HQ 
A key consideration in the sustainment of WSD innovations at the district level was 
whether HQ provided the DEO with adequate support and supervision. DEO officials 
acknowledged that the level of supervision they received from HQ – e.g. through the 
zonal coordinator and the district support team – had decreased. This in turn affected 
the quality and frequency of support the DEO was able to provide to the schools, and 
the extent of in-service training it was able to facilitate (interview L1; L7; U8; U9).  
 
Officials were in agreement that HQ needed to monitor the DEO and provide it with 
much more supervision if it were to regain the level of efficiency it had attained at the 
height of WSD. Indeed, there were signs that old management practices were already 
eroding some of the gains the intervention had made: “Old habits can slip back any 
time…people slip back to the easy way” (interview U7).  
 
The need for stricter supervision from HQ was particularly voiced in Lower Denkyira  
where budgeting and expenditure processes did not appear to be transparent to the 
officials. Under circumstance in which an internal monitoring mechanism was not 
evident, supervision from HQ was seen as key to any chance of sustaining the 
intervention.  
 
6.3.2.3  Summary of Findings at the Meso Level 
It appeared that to some extent WSD had been assimilated into daily DEO operations, 
although the degree to which this had been achieved differed markedly between the 
two DEOs. However, this did not mean that the officials considered WSD to be 
sustainable in the district. Rather, sustainability depended mainly on whether training, 
supervision, support and monitoring were continuously provided  by HQ in the long 
term. This was considered to be the only way of enabling the DEO to maintain the 
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initiations brought about by WSD. However, success also depended on the 
commitment and leadership of the district directorate. Without such commitment and 
supervision, it could not be guaranteed that funds would be spent transparently and 
efficiently in the districts.  
 
6.3.3 Micro Level 
This section explores how the sustainability of the WSD programme was seen at the 
school level.  
 
The exact manner in which those in the schools regarded the sustainability of WSD 
was unclear. As seen in the previous section on WSD impact, the implementation of 
the programme was not highly visible in the schools, and its impact and outcomes 
could not be easily gauged. The imprest and the resources it procured, including 
desks, chairs and books, which became available to the schools with the introduction of 
WSD were noticeable (interview L/W3/HT); but they were not sufficiently substantial for 
those in the schools to recognise the tangible and/or immediate impact of such 
improvements, much less the outcomes. Consequently, opinions on the sustainability 
of WSD at the school level were inevitably ambivalent.  
 
Consequently, head teachers and their staff could perceive no clear dividing line 
between conditions before and after the advent of WSD (e.g. interview L/W2/HT; 
U/W1/HT). Instead of regarding the intervention as some kind of event, there was a 
sense of continuity or it being part of a process. It did not matter much to teachers if the 
government programme had officially concluded or not – they simply continued 
teaching. WSD was part of their life and work; it was not something they could extract 
from their day-to-day teaching and scrutinise. 
 
The views of head teachers on WSD sustainability varied. Their attitude depended 
solely on how much support the school had received from the DEO, for example the 
imprest; teaching materials; invitations to a cluster-based training course; and visits 
from DEO officials such as the circuit supervisor and the DTST.  
 
As far as the heads were concerned, the question of whether they could conduct on-
site training, provide supervision to their teachers or check lesson plans – and 
ultimately ensure that their pupils were well taught – depended on whether the DEO 
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could provide the necessary support and supervision. But this was seen as something 
beyond their ability to influence.  
 
During the interviews, there were occasions when head teachers expressed some 
mistrust of the DEO. This was particularly evident in circumstances in which head 
teachers had not received the imprest as often as they had initially been assured they 
would. One head teacher, who claimed his school had only received the imprest once, 
seriously questioned what the DEO expected him to do without having been provided 
with the promised money (interview U/W1/HT3). He suspected that the reason it had 
not arrived could be attributed to the DEO‟s misapplication of funds, leading him to 
form the opinion that incompetence or malpractice in the office was the reason that 
WSD did not function properly.  
 
In contrast, head teachers whose schools had received the imprest regularly and had 
enjoyed a high level of support from the DEO considered that in the end, it was the only 
agency that the schools could depend on:  
 
WSD is good because [the] District Office is doing [working well]. People come and 
go; NGOs come and go. But whatever happens, they [the DEO] are with us (interview 
L/W3/HT).  
 
Another head teacher attested: 
WSD will, if the government continues to be committed to support [it], last. It is up to 
the government. Any kind of programme can last as long as the DEO works hard and 
resources are available to capable head teachers (interview U/W2/HT).  
 
The head teachers believed that their staff could easily slip back into old and 
undesirable teaching habits without constant support and periodic training (interview 
U/W2/HT; L/W1/HT). Therefore, sustaining innovations such as those WSD had 
brought into the schools essentially depended on the commitment and substantial 
support of the DEO. 
 
Finally, as discussed in the earlier section on WSD impact, WSD outcomes were not 
tangible as far as the teachers and the SMC were concerned. Therefore, the question 
of whether the impact of WSD was sustainable was not uppermost in their minds.  
 
6.3.3.1  Summary of Findings at the Micro Level 
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For those in the schools, the question of whether WSD was practiced depended on 
leadership and the commitment of the DEO. Without support and supervision from the 
DEO, it was literally impossible for head teachers to continue implementing WSD.  
 
6.3.4 Summary of WSD Sustainability 
To some extent, WSD became embedded in GES operations purely because the GES 
was entrusted with the implementation of WSD. However, there was a paradox to its 
sustainability as long as the GES treated WSD as a completed intervention, and as 
long as GES implementation officials considered WSD to have already been 
assimilated into GES operations.  
 
There was a strong sense of sustainability and ownership of the WSD programme at 
GES HQ, and perhaps even in the DEOs. However, this view was not shared by those 
in the schools. The fact that the SMC members and teachers I met knew scarcely 
anything about WSD, and the head teachers themselves were barely kept informed 
about the programme, had serious implications for state ownership of the WSD 
process.  
 
Ownership did not reside merely with GES HQ and/or the state. Ideally, ownership, 
should have involved a range of stakeholders, not only at different levels of government 
but also – and most importantly – in the schools. Yet, the sense of ownership of the 
WSD intervention grew weaker as it percolated down from HQ towards the school 
level.  
 
As far as teachers were concerned, and perhaps officials at the DEO as well, whether 
interventions such as WSD could be sustained in school and district, depended on how 
much they were able to receive continuous support and supervision from the higher 
authority. In this sense, the sustainability of WSD was regarded as depending on the 
commitment and leadership of MoE/GES HQ.  
 
 
6.4. Conclusion 
The DFID ESSP focused on basic education in support of FCUBE. By means of a sub-
sectoral budget support approach, ESSP funds were disbursed via the GES to support 
the WSD programme, and concentrated on a district and school level intervention.  
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WSD employed existing GES institutions – including various divisions of HQ, the DEOs 
and the schools – entrusting funds to Ghanaian education actors, thus enabling them 
to take responsibility for a series of implementation activities. As a result, structures 
were put in place and the system was strengthened to some extent.  
 
At HQ in particular, officials were confident that WSD had made a significant impact in 
terms of providing more cost-efficient service delivery through direct support to GES 
structures. However, although there were noticeable innovations, they were not entirely 
successful in translating into tangible outcomes in schools. 
 
WSD contributed to promoting Ghanaian ownership of education intervention, at least 
at the national and district levels, as the donor-initiated programme and GES 
operations were to a certain extent assimilated. As a consequence, the sense of a 
distinction between donor funding and the government budget could also have become 
blurred. In other words, the fungibility of WSD funds might have reached the same level 
as the national treasury itself. Indeed, the GES struggled to provide sufficient 
supervision and support to schools through its DEOs; and funds that were intended for 
the schools were not delivered, or else were not spent as they should have been.  
 
As DFID control relaxed, the onus on the GES to deliver increased proportionately. As 
the GES took responsibility, the fungibility of WSD funds seemed to grow and the 
transparency of their expenditure was not ensured. However, although the impact had 
yet to be seen to any tangible extent at the school level, GES officials emphasised that 
strengthening the state education system by employing the GES to deliver funds and 
services was the most efficient approach to education development in the long term.  
 
Since the conclusion of the ESSP programme, the UK has continued to support the 
Government of Ghana in its mission to achieve its FCUBE objectives, with particular 
emphasis on the enhancement of universal primary completion (UPE). DFID currently 
supports Ghana‟s Education Strategic Plan, having pledged GBP 105 million over ten 
years, from 2006 to 2015. This is sector earmarked budgetary support, the intention 
being to create a migratory path to general budget support.   
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Chapter 7 Cross-case Analysis of ‘Whole School Development’ 
and ‘Quality Improvement in Primary Schools’ 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the themes of aid absorption that emerged in the analyses of 
the Quality Improvements in Primary Schools (QUIPS) and Whole School Development 
(WSD) programmes in chapters 5 and 6 respectively, and answers the research 
questions set in chapter 4. These themes – namely, accountability, power, trust, 
ownership and sustainability – were established as the common and constant threads 
that ran through Ghanaian education actors‟ perceptions of international financial 
assistance. 
 
This study is framed by an overarching question – What are Ghanaian actors‟ 
perceptions of international financial assistance to basic education? – and guided by 
the five specific questions set out in chapter 4, section 2. The present chapter revolves 
around the research questions, even as these themes interlink across the inquiry. 
Thus, here is a reminder of the specific questions that guided the study:  
 
Q1 What are the differences in approach to the use of external funds in theory and 
in practice between WSD and QUIPS?    
Q2 How do education actors perceive the contribution of WSD and QUIPS 
respectively, and what accounts for their perceptions?   
Q3 What do they consider to be the constraints to the efficient use of external 
resources (in enhancing the quality of education)?   
Q4 How do they perceive the efficiency of WSD and QUIPS respectively, and what 
factors explain differences in perception between the two programmes? 
Q5 What are the implications of the findings of this study for an approach to 
education development in terms of making the most of the available external 
funds?  
 
The following section discusses the approaches that the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the UK‟s Department for International 
Development (DFID) each adopted, which aims to answer question 1. Next, the 
respective contributions of QUIPS and WSD are discussed in order to answer question 
2. This is followed by an examination of monetary fungibility as a challenge to the 
effective expenditure of external funds, which is related to question 3. The themes of 
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accountability, power, trust and ownership are then discussed in order to answer 
question 4. Finally, the theme of sustainability is considered in order to examine the 
implications of this cross-case analysis, which addresses question 5.  
 
 
7.2 Approaches to the Delivery of External Funding 
As demonstrated in chapter 2, national education reform under the auspices of the 
Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FUCBE) programme was originally 
designed as a sector-wide approach in response to the realisation of both government 
and donors that sector coordination was necessary in order to avoid the duplication 
and proliferation of development efforts. However, although donors working in the 
Ghanaian basic education sector did so in the best interests of the FCUBE programme, 
they ended up failing to combine aid modalities and procurement procedures into a 
harmonised strategy.   
 
USAID and DFID – the two bilateral donor agencies that concern this study – also 
designed programmes to complement the government‟s FCUBE initiative. DFID 
supported WSD, which was adopted by the Ministry of Education (MoE) and the Ghana 
Education Service (GES) as a framework for the achievement of FCUBE through the 
Education Sector Support Programme (ESSP), by releasing funds for implementation 
to the GES. Alternatively, USAID launched its QUIPS intervention, setting up a 
programme office from which it directed assistance to the schools. 
 
Both agencies aimed to address a shared national objective – namely, the 
enhancement of the quality of education – by strengthening the decentralised 
management system. Change was sought through pupil-centred teaching and learning, 
and wider participation in school improvement, in an attempt to change the professional 
and organisational culture of the school. This was to be achieved through capacity 
building at all levels.  
 
The objectives of WSD and QUIPS were almost identical (van Donge et al., 2002). 
However, the further we move away from the overall objective, the more the 
differences become apparent. Since their respective preferences for the modality of aid 
delivery differed, the manner in which the two programmes transformed funds into 
practice was also fundamentally disparate. DFID opted for sectoral funding, whereas 
USAID went for the classic model of standalone project assistance.  
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In theory, USAID/QUIPS and the MoE/GES worked together as partners in the 
implementation of QUIPS (QUIPS Programme Evaluation Team, 2005). However, in 
practice, USAID/QUIPS took the lead in programme design and appraisal, determining 
input and using its own disbursement and accountability procedures. To facilitate 
QUIPS, USAID implemented a parallel system to that of the MoE/GES, contracting 
several international and national agencies to set up a programme office independent 
of the government.  
 
The direct focal point of QUIPS was the school. Three schools in each district were 
selected and targeted with substantial support, for example, teacher training in pupil-
centred instruction techniques; guidance for the SMC in school management; the 
construction of a school compound or teachers‟ quarters; and a micro grant awarded 
for the duration of the two-year intervention.  
 
In parallel to this strategy, QUIPS aimed to strengthen capacity by providing district 
officials with administrative and financial training. It was also designed to influence 
national primary education development policy by providing funds to the District 
Education Office (DEO) in the form of a district grant, and to the MoE by means of non-
project assistance (NPA). The rationale was that „best practice‟ in the pilot schools was 
to be extended to a district-wide strategy by DEO officials and QUIPS-trained teachers, 
and incorporated into national policy.  
 
On the other hand, DFID employed the existing GES structure at central, DEO and 
school levels. To facilitate WSD, DFID released funds to the GES, enabling it to 
implement the programme itself.  
 
WSD aimed to deliver funds, resources and services at school level by releasing 
money to existing institutions within the state education system. Thus, the GES itself 
assumed control of delivery to schools through the DEO. In the process of so doing, it 
was intended that the WSD programme should strengthen the financial and 
administrative capacity of the GES.  
 
Not only did various departments at GES HQ take charge of a series of implementation 
duties, but the DEO also budgeted for and implemented district activities, for example, 
the organisation of in-service training based on the cascade model, and the disbursal 
of the imprest to the schools. This was the first time the DEO had received a regular 
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budget for conducting its activities; and likewise, it was the first time the schools had 
received „regular‟ funding from the DEO. In order to achieve the aims of the 
programme, all basic schools were targeted.  
 
In summary, although WSD and QUIPS both aimed to achieve the same objective in 
targeting school improvement, their respective processes for delivering external funds 
to link money to development impact differed, since the former opted for system-wide 
funding while the latter took the form of project assistance. The next section examines 
the perceived outcomes of these disparate funding mechanisms.  
 
 
7.3 The Respective Contributions of WSD and QUIPS 
As discussed above, both programmes ultimately targeted school improvement. 
However, arrangements for delivering funds, resources and services to the end-user 
(the school) varied, as did the number of hands they passed through before reaching 
their destination. WSD funds trickled down through the GES structure from HQ to the 
school by way of the DEO, whereas QUIPS funds were literally handed over to the 
intended recipient from the programme office. In other words, whether the funds were 
actually delivered and how much of the original amount was received by the end-user 
already posed a challenge even before the question of how they were actually spent 
under WSD could be addressed, while this was not a concern in respect of QUIPS.  
 
From the end-user‟s point of view, WSD struggled to link input at the national level with 
tangible impact at the grassroots level, and little of the benefit appeared to trickle down 
to the school. For example, the promised imprest, which should have been delivered to 
head teachers to enable them to engage in on-site training, was not received regularly 
from the DEO. This resulted in great challenges to – and sometimes the near 
impossibility of – the organisation of school-based in-service training; and the GES 
clearly struggled to provide effective training via the cascade model. Thus, the impact 
on school improvement and pupils‟ learning often seemed negligible to those in the 
schools, although some progress was noticed.   
 
In this sense, the changes brought about by QUIPS were highly visible because the 
funds, resources and services, along with intensive training and supervision, were 
delivered directly by the QUIPS facilitators. As seen in chapter 3, advocates of project 
support claimed that one of its key merits was effectiveness of implementation. In fact, 
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QUIPS basically accomplished what it had set out to do within a two-year cycle. All 
teachers received intensive and regular training in pupil-centred teaching and learning 
from QUIPS trainers; while, headed by the school management committee (SMC), the 
community was encouraged to take an active role in school improvement. Thus, there 
were visible innovations in the pilot schools.  
 
However, the impact can be seen from a different angle. From the point of view of the 
officials, the contribution of an intervention should not have been assessed purely in 
terms of immediate results, but with regard to the long-term impact as well. Although 
the GES might have still been so weak that funds and services were not delivered as 
planned, it was considered that GES capacity could not have improved at all if DFID 
had not taken a risk and entrusted it with the funds, allowing it to learn and build a 
system through independent practice. One of the high points was the delivery of the 
capitation grant, which was conducted quite smoothly due to the experience of WSD. 
Thus, WSD‟s biggest contribution was in installing institutions and strengthening the 
administrative capacity of the GES.  
 
The GES system might have been strengthened; structures might have been put in 
place; a mechanism for providing in-service training might have been introduced; the 
SMC might have been legitimised; DEO officials might have become accustomed to 
budgeting and planning on their own; and the district teacher support team (DTST) and 
the circuit supervisors might have obtained regular funds to enable them to visit 
schools more often than before. Yet, all this input did not result in tangible impact at 
school level, at least not any that was visible enough for those on the ground to notice 
significant changes.  
 
At the same time, QUIPS struggled to extend its intervention at district and school 
levels to nationwide practice, or even to districtwide practice. As seen in chapter 5, 
USAID/QUIPS failed to influence national primary education policy at state level, as its 
NPA was terminated. Some district education officials took an intensive training course. 
The training itself was considered to be useful but the intention behind the district grant, 
whereby the DEO was expected to extend the QUIPS programme to a districtwide 
intervention, appeared to officials to be overambitious and unrealistic. Thus, with no 
mechanism for linking QUIPS practice at district and school levels to the national 
education policy framework, its contribution would continue to be regarded as nothing 
more than “a stone in [a] massive sea” (interview G15).  
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Moreover, any indication of improved test results in the pilot schools, which QUIPS 
tried to gauge in a quantitative manner, turned out to be rather subtle in comparison 
with neighbouring schools. This resulted in a lack of conviction on the part of GES 
officials that QUIPS was an effective way of improving the quality of education.  
 
Nevertheless, there are sharp contrasts in terms of the respective contributions of WSD 
and QUIPS. WSD arguably strengthened GES institutions in terms of service and 
funding delivery, but struggled to follow this through and make a tangible impact on the 
school itself, whereas QUIPS made a visible impact but failed to establish a 
mechanism for linking it to national policy.  
 
A further contrast may be seen in the allocation of funds. WSD accommodated all 
18,64355 basic schools, which inevitably reduced the share of funding each one 
received, while QUIPS targeted just three schools in each district with substantial 
assistance. Therefore, it may be impossible to make a fair comparison of the respective 
impact at school level between the two programmes.    
 
There is an inherent dilemma in these two types of development approach: attempt to 
strengthen capacity by releasing funds to the state system, even if it results in 
compromising the efficiency of delivery; or aim for direct results at the school level by 
bypassing the state system. The former may take some time to achieve tangible 
outcomes at the grassroots level, while the impact of the latter can be seen straight 
away but is open to criticism in that it only benefits a limited number of schools for a 
limited period.  
 
This dilemma was reflected in a perception gap between GES officials and those at the 
school level with regard to what they thought needed to be done. GES officials 
considered the challenge from a macro and somewhat long-term perspective, while 
those in the schools were intent on enjoying the imminent benefits without delay.  
 
Indeed, the manner in which the various actors regard the impact of a programme 
depends on the point of view of each individual. It is not that their priorities necessarily 
conflict, but the sense of urgency is likely to differ between suppliers and receivers.  
 
                                                     
55
 http://www.ghana.gov.gh/studying/education/index.php (accessed on 28/06/10). 
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According to education officials, the biggest contribution made by WSD was in 
enhancing the capacity of the GES in terms of budgeting and administration, in 
allowing it to take charge of programme implementation. Structures were installed not 
only at the centre but also at the DEO. Officials with budgeting and related duties 
undertook financial and administrative training courses; and some new institutions – 
e.g. a budget committee – were established at the DEO. Likewise, a mechanism for 
providing the cascade model of in-service training was introduced, the imprest was 
brought in, and the SMC was legitimised. There were notable positive changes in some 
schools, for example, innovations in teaching methodology and an increase in 
enrolment; but any progress was restricted to certain schools. Nevertheless, it was 
hoped that with persistence, such promising results would be mirrored in national 
statistics.  
 
 
7.4 Fungibility: Constraints to the Efficient Use of Funds  
Money alone does not lead to development. Rather, the crucial point is the way in 
which it is absorbed in order to make a given impact. The biggest challenge in terms of 
the efficient use of external resources is the monetary fungibility that seems to be 
embedded in the system. This section compares WSD and QUIPS in the light of their 
respective susceptibility to monetary fungibility, thus addressing question 3.  
 
One of the potential merits of the sector-wide approach is the cost efficiency that 
results from the use of government systems (Riddell, 2007b). Accordingly, Ghanaian 
officials claimed that WSD exhibited a cost-efficient approach in releasing funds to the 
GES, thus enabling it to take charge of programme implementation.  
 
Using existing structures should be relatively cost efficient in comparison to a situation 
in which structures for the delivery of aid have to be initiated on an ad hoc basis. 
However, in respect of the present study, such a precept becomes open to question if 
we consider the fact that the potential fungibility of WSD funds was high and their 
leakage from the system could often be observed.  
 
QUIPS programme funds were far less fungible as the money was delivered directly to 
the end-user; thus, the only possible point at which fungibility could occur was when 
the funds were in the end-user‟s hands. Indeed, one of the reasons why USAID 
adhered to the project approach was to enable it to track its funding closely. 
191 
 
Accordingly, the donor awarded contracts to organisations with which it was familiar 
and let the office take charge of the project budget. As the office was answerable to 
USAID, the level of accountability that those in receipt of the grant (i.e. the pilot schools 
and the DEO) were required to maintain was higher than in the case of WSD (aspects 
of accountability are discussed in greater detail in section 7.5). 
 
Consequently, monitoring was stricter and more frequent under QUIPS than it was with 
WSD. Moreover, QUIPS also introduced an internal monitoring mechanism in the case 
of the micro grant whereby a multiple checking procedure was used in its management 
in the pilot schools and their communities. This not only helped ensure that the funds 
were used properly but also avoided the arousal of suspicion of improper usage among 
actors by making expenditure quite transparent.  
 
In contrast, there was no such scrutiny or monitoring system employed by WSD. The 
DEO checking mechanism (e.g. as utilised by the budget committee, the district 
education oversight committee (DEOC), and DEO officials) did not function fully either, 
the imprest not being delivered to the school as it should have been. As Xiao Ye and 
Canagarajah (2002) note in their survey of Ghana, there was a serious lack of synergy 
throughout the system. Indeed, the present study found that this disconnection 
between the measurement of resource flow from the centre to the DEO and down to 
the school level rendered financial management unclear, which resulted in leading 
actors becoming suspicious of each other and, consequently, deterioration in the 
efficiency of their work.  
 
Even when the WSD imprest did reach the school, information about it was not widely 
shared. In many cases, the way in which it was spent was unknown, or only known to a 
very limited number of actors. As a result, the transparency of its management was in 
serious doubt. It is obvious that a multiple checking system seldom operated in most 
WSD schools as it did in QUIPS schools; although the introduction of participatory 
management to a wider circle of actors – the SMC in particular – was one of the core 
components of WSD (GES 1998).   
 
One of the factors that prevented the effective functioning of the WSD checking 
mechanism was a bureaucratic environment permeated by what Fobih et al. (1995) 
term the „culture of silence‟ at school and district levels, in which little information 
percolated through the system. Head teachers did not usually challenge the authorities 
if the imprest was „lost‟ somewhere between the DEO and the school. DEO officials 
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themselves did not challenge the directorate with regard to the flow or leakage of funds 
at district level; and did not usually take steps to expose to HQ or the regional office 
(RO) any monetary misapplication or misappropriation. Finally, it was unusual for the 
DEO directorate to challenge the authority of the centre.  
 
All this inertia meant that little information about the problems of basic education at 
district or local levels was channelled to GES HQ. This in turn resulted in the 
disengagement and alienation of district officials and teachers. Under such a prevailing 
culture of silence, it was perceived that the more money that passed through the 
various levels of the GES system, the greater its fungibility was likely to be.  
 
The key to the reversal of such a situation was the internal monitoring mechanism, 
which, however, often failed to function. Nevertheless, the same officials‟ attitude 
towards accountability varied between WSD and QUIPS; in other words, with or without 
the presence of an external or internal monitoring system. DEO officials were 
somewhat cavalier when working with WSD funds, while the same people grew more 
alert when they turned their attention to the QUIPS grant. This suggests that the GES 
was able to increase the financial efficiency of its operation when a strict monitoring 
mechanism was put in place.  
 
As demonstrated in this section, the factor that affects the level of fungibility is the 
requisite degree of accountability. Variation in the extent of accountability assumed by 
WSD and QUIPS had a direct bearing on how their respective aid funds were 
absorbed. The theme of accountability is also directly linked to issues of power 
relationships, trust and ownership. For this reason, the next four sections discuss 
accountability, power, trust and ownership in relation to question 4.    
 
 
7.5 Accountability: The Efficient Use of Funds  
This section addresses the type of accountability in each of the two case studies. First, 
it analyses accountability relations between donor and implementing agency; and 
second, it examines other accountability relations under WSD and QUIPS.  
 
7.5.1  Accountability: The Relationship with the Donors  
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According to Eraut et al.‟s (1978) „dimensions of accountability‟ – termed „patterns of 
accountability‟ by Cornwall et al. (2000 p.3) – there are three elements that constitute 
the concept of accountability: accountability to whom; accountability for what; and a 
mechanism for passing judgement.  
 
Accountability to whom depends on the “type of accountability relationship” (Becher et 
al., 1981 p.20), that is, the relationship between those who are held accountable and 
those who seek accountability. Such a relationship may take the form of moral 
accountability (to a client); professional accountability (to oneself or one‟s colleagues); 
or contractual accountability (to one‟s employer/master).  
 
Accountability for what concerns the subject for which accountability is required, for 
example, a result or process.  
 
The mechanism for passing judgement on accountability is assembled from the 
following elements: dissemination of information prerequisite to judgment; the criteria to 
be used; and communication of the judgement to those who are held accountable.  
 
In an application of these accountability relationship criteria to QUIPS, the programme 
office was exclusively accountable to USAID Ghana, which was the programme‟s 
„employer/master‟ (Becher et al., 1981 p.20). Such an accountability relationship is 
regarded as „contractual accountability‟.  
 
To illustrate this, the QUIPS office was held accountable to USAID Ghana for 
programme funds. USAID made judgements based on financial requirements 
determined by US policy and the performance of the QUIPS office. In this case, the 
relationship was one of accountability for results to one‟s employer/master through an 
external, formal and collective mechanism of judgement.  
 
In a contractual relationship, the contract may include the application of rewards or 
sanctions in return for the respective accomplishment or non-accomplishment of the 
envisaged action. As Chapman (2006) points out, in the case of USAID, the ultimate 
sanction was that a non-governmental organisation (NGO) that had been awarded the 
QUIPS contract might be omitted from the next bid if it failed to ensure the 
accountability of funds to USAID and meet the donor‟s financial requirements.  
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Such contractual accountability cannot be so readily applied to the relationship 
between DFID and the GES. Since the management of the funds was delegated from 
DFID to the GES, the relationship between the two can be seen as lying somewhere 
between moral and contractual accountability.  
 
For example, applying Becher et al. (1981), GES HQ was held accountable to DFID 
Ghana for WSD funds; and DFID made judgements based on the WSD plans that it 
had agreed to. Thus, in this case, the relationship was rather accountability for 
progress to the client through an external, formal and collective mechanism of 
judgement.  
 
Unlike a contractual relationship, with moral accountability, those who seek it do not 
have recourse to effective sanctions. It was occasionally reported that DFID did not 
release funds to GES on schedule. However, this was not regarded as the application 
of a sanction by DFID. Rather, the principal accountant saw it as being merely because 
the GES had not managed to spend the previous quarterly budget by the date that the 
next release was due (interview G10).  
 
Considering that the donor field office is often under pressure to disburse allocated 
funds; is monitored in so doing by its head office (Ostrom et al., 2002a p.xxiv); and that 
one of the merits raised by advocates of the sector-wide approach is that the budget 
can be absorbed quickly (Al-Samarrai et al., 2002 p.4), suspending funds to the GES 
would not have been a practical measure for DFID to take as a sanction.  
 
7.5.2  Accountability: Relationships under WSD and QUIPS 
According to Kogan (1986 p.25), A is accountable to B when A is obliged to act on 
behalf of B; and A is subject to the application of a sanction or reward by B for his or 
her action. In this definition, if B cannot impose an effective sanction against A, he or 
she is not accountable to B but can still be responsible to B. Fearon (1999 p.55) terms 
such a relationship „moral responsibility‟.  
 
The central premise of Kogan‟s (op.cit.) definition is the application of the sanction. 
Similarly, Stewart (1984) stresses the potential to impose a sanction as an important 
element of accountability; and distinguishes an accountability relationship from a 
relationship in which A is obliged to give information (an account) to B, yet B does not 
have the capacity to take action on the basis of that information.  
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When Stewart‟s (op, cit) definition is applied to the different types of accountability 
relationship, it is clear that a contractual relationship may easily fall within this narrow 
concept of accountability, whereas moral and professional types of accountability do 
not. In a contractual relationship, the contract can include rewards and sanctions. 
However, in moral and professional accountability relationships, those who seek 
accountability do not have recourse to effective sanction measures. This is where the 
difficulty arises in seeking to make actors accountable for their actions. 
 
Under the contractual accountability relationship between USAID Ghana and the 
QUIPS office, any further accountability relationship formed by the latter could be 
viewed as contractual accountability. Both the DEO and the pilot schools were 
ultimately accountable to the QUIPS office. What the DEO and the schools were 
accountable for – i.e. in terms of degree and detail – had been predefined by QUIPS.  
 
There was also a mechanism for passing judgement through the application of rewards 
and sanctions. If a DEO did not complete activities planned for the first tranche of the 
grant by a preset deadline, or failed to send a report to the QUIPS office on time, it was 
not awarded the second tranche of the grant. Similarly, a given tranche was not 
disbursed to any school whose SMC had failed to collect matching funds in compliance 
with QUIPS prerequisites. Conversely, the first school in the district to complete its 
building project was rewarded with extra funds. All the strands of this accountability 
relationship converged at the USAID/QUIPS office.  
 
Eyben (Eyben, 2006a; 2006c; 2008) identifies three categories of accountability in 
terms of power relationship: downwards, upwards and mutual accountability; arguing 
that the last is the way forward in terms of international development. However, while 
the DEO and the pilot schools were held accountable to the QUIPS office, the donor 
did not hold a correspondingly high level of accountability to either institution. Thus, all 
these accountability relationships under QUIPS were single-headed arrows, which 
would seem to make them skewed.  
 
Moreover, since the centre was excluded from it, such a relationship had the potential 
to undermine the capacity of the GES, and entailed a potential risk – it might fail to 
capture the complete picture of the financial situation at district level. HQ officials were 
criticised by QUIPS personnel for being ignorant of events taking place at district and 
school levels, but the officials challenged this, claiming that they were deliberately kept 
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out of the loop. Thus, in the process of ensuring the greater accountability of QUIPS 
funds to the US side, USAID accountability to the Ghanaian side was undeniably 
neglected.  
 
According to Kogan‟s (1986) definition, the DEO was contractually accountable to GES 
HQ. However, there were no direct sanctions that those in the schools could impose in 
the event of misconduct by DEO officials. The DEO had a contracted „responsibility‟ to 
the schools, but there was no mechanism whereby the latter could voice their 
discontent or transform it into an internal sanction mechanism. Rather, similar to the 
findings of a Ugandan case study (Suzuki, 2003), those in the schools were kept in 
ignorance of the „responsibility‟ of the DEO.  
 
Similarly, Kogan (op.cit.) argues that teachers are contractually accountable to the local 
authority, but are only responsible to pupils and their parents. Yet, Lello (1979) 
contends that education entails more of a moral sense of duty. In fact, a University of 
Sussex study (1981) shows that teachers perceive themselves as being accountable to 
pupils and parents, but less so to the local education authority. In respect of the 
present study, this implies that the accountability concept embedded in the system 
conferred a strong moral responsibility. However, in the case of WSD schools, 
accountability was seldom ensured in either direction.  
 
The difficulty of ensuring accountability questions whether it was possible for an 
effective rewards and sanctions mechanism to operate within the state education 
system. There were cases in which the GES HQ financial controller suspended the 
quarterly disbursement to a DEO in retribution for its unaccountable failure to return or 
delayed submission of a report. The disbursement to a whole region was also 
sometimes suspended if one or more of its DEOs did not meet the deadline. This was 
undoubtedly a sanction – which may have even had the desired effect – but it was of 
course the teachers and their pupils who suffered the most from such measures, not 
the DEO officials.  
 
Moreover, the ostensible accountability relationship between the DEO and the schools 
was extremely ineffectual. Schools were not under any strict obligation to account to 
the DEO for the imprest because there was no sanction for failing to do so. On the 
other hand, some schools were not even aware of how much the imprest should have 
been or how often they were entitled to receive it. Furthermore, once a head teacher 
had received the imprest, he or she was supposed to draw up an action plan in 
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collaboration with his or her staff and the SMC, but this rarely occurred. Thus, such 
arrangements could hardly be said to have constituted an accountability relationship.   
 
In short, contractual relationships that were subject to effective rewards and sanctions 
ensured a high level of accountability, resulting in the „efficient‟ expenditure of funds (as 
in the case of QUIPS). In contrast, accountability relationships were more complex 
within the bureaucratic system of the GES; and since it did not utilise an effective 
sanctions and rewards mechanism, the potential for fungibility remained high.  
 
Stewart (1984) contends that the dynamics surrounding accountability are intrinsically a 
power relationship. Accordingly, it emerged that the power relationship behind the 
notion of accountability with regard to both WSD and QUIPS affected the manner in 
which aid funds were absorbed. Therefore, in the next section, question 4 is further 
discussed in terms of the respective power relationships behind the implementation of 
the two programmes.  
 
 
7.6 Power Relationships: The Efficient Use of Funds  
This section examines the locus of power and the asymmetrical relationship it forms; 
power within the GES; power over actors in schools; and power relations between 
WSD and QUIPS.  
 
7.6.1  The Locus of Power  
GES officials at HQ in particular regarded aid funds – termed „resources power‟ 
(Keohane and Nye, 1998) – as representative of power. Technically, both USAID and 
DFID were the providers of aid, while the Ghanaian side was the recipient. However, 
as far as the Ghanaian officials were concerned, the seat of power was very different 
under WSD and QUIPS respectively. As DFID delegated the management of WSD 
funds to the GES, power over WSD was to a large extent considered to have been 
transferred from DFID to the GES in order for it to be exercised within the state 
education system. 
 
On the other hand, USAID did not delegate and the locus of power thus remained 
external to the GES. USAID lacked confidence in the capacity of the GES to take on 
the mandate of managing funds for project implementation; and, therefore, awarding 
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contracts to organisations that had a good knowledge of USAID requirements and 
financial procedures was a reasonable second best choice for the US. For its part, the 
GES argued that such concerns were simply designs to control and maintain the 
balance of power in the relationship. 
 
7.6.2  An Asymmetrical Power Relationship  
GES HQ officials did not share in the management of the QUIPS programme or regard 
the achievement of its objectives as a common goal. The GES considered that 
USAID/QUIPS exercised power over the MoE in order to obtain the cooperation of its 
officials in the interests of the smooth implementation of the programme. 
 
According to Keohane and Nye‟s (1998 p.86) definition, either sanctions or rewards 
must be applied in order to get „ABC‟ to do what „X‟ wants to obtain. 
 
NPA funds constituted a sanction and reward mechanism to get the GES engaged in 
QUIPS. However, the mechanism failed to work in this instance. This implies that a 
form of uncompromising power – „hard power‟ (op.cit.) – in which the dominant actor 
„calls all the shots‟, does not always achieve the desired outcome.  
 
In their treatise Ownership and Donorship, Cramer et al. (2006) argue that a 
relationship shaped by caveats cannot give the recipient government any real sense of 
power. In fact, the relationship between the MoE/GES and USAID/QUIPS was 
regarded by the Ghanaian officials to be distorted, which caused friction between them.  
 
Unlike the relationship with GES HQ, resource power was used to get the DEOs to 
engage in QUIPS; and, with access to the funds, DEOs planned their own activities. 
Thus, power might in theory appear to have been handed over to the district. However, 
in practice, plans had to be approved before the disbursement was received. If QUIPS 
did not approve an activity, the DEO had to reorganise its schedule in order to meet the 
donor‟s requirements.  
 
QUIPS also set deadlines for the DEOs to complete a set of activities. However, if a 
DEO failed to meet its target, it was required to make capital purchases instead of 
continuing to attempt to deliver the service, in order to spend the funds immediately. 
This arrangement was obviously driven by QUIPS so that it could obtain the desired 
outcome. As corroborated by Cramer et al. (2006) in their Tanzanian case study, the 
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DEO felt that power resided with the QUIPS office alone, clearly rendering the 
relationship asymmetrical.  
 
In contrast to QUIPS, once the programme outline had been agreed, DFID entrusted 
WSD implementation to the GES. In fact, it did not appear to the officials that DFID had 
exercised its power over GES in setting WSD objectives in line with DFID goals; or 
exercised power over the GES to obtain the outcomes DFID desired. 
 
According to the officials, it was the GES that determined WSD outcomes rather than 
DFID. Nevertheless, the officials believed that if DFID had exercised its power to 
„coerce‟ the GES, DFID would have actually been doing it in order to urge the 
Ghanaians to pursue what they already wanted to do, or what DFID and the GES had 
agreed they both wanted to do. In this respect, DFID and USAID were perceived to 
have very different approaches.  
 
7.6.3  Power within the GES 
Since the implementation of WSD was subject to the various power relationships within 
the GES, irregularity in the delivery of funds and resources to the schools was 
sporadically observed. And given that no external power was applied to the GES, the 
power dynamic within the GES affected the distribution of funds.  
 
Corroborated by tracking surveys of government spending on education in Uganda 
(Reinikka and Svensson, 2001) and Ghana (Xiao Ye and Canagarajah, 2002), the 
present study found that schools used their bargaining power to secure a greater share 
of funding. For example, head teachers who exercised strong leadership were 
prepared to acquire the WSD imprest from the DEO by any means, while their less 
forthright peers failed to do so. Anecdotal evidence indicates that a head teacher‟s 
relationship with district officials was an important factor in obtaining funding from the 
DEO.  
 
Similarly, high performing schools were favoured by district officials because they 
projected a positive image of the school and the district as a whole, as well as 
attracting fact-finding delegations from the centre. In return, local officials rewarded 
these schools with a larger imprest. Moreover, district budgets were not always fairly 
executed as the power relationship within the DEO influenced financial allocation. In 
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other words, funds were not allocated according to the rules underpinning government 
spending, which had substantial equity and efficiency implications.  
 
The identification of factors that affect financial flow to schools is beyond the scope of 
this study, though an important area for future research. However, the crucial point 
here is that funds were very fungible en route from the DEO to the schools, and also 
within DEOs and schools. Thus, central budget allocation of funds to all end-users was 
seriously compromised by local power dynamics.  
 
The literature on power dynamics in international aid generally regards the asymmetry 
between donor and recipient to be negative (e.g. Clarke-Okha, 2003). Indeed, the 
imbalance of power between the Ghanaians and the donors was largely considered to 
be unfair by the officials, for example, in the case of USAID/QUIPS. Therefore, the 
power transfer from DFID to the GES in terms of the implementation of WSD was 
regarded as a positive shift that redressed the imbalance somewhat.  
 
Nevertheless, the present study found that not all officials considered the power 
asymmetry between the principal actors to be negative, or necessarily welcomed a shift 
in the balance of power. At the district level, it was questionable whether relinquishing 
power to the Ghanaian side increased the efficiency of service delivery or achieved the 
optimum outcome with the available funds. Since DFID did not have power over the 
GES, WSD funds were spent in a similar manner to the government budget, which left 
the funds fungible. In other words, some thought that the GES should not have been 
granted full power over WSD funds because there was a risk of high monetary 
fungibility, which prevented the funds from being used to their greatest efficiency.  
 
The voices proclaiming the potentially positive aspects of an imbalance of power 
became louder at district and school levels. At the DEO, it was perceived that the GES 
(at both central and district levels) required close supervision and monitoring by an 
external agency (preferably the donor) in order to prevent any misuse or 
misappropriation of funds. Likewise, some teachers wished that donors would exercise 
more power and apply greater pressure on the GES to deliver funds and services to 
schools promptly and efficiently without leakage from the system.  
 
There seemed to be a perception gap between HQ officials and those in the districts 
and schools with regard to the capacity of the GES. Unlike the perception of those at 
HQ, at district and school levels, it was considered that in the interests of good 
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governance, the donors would do better to exercise asymmetrical power over the GES 
until such time that it could be trusted to operate efficiently without outside pressure.  
 
7.6.4  Power over Teachers and the SMC  
Most teachers in the pilot schools found QUIPS pedagogic methodology to be effective 
and rewarding, but many also complained that the necessary preparation was more 
time-consuming than with their usual teaching methods. Moreover, while appreciating 
how much their pupils benefited from the new style of lessons, many also struggled to 
continue to maintain the high quality of teaching QUIPS expected them to deliver.  
 
Teachers emphasised that financial reward was crucial if they were to continue to work 
under QUIPS, but such remuneration was not available to them. This implies that they 
might have been convinced to participate fully in the programme at the introductory 
stage, which could be regarded as the exercise of „soft power‟ (Keohane and Nye, 
1998 p.86); but that this might not have been enough to sustain the initial eagerness 
and willingness of the teachers in the long term without reward.  
 
There were some cases in which teachers considered that they had been forced to 
comply with QUIPS facilitators – the exercise of „hard power‟. With the threat of 
sanctions but no promise of reward, the situation often seemed most unfair to teachers. 
Moreover, an in-service training course completion certificate, which was expected to 
enhance career opportunities, was promised to pilot school teachers at the end of the 
intervention; but it was not issued after all. Many teachers regarded this as a breach of 
contract or abuse of power, damaging their trust in QUIPS and leading to a feeling of 
exploitation.  
 
Unlike the teachers, the SMC had a „reward‟ in the shape of the micro grant. Thus, they 
might have been more highly motivated than the teachers. However, before the grant 
could be accessed, QUIPS facilitators spent sufficient time in a pilot school and its 
community to convince the SMC and other community members to follow QUIPS 
practices, and agree to the innovations that would produce the desired results and 
behaviour. The persuasion that the QUIPS facilitators exercised to obtain the initial 
consent and involvement of the SMC can therefore again be regarded as soft power.  
 
Once the SMC had agreed to the terms and started engaging in the initiative, it was 
awarded the micro grant to help it achieve the programme goals as quickly as possible. 
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It may thus be said that QUIPS facilitators employed soft power at the entry point to 
attract the SMC. However, according to Keohane and Nye (1998), soft power is not 
associated with a reward. Accordingly, the power that QUIPS exercised over the SMC 
perhaps cannot strictly be termed „soft‟ as there was a precondition (the collection of 
matching funds) imposed on it in order to earn the reward (the grant).  
 
The obvious imbalance of power notwithstanding, unlike GES officials or teachers, 
SMC members did not generally complain about such asymmetry; rather, they often 
referred to QUIPS facilitators as „partners‟. Therefore, it seems that the use of „soft‟ 
power at the entry point helped develop cordial relations between the facilitators and 
the SMC. In addition, the SMC was a direct beneficiary, unlike the officials or teachers.  
 
7.6.5  Confusion over Who Has Power  
In spite of the original intention behind the launch of FCUBE, whose aim was to 
coordinate various development efforts, as evaluated in USAID (2005) and World Bank 
(2004a) reports, the present study found that a lack of coordination between WSD and 
QUIPS sometimes caused confusion or competition at district level. When this 
occurred, the power relationship that officials were subject to dictated work priorities 
and QUIPS work took precedence over WSD work.  
 
When the district grant was disbursed, DEO officials were inclined to attend first to 
QUIPS business, putting aside other work. This meant that the QUIPS programme was 
implemented quite efficiently due to the power exercised over the officials; meanwhile, 
causing other work to be suspended. However, this would not have been an issue if the 
QUIPS programme had been recognised as part of the DEO‟s portfolio.  
 
Correspondingly, USAID was considered to have enjoyed considerable advantage over 
the GES in the field. QUIPS was well organised locally and had staff who were able to 
travel to sites that GES officials often could not reach due to lack of transport or fuel – 
or both. To invoke an old dictum, „knowledge is power‟: the QUIPS programme 
gathered information that was frequently unavailable to the GES. State officials simply 
did not have access to the kind of data the QUIPS office routinely gathered (e.g. 
individual school/community statistics and school assessment histories). QUIPS staff 
made exploratory visits from which they developed strategies and implementation 
plans that facilitated the running of the programme; and they subsequently conducted 
follow-up and evaluation.  
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Accordingly, QUIPS personnel – and thus USAID – were generally better informed 
about the Ghanaian education sector than many GES officials themselves, which 
further tipped the balance of power in favour of USAID/QUIPS. Such were the shadows 
that this power asymmetry between them cast on their day-to-day interactions in the 
field.  
 
The GES and those in the schools perceived both the QUIPS office and QUIPS 
facilitators as donors. However, the reality could be rather different. As Girgis (2007) 
points out, the QUIPS programme office, which was composed of various USAID-
associated organisations, was also a recipient of funds and might have perceived itself 
as an intermediary rather than a donor. This confusing mix of role interpretations 
complicated the situation and demonstrates that the perception of power – not 
necessarily actual power – affected the relationships between various individuals and, 
ultimately, between the Ghanaians and USAID.   
 
While GES HQ might have been almost completely excluded from playing a meaningful 
role in QUIPS implementation, QUIPS worked closely with the pilot schools and their 
communities, as well as the DEO. The teachers and other actors in the pilot schools 
were actively engaged in the programme, and came to play key roles in school 
improvement. Similarly, the DEO took charge of the management of the district grant.  
 
However, if we consider how they came to be assigned to QUIPS, it can be concluded 
that the level of the Ghanaian actors‟ engagement was actually determined by 
USAID/QUIPS. The manner in which they were engaged; the extent to which they were 
engaged; all their roles; and what they were expected to do and achieve had been 
predetermined, even before they became involved. In other words, the degree to which 
the Ghanaian actors were engaged was determined by the degree to which QUIPS 
wished them to be engaged.  
 
Under this asymmetrical power dynamic, the questions of whether Ghanaian education 
actors felt they were trusted by the donors and whether the former trusted the latter 
emerged as the foundation for the fostering of ownership and sustainability (which are 
discussed in the following sections). For this reason, issues of trust in relation to WSD 
and QUIPS respectively are discussed in the next section, which aims to further 
answer question 4.  
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7.7 Trust  
Mohiddin (1998 p.6) argues that trust is not something that can be created by the force 
of law, or the contractual or conventional requirements of a job, but is a product of the 
collective experiences of people living and working together, of mutual expectations, 
and of sharing common values and commitment.  
 
However, in reality, such trust is not easy to achieve, especially in the context of a 
donor–recipient relationship in which the recipient does not constitute a single group of 
beneficiaries, but various actors working at various levels, from the most senior position 
at HQ down to the most junior basic school teacher. Moreover, donor–recipient 
relations are often couched in terms implying that organisations in and of themselves 
can speak and act independently of the people who run or represent them. They do 
not; at least not in an interactive psychosocial sense. It is the interaction between 
individuals that makes or breaks relationships in donor–recipient dynamics.  
 
Thus, the level of trust nurtured by its diverse actors can also vary throughout an 
intervention. Expectations may be different; there can be disparate levels of 
commitment; and the extent to which values and objectives are shared may also differ. 
All these factors affected the level of trust that the Ghanaian actors in this study 
developed.  
 
In terms of a comparison between WSD and QUIPS, the question of whether the 
Ghanaian actors themselves felt entrusted seemed to be crucial as a basis for them to 
develop trust in the donor. Their sense of entrustment was seemingly a prerequisite to 
trusting the other. In other words, without such a perception, there seemed to be 
scarcely any chance that trust might develop in the Ghanaian education sector.  
 
USAID (2001; 2003) states that trust is fundamental to an effective working 
relationship. Indeed, USAID identifies the establishment of trust as one of the most 
important stages in the evolution of the partnership through which QUIPS was intended 
to operate (Academy for Educational Development, 2004). At the same time, concern 
about accountability was at the heart of the matter as far as USAID was concerned. 
Under the circumstances, retaining control of the funds was a reasonable second best 
choice for USAID. For their part, Ghanaian officials argued that USAID did not trust the 
MoE/GES, and that the donor‟s priority was its responsibility to the US taxpayer. The 
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fact that some donors – notably DFID – put their concerns about accountability to one 
side and took a chance on strengthening GES administrative capacity, only prompted 
the officials – those at HQ in particular – to distrust USAID all the more. 
 
In contrast, the fact that DFID took a huge risk in entrusting the GES with its funds 
appears to have heightened the officials‟ sense of entrustment. However, as seen in 
chapter 6, this did not mean that it delivered the funds efficiently. Rather, USAID‟s 
concerns seemed to have been well founded, considering the extent to which the funds 
became fungible. Yet, being considered reliable enough to be entrusted with DFID 
funds helped the Ghanaian actors to develop trust in the British donor.  
 
As a result, HQ officials were deliberately less than cooperative whenever they were 
asked to participate in the QUIPS programme, except in accepting lucrative  
consultancies.  
 
Pasteur and Scott-Villiers‟ (2006) study of the transformation of learning at the 
organisational level in Uganda describes the intersection of a „push culture‟ and a „yes 
culture‟ – the donor drives the initiative forward (the push) and the Ugandan tendency 
is to say „yes‟, but then quietly yet effectively to resist (ibid p.95). In her study of 
development projects, Leach (1996 p.470) describes this negative use of power as a 
blocking mechanism employed by nationals.  
 
Likewise, GES HQ officials tended to say „yes‟ to any request made by the QUIPS 
office. However, they would then deliberately not meet QUIPS‟ expectations and/or 
requests, for example, by using delaying tactics; arriving late for a meeting; failing to 
adhere to the deadlines for signing documents; or withholding information, all of which 
inevitably served to reduce project effectiveness. Nevertheless, the officials at the 
centre claimed that this kind of eventuality was often inevitable, since QUIPS work was 
not part of their job descriptions.  
 
On the other hand, the QUIPS side became frustrated with the officials‟ uncooperative 
attitude and lack of commitment to its programme. Thus, the mutual mistrust between 
HQ officials and the donor was generally felt by both parties to varying degrees of 
intensity.  
 
Leach (1991; 1997) explains the confusion and misunderstanding among actors in host 
institutes by using Handy‟s notion of organisational culture (Handy, 1999). Accordingly, 
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QUIPS brought diverse cultural and organisational values into its host institutes, 
notably DEOs and schools. Leach (op. cit.) points out that actors in host institutes are 
accustomed to working in a hierarchical bureaucracy (Handy‟s „role culture‟) and tend 
to be ill-prepared for the pressurised atmosphere of managing a project (Handy‟s „task 
culture‟). This results in different perceptions of how the project should be run and what 
its purposes are (Leach, 1999 p.383), which inevitably lead to a deterioration in the 
effectiveness of aid programmes.  
 
The fact that QUIPS was not fully committed to fostering a solid relationship with the 
GES led to a climate of doubt, suspicion and mistrust towards the donor at GES HQ. 
To compound the problem, the subtle human interaction that informed the relationship 
clearly grew in complexity and communication between the two parties was often at 
cross purposes.  
 
In contrast, it was considered that a high level of trust was built up in the pilot schools, 
especially between QUIPS and the SMC (CSA 2004). Collins and Higgins (2000 p.22) 
argue that trust fosters the expectation that reciprocal obligations will be met. In this 
sense, the SMC knew that QUIPS facilitators‟ promises were not merely empty words 
but would be honoured. This prompted the SMC to regard QUIPS facilitators as reliable 
actors.  
 
This kind of intense relationship was not usually observed in the WSD schools. Rather, 
the teachers and SMC even reconciled themselves to a lack of capacity on the part of 
the GES. In other words, they did not place much trust in the DEO in terms of efficiency 
of resources or service delivery; although the actual level of trust was dependent on 
how frequently schools received funds and services from the DEO. In return, the 
officials did not entirely trust those in the schools to spend their funds efficiently.  
 
Regardless of this lack of mutual trust, those in the schools believed that in the end, it 
was only the DEO that was and always would be with them. They argued that a donor-
related programme vanished from the site on its completion but that this was not the 
case with the DEO. Actors in the schools emphasised that there was nothing other than 
the DEO for them to rely on, as was the case even for those in the QUIPS pilot 
schools. There was no great trust observed between QUIPS and the SMC in the pilot 
schools; indeed, the DEO was the only agency that both WSD and QUIPS schools 
could work with in the long term.  
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In its pursuit of tangible outcomes, QUIPS opted to focus on building up trust with the 
pilot schools, which was deemed to be a great success (CSA 2004; QUIPS 
Programme Evaluation Team, 2005). Indeed, the quality of relationships within and 
between organisations in the aid world is crucial, especially if there is to be a chance of 
long-term sustainability (Eyben, 2006b).  
 
However, if trust is one of the key factors that leads to ownership of innovations 
(Clarke-Okha, 2003), and one that also affects efficiency in any working relationship 
(Takahashi, 2002a; 2006), putting collaborative effort into fostering a new partnership 
that is only designed to last for a limited period may be regarded as a waste of limited 
resources. As those in the schools considered GES institutions to be the only agencies 
that would ultimately stand by and support them in the long term, it can be argued that 
helping to strengthen a relationship that already exists might be more productive in the 
end (Akyeampong, 2004b).  
 
 
7.8 Ownership  
The working relationship under WSD and QUIPS respectively has been discussed in 
terms of trust. This section considers the two programmes in relation to ownership. It 
examines how different views of the ownership of the programme were formed, and 
discusses the level of involvement of each actor in implementation. This contributes 
further discussion with regard to question 4.  
 
7.8.1  Donor Control 
One of the differences between WSD and QUIPS was the level of donor control. DFID 
gave the GES full control of the funds, which enabled the Ghanaian actors to perceive 
the funds as being connected to the programme. Moreover, as the WSD initiative was 
assimilated into daily GES operations, the sense of a boundary between the donor-
related intervention and its own work began to blur.  
 
Thus, the approach DFID adopted was considered to be ownership enhancing. In fact, 
being entrusted with the funds for implementation seems to be one of the decisive 
factors that increased the sense of ownership among GES officials. If strict conditions 
for implementation had been imposed, ownership would have not been enhanced 
(Cramer et al., 2006); but this was not the case with WSD.  
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On the other hand, funds that bypassed the MoE/GES budget led to less national 
ownership – at least at central level – of the intervention. It thus appears that the close 
proximity of funds and resources was ownership enhancing; and vice versa. In general, 
as the level of donor involvement increased, the level of recipient ownership 
correspondingly decreased, since implementation was controlled more by the donor 
than the recipient. 
 
7.8.2  The Involvement of Ghanaian Actors 
Ostrom et al. (2002b p.15) identify four criteria that determine recipient ownership: 
demand, contribution, benefit and responsibility. DFID and USAID contributions to the 
FCUBE programme were officially made in response to a request from the Government 
of Ghana (Bonner et al., 2001). However, GES officials recalled events differently. One 
Teacher Education Division (TED) budget officer claimed that the GES had asked 
DFID for help in developing the WSD programme, while USAID had come up with the 
concept of QUIPS without being invited to do so by the MoE (interview G6).  
 
A former basic education officer who was then serving as district director recalled: 
 
You know, USAID hired some consultants who were developing a programme, 
developing concepts and sending the GES what they wanted to do. So, GES personnel 
went along with what QUIPS had planned for basic education. So, the basic difference 
was that WSD was internally, you know, organised by the GES itself… QUIPS was 
stimulated from the outside and brought into the GES (interview G11). 
 
Accordingly, the level of involvement of MoE HQ officials in QUIPS in terms of Ostrom 
et al.‟s (2002b) remaining three criteria was considered to be either low or actually non-
existent; except in the contribution of „manual labour‟, that is, simple routine tasks such 
as signing invitations to QUIPS-organised workshops (interview G12), or attending 
meetings organised by QUIPS, which were regarded as a burden rather than integral 
parts of the job description (interview G8). Thus, such forms of participation and 
engagement did not contribute to the officials‟ sense of ownership and only had a 
negative effect.  
 
On the other hand, the four criteria were mostly met in the pilot schools, especially by 
the SMC. Although teachers generally did not consider that they had benefited from 
QUIPS, they admitted that they had contributed to and taken responsibility for 
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innovations. Indeed, QUIPS personnel played a crucial facilitative role in ensuring that 
ownership of activities was anchored primarily with the beneficiaries. What is clear is 
that QUIPS facilitators had a greater ability to act as initiators of ownership on this level 
than did GES officials, as a programme office such as that which QUIPS operated was 
able to work closer to the schools than the DEO could (Edwards, 1997, 1999).  
 
The four criteria were also met - to some degree - at the DEO. However, it should be 
borne in mind that although the demand was always there in the districts, QUIPS was 
not an intervention that the DEO had requested but one that had been brought in by an 
external agency.  
 
In fact, district education officials who were required for QUIPS implementation service 
were seconded without necessarily informing the district director of education (interview 
U7). District directors were initially not even considered for or consulted about any 
training course or workshop, and only became involved during the organisation of 
training for district management implementation teams (DMITs), of which they were 
automatically members. Thus, it was considered that QUIPS had been imposed on the 
districts. Yet, due to the bureaucratic structure of the GES, district directors of 
education could not object to the secondment of their staff. Consequently, many DEOs 
became seriously understaffed but they did not complain to GES HQ (interviews G11; 
G15).  
 
Such non-involvement of the directorate at the planning stage led to a fatal flaw in the 
sustainability of the programme – there was a lack of support from the GES after the 
completion of the intervention. Therefore, the QUIPS approach, which had led to such 
positive changes in the pilot schools, signally failed to link this initial success with 
ownership of the programme at the district and national levels.  
 
This was ironic. USAID cautions that concentration on national ownership alone is to 
overemphasise the current aid trend towards sector-wide assistance, which tends to be 
top down (USAID, 1996). This concern was precisely the reason why it continued to 
direct some funding to NGO actors who had the advantage of working at the grassroots 
level (Riddell, 2002). 
 
However, the present study shows that without national ownership of the programme, 
there was no reason for local officials or those in the schools to believe that innovations 
could be sustained in their district. They did not possess the will to continue the new 
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practices; nor would they feel responsible for the task unless extra resources were 
made available to them, or if GES HQ did not opt to take over the programme.  
 
DEO officials were of the opinion that the question of whether or not QUIPS practices 
continued lay either with the Government of Ghana (GoG) and GES HQ, or depended 
on negotiation between the government and USAID; in any event, it was not something 
that could be influenced at district level.  
 
This was a limitation that could have been addressed at the programme design stage. 
However, as a result of this oversight, although the DEO met Ostrom et al.‟s (2002b) 
criteria, it cannot be said that the DEO ultimately gained ownership of the QUIPS 
programme.  
 
In contrast, the involvement of GES officials in the WSD intervention basically satisfied 
all four criteria. However, this was not the case at the beneficiary level. Demand was 
always there in the schools, but this did not necessarily mean that the four criteria were 
met; WSD philosophy was not universally shared by the teachers, let alone the SMC.  
 
One interpretation is that perhaps it was too early to reach any conclusions on the 
effects of ownership at the school level, given that sector-wide assistance tends to 
focus its power, funds and capacity building at the central government level.  
 
Another reading is that such inertia at school level originated from the difficulty in 
defining ownership under circumstances in which the concepts of „recipient‟ and 
„beneficiary‟ differed. In cases such as QUIPS, recipients are targeted beneficiaries, 
whereas in those like WSD, beneficiaries have little or no voice. The latter were 
passive participants in the sense that the official owner of the intervention was the 
central government, or its ministry in the form of the GES, which might have had little 
knowledge of the real problems facing targeted beneficiaries in the schools (Casely-
Hayford, 2000).  
 
As Smith (2005) argues, in order to improve the quality of education, ownership at 
school level should not be neglected. In this regard, the fact that SMC members and 
teachers I met knew scarcely anything about WSD, and that head teachers themselves 
were barely kept in the loop, had serious implications for national ownership of the 
WSD programme. Such Ownership does not just reside at the central level (DANIDA, 
1998a); most importantly, it should also include those at the grass roots. Nevertheless, 
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the present study found that ownership of the WSD programme became weaker as its 
implementation percolated down from the centre to school level.  
 
7.8.3  The Driving Seat  
The literature on ownership generally comes down firmly in favour of involving the 
recipient in problem diagnosis and solution designs if follow-through in implementation 
is to be assured (Brinkerhoff, 1996). The rationale for emphasising the importance of 
fostering ownership in the recipient is that, through conferment of leadership, it puts the 
host country, institute or side firmly in the proverbial driving seat; that is, in full control 
of the series of stages in the development process – from developing an agenda, to 
setting priorities, making decisions, allocating resources, implementing the programme, 
and evaluating it. Therefore, ownership should not be limited to a particular level or 
institution but applicable to all actors involved on the host or recipient side.  
 
In respect of the present study, officials generally agreed that the GES had come to 
own the WSD programme. Among the advantages they counted was the fact that 
leadership and accountability had been delegated to the DEO, although this view did 
not generally extend to the DEO officials themselves, given that activities and funds 
were still largely controlled by GES HQ.  
 
Similarly, during the two-year intervention, the DEO and pilot schools worked closely 
with QUIPS and met the set „targets‟; but the process was considered to have been led 
by the QUIPS facilitators. Admittedly, USAID/QUIPS staff frequently referred to the 
beneficiaries as partners, with the GES in the driving seat, but this notion was strongly 
rejected by its officials (interview G12).  
 
„Driving seat‟ is used as a metaphor to describe ownership of an initiative by the 
recipient. However, if this image is extended to allude to relationships at various levels 
under WSD and QUIPS, the nature of the association appears to depend on whether 
the context is that of a chauffeur-driven or an owner-driven vehicle.  
 
In the chauffeur-driven model of ownership, the driver is an afterthought. He or she 
does not have a chance or right to decide what type of vehicle is bought, its intended 
purpose, how it is to be used, or the nature of its maintenance. The driver cannot 
decide when to drive the vehicle or where to take it, unless he or she is merely being 
sent on an errand. Such decisions are the prerogative of the owner of the vehicle. At 
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the end of the day, the vehicle stays with its rightful owner and the driver walks or takes 
a bus home. In many cases, the driver is simply tolerated, knowing that his or her 
service is not really essential or irreplaceable.  
 
If this hypothesis is applied to the present study, the degree of ownership that could 
have been nurtured in either case is debatable, given that GES HQ did not actually 
delegate full power over WSD implementation to the DEO; and that the details of the 
QUIPS programme had already been decided before either the DEO or the pilot 
schools became involved.   
 
In their hurry to get the project off the ground and meet their disbursement targets 
within the financial cycle, QUIPS facilitators tended to fall into the trap of making 
decisions and undertaking duties that should rightly have been the preserve of the 
DEO, undermining or betraying the idea of local ownership in the process. A senior 
officer in Upper Denkyira described the relationship between QUIPS and the director 
as being “like an adult walking with a toddler – the toddler cannot keep up but the 
parent is in a hurry” (interview U7). Similarly, the former district director of education 
argued that USAID wanted “to lead in everything, when the District Education Office 
should actually be taking the lead” (interview G15).  
 
It was ambiguous as to what kind of ownership model was really expected to be 
developed when Ghanaian officials at neither central nor DEO level were consulted 
before USAID/QUIPS decided exactly how the programme was to be implemented in 
the districts and schools. Moreover, it was also unclear whether „actual ownership‟ 
(Mackin, 1996) could have been fostered in even a QUIPS pilot school and community 
when all the decisions on the application of QUIPS practices had already been taken 
before the schools engaged in the programme. Thus, those in the schools were twice 
removed from actual ownership; and ultimately, the beneficiaries may have been 
merely hitchhikers in a chauffeur-driven car.  
 
In summary, there is invariably a trade-off between ownership on different levels, which 
means it is difficult to achieve a high degree of ownership on all levels at the same 
time. WSD clearly enhanced ownership at ministerial and district levels, but failed to 
develop any real sense of ownership at the local beneficiary level; while QUIPS 
cultivated ownership at the school level but failed to link local ownership to national 
ownership. However difficult it may be, it is still necessary to achieve a balance 
213 
 
between all levels, since they are all crucial to the achievement of effective 
implementation and sustainability. 
 
 
7.9 Sustainability  
Thus far in this chapter, the themes of fungibility, accountability, power relationships, 
trust and ownership have been discussed in relation to research questions 1 to 4. All 
these issues seem to be woven into the question of whether the innovation and impact 
brought by the absorption of external funds can be sustained after the conclusion of the 
intervention. This fundamental theme is discussed in this section with the aim of 
answering research question 5.  
 
Rogers (2003) describes the sustainability of an aid-related intervention in the following 
terms: 
Sustainability is the degree to which a program of change is continued after the initial 
resources provided by a change agency are ended… Unless an innovation is highly 
compatible with clients‘ needs and resources, and unless clients feel so involved with 
the innovation that they regard it as ―theirs‖, it will not be continued over the long 
term (ibid p.376 emphasis in original).  
 
In Rogers‟ conceptualisation, a high degree of ownership over the intervention on the 
part of the host is one of the most significant criteria for sustainability; although other 
factors – e.g. financial autonomy – are also crucial to the achievement of this end. In 
this regard, it would hardly be worth considering the possibility of sustainability if the 
actors involved in the implementation of the programme did not feel that they owned it 
(Catterson and Lindahl, 1999).  
 
The following sections examine the theme of sustainability in terms of the three aspects 
reviewed in chapter 3: sustainability of organisation, of individual capacity, and of 
institutional capacity. This is followed by a discussion of factors affecting the issues of 
sustainability under WSD and QUIPS respectively.  
 
7.9.1  Organisational Sustainability 
One way of addressing the topic is in terms of organisational sustainability, which is 
concerned with the question of whether the specific organisational structures 
established by a programme continue to function after funding is withdrawn.  
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In this regard, the study shows that any institutions introduced at the district level by 
either QUIPS or WSD were seldom sustained. The DMIT was dissolved when the 
QUIPS district grant was terminated. The DTST, the DEOC and the post of community 
participation coordinator (CPC) might have continued to function but in the event, they 
all lapsed into dormancy. Meanwhile, the institutions and positions that had been in 
place before the interventions – such as the circuit supervisors – continued to operate 
as usual.  
 
Financial maintenance is a crucial element of sustainability (which was negatively 
exemplified in the case of the DMIT). However, it is not sufficient to perpetuate 
operation by itself. Budgetary allocation to the DTST, DOCE and CPC notwithstanding, 
the incumbents lost their initial industrious work ethic. What differed between the early 
stages of the interventions and the time of my fieldwork was the level of supervision 
and technical support from the centre to the DEO. This was originally facilitated through 
the DST and zonal coordinators, both of which had been abolished by the time of the 
study. 
 
In this sense, political will, leadership and champions of the programme at the highest 
level of the administration were crucial. Without such long-term commitment and 
assurance, it is difficult to see how any programme can be sustained.  
 
QUIPS operated outside the jurisdiction of the MoE. Thus, it was understandable that 
the GES did not demonstrate any particular persistence in attempting to sustain this 
programme. On the other hand, WSD was incorporated into the ministerial framework; 
but the fact that it was allowed to fade away casts doubt on whether the programme 
had actually been owned by the GES. A lack of support at the highest level indicates 
that ultimately, WSD might not have synchronised fully with national education policy 
after all.  
 
7.9.2  Individual Capacity 
Sustainability can be seen in terms of capacity building at an individual level, that is, 
whether the capacity of education actors (GES officials, teachers and SMC members) 
was enhanced through the programme, and whether they continued to work with 
increased capacity.  
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Education personnel who had received instruction were confident of incorporating 
some of the gains of the two interventions into their daily work, for example, skills 
gained through financial and administrative training; in-service training through the 
cascade model; and intensive training at QUIPS pilot schools.  
 
The assertion that work continued with enhanced capacity notwithstanding, as 
Huberman and Miles (1984) stress, whether the capacity of an individual can be 
sustained depends on whether or not he or she is provided with continuous support 
and training, especially those who have been newly assigned. In this regard, the input 
associated with QUIPS was regarded as a one-off event. Under WSD, such 
supervision took the form of a series of processes. Nevertheless, the level of training 
that GES HQ offered to DEO officials and DEO officials to teachers was said to have 
gradually waned.  
 
If the continuous support of individuals is the key to maintaining the gains made from 
WSD and QUIPS, and since the initial interventions were implemented for the same 
purpose, the programmes should be synchronised so that they operate in harmony. A 
lack of continuous support may undermine the impact of WSD and QUIPS, and make it 
easy for officials and teachers to slip back to their old ways of working. This is 
especially serious as the turnover of officials and teachers is high. A long-term 
mechanism should have been taken into consideration at the planning stage and 
embedded in the system; indeed, the needless duplication of innovations could have 
been reduced if there had been better coordination within the overall FCUBE initiative.  
 
7.9.3  Institutionalisation 
Yin (1979) observes that some projects might seem to disappear but continue to 
survive by becoming assimilated into a larger organisation, that is, „institutionalising‟ all 
or some of their practices into an existing system. The fact that installed structures may 
not survive does not always signify the end of sustainability; it is not merely a simple 
dichotomy consisting of the survival or collapse of a programme.  
 
The Ghanaian officials appeared confident of institutionalising some of the gains of 
both programmes. This was especially the case with WSD. In their study of 
organisational change, Berman and McLaughlin (1978) provide a relevant clue to the 
description of the trajectory of a project: institutionalisation involves at least one and 
perhaps a cycle of decisions taken by managers in order to reutilise the implemented 
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practice so that it becomes incorporated into organisational procedures. Indeed, in the 
case of WSD, cycles were established in which practices could be repeated; and the 
GES could assimilate and internalise the programme into its operations as a result of 
such repetition. 
 
On the other hand, Fullan (2007) argues that the total period from initiation to 
institutionalisation may be lengthy: moderately complex changes take from two to four 
years, while larger-scale efforts can take five to ten years. Indeed, Ghanaian actors 
considered that a project-type intervention like QUIPS, which offered participants a 
one-off event or a couple of repetitions, was not long enough for innovations to be 
institutionalised.  
 
7.9.4  Factors Affecting Sustainability  
7.9.4.1  Financial Sustainability 
One of the key factors affecting sustainability is whether the host has sufficient 
available funds to enable it to assume control of the intervention and/or continue to 
support it. In this sense, one of the negative effects of sustainability, which is especially 
applicable to QUIPS, is the absence of the necessary financial sustainability of 
supported institutions.  
 
Yin et al. (1977) caution that the recipient at district level is unlikely to be in a position 
to incorporate recurrent expenditure into its regular budget once external funds are 
withdrawn. Due to the substantial input of external resources, good practice in the pilot 
schools could be regarded as a „success story‟; yet, the GES was unable to shoulder 
the financial burden of sustaining it. This was not only attributed to its lack of ownership 
but also the fact that there was a gap between what the donor agency (USAID) and the 
government could afford.   
 
With regard to WSD, the fact that support from DFID through the ESSP came to an end 
could have been equally disruptive. However, DFID considered its continued 
involvement in service delivery to be of vital importance (Berry et al., 2004). To 
demonstrate its commitment, DFID Ghana explicitly expressed its intention of 
continuing to support the country‟s education sector through multi-donor and sector 
budgetary support (DFID 2009b). Thus, the officials were assured of the continuation of 
funding from DFID. This enabled the MoE/GES to make better long-term plans and 
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commitments, and to perceive the intervention as a process rather than an event of 
finite duration.  
 
7.9.4.2  Poaching and Capacity 
As discussed earlier, another influence on sustainability is the problem of fungibility. 
One way of dealing with this weakness is to delegate task management to hand-picked 
staff hired from outside the administration, which was what QUIPS did. Indeed, external 
facilitators were seen to be highly capable of and instrumental in implementing QUIPS 
interventions.   
 
However, poaching capable staff from the system and bypassing official organisations 
in order to maximise the success of a programme undermines the capacity of local 
institutions; and the benefit of such expertise is lost once the programme comes to an 
end. Akyeampong (2004a p.46) argues that the skills of exemplary project facilitators 
can be incorporated into the state system if there is an appropriate mechanism for so 
doing, thus ensuring that acquired capital is not completely lost. However, as the 
author (ibid) further observes in the case of an NGO project in Northern Ghana, there 
was no such arrangement in respect of QUIPS, a shortcoming that added to the 
challenges of sustainability.  
 
Another way that fungibility was dealt with was to post technical assistants or advisors 
with the MoE/GES in order to fill capacity gaps. This included the deployment of GES 
officials in donor-related programmes and the assignment of consultancy staff to 
MoE/GES positions. In the case of WSD, there was no direct poaching, as all 
implementers were GES officials; thus, theoretically their expertise remained within the 
system. Nevertheless, not only did the transfer of such parastatal personnel – e.g. the 
WSD national coordinator – and other administrators, hardly ever occur, but the 
prospective salary gap also had a negative effect on GES officials‟ sense of ownership, 
and therefore on the sustainability of programme.  
 
7.9.4.3  Conviction and Commitment 
Another fundamental challenge to the sustainability of education development that 
emerged from this study is the question of whether the recipient was convinced that the 
approach or intervention was sufficiently effective, efficient and relevant for the 
Ghanaian government to adopt and continue to support it, the aim being to achieve a 
nationwide improvement in the quality of education.  
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If the host government/sector is to be the real owner of innovations brought about by 
an initiative, and if the state is expected to assume control of any donor-related 
intervention and take the lead in the development of, for example, the basic education 
sector, without its conviction and commitment it is difficult to see how any intervention 
can be sustained in the long term.  
 
This study shows that the MoE/GES was not certain of the efficacy of the project 
approach. While some QUIPS innovations were considered worth adopting as „best 
practice‟, the question remained as to how to deliver such a strategy to all schools in 
Ghana, and how the MoE/GES could achieve this unaided. Accordingly, the study 
found that The MoE/GES ultimately remained unconvinced that this approach was a 
cost-effective way of achieving nationwide education development.   
 
Moreover, if the host government/sector was to take responsibility for realising the 
long-term aims and outcomes of donor assistance, the understandable position of the 
MoE/GES officials was to inquire why USAID did not contribute to strengthening the 
capacity of the existing system but expected the ministry, which USAID had turned its 
back on, to take over and even scale up the intervention. Naturally, such an 
expectation was seen as hypocritical and unrealistic.   
 
For these reasons, the MoE/GES opted for the system-wide model of assistance. In 
their study of international aid to Namibia, Bandstein and Dietrichson (2004) found that 
ministry officials generally preferred project support rather than budgetary assistance, 
mainly due to the fear of increased fungibility, bureaucracy and even corruption; as well 
as the lack of human resources experienced in many sectors.  
 
In contrast to the above-mentioned study, their overt recognition of the high potential 
for fungibility notwithstanding, the Ghanaian officials in the present study did not opt for 
project support, such as QUIPS, over budgetary assistance, such as that provided 
through the ESSP.  
 
Having observed and experienced various attempts to overcome the capacity gap, the 
officials eventually conceded that putting the persistent problem of weak capacity aside 
for the time being in order to achieve short-term aims did not contribute effectively to 
education development in the long run. It appears that they believed that tackling 
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capacity weaknesses by strengthening the existing structure was the only way to 
overcome such a challenge.  
 
In this regard, support for the state system has the potential to obtain sustainable 
impact and bring about development in the long term. After the donor phases out its 
assistance, the project will in all probability have to rely on the government or the 
MoE/GES for sustainability. Indeed, even if all objectives are otherwise met, 
programmes that are implemented outside the jurisdiction of the government or GES 
structure without addressing the fundamental problem of capacity are more likely to 
end in merely looking wistfully back on past success.  
 
 
7.10 Conclusion 
This chapter discussed themes that reveal the complex nature of the absorption of 
international assistance, drawing from two very different aid interventions that aimed to 
achieve the same objectives. The goals of WSD and QUIPS were almost identical, 
sharing the same principles of education development and placing the school at the 
centre of innovation. However, moving away from their overall principles, significant 
differences become apparent. Indeed, the approaches adopted by WSD and QUIPS 
respectively – how external funding was transformed into practice and absorbed into 
the sector – differed markedly between the two programmes.  
 
I observed numerous trade-offs with regard to how external funds were absorbed in 
both project and system-wide models of assistance, for example, in terms of capacity 
building and accountability; ownership and donor control; and immediate impact and 
sustainability. External funding was absorbed in the context in which the programmes 
were implemented, balancing these themes in accordance with the aid principles the 
donors had formulated.  
 
Funds could be absorbed in an „efficient‟ manner under the close supervision of the 
programme office, which resulted in the project fulfilling its goals and making a visible 
impact on the targeted groups. Accountability was ensured under the tight control of 
USAID/QUIPS. However, such a project approach faces the difficulty of linking good 
practice at school level with national ownership and commitment.  
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On the other hand, the weak capacity of the system could hamper the effective use of 
funds in respect of the programme model of assistance. Indeed, in the context of WSD, 
funds leaked substantially within the system before reaching the end-user. 
Consequently, system-wide funding such as that advocated by DFID may seriously 
struggle to link money to tangible impact at the school level. Accordingly, not all actors 
welcomed a strategy whereby the donor reduced its influence on the host 
government/sector, as this was considered to have affected service delivery. This view 
was especially expressed by actors at the grass roots.  
 
Nevertheless, the fact that the MoE was convinced that the system-wide model of 
assistance had strengthened capacity by releasing funds to allow the GES to take 
charge of programme implementation on its own has important implications in terms of 
the ownership and sustainability of donor assistance.  
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Chapter 8  Conclusion 
This study explored the perception of international assistance under the Ghanaian 
national Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE) programme. In 
particular, it examined the ways in which external funds utilised in different aid 
approaches were absorbed for the purpose of reaching sustainable outcomes, and 
revealed the complexity and challenges of putting the principles of the various 
programmes into action. The multilevel analysis involved several actors at different 
levels, all of whom had different experiences of aid absorption.  
 
This concluding chapter digests the implications of the study for international 
assistance to the Ghanaian education sector by summarising the main findings of the 
study. The chapter concludes with suggestions for areas for further research and 
reflections.  
 
8.1 The Relationship between Fungibility, Accountability and 
Power  
In corroboration with the literature on fungibility, chapter 3 reveals the finding of this 
study that there was a high probability of the funds being fungible. The biggest 
bottleneck in the appropriate processing of external funds was the weak capacity of the 
Ghana Education Service (GES) and funds were leaked at various levels of the 
system. Even when funds were delivered to the intended users, this did not always 
mean that they were spent in accordance with HQ and/or District Education Office 
(DEO) plans; rather, usage depended on the circumstances in which the users found 
themselves.  
 
The field data identify several factors that affect the use of external funds: (1) 
availability of information; (2) availability of monitoring and supervision; (3) availability 
of training; (4) relationships among officials at the DEO; (5) relationships between 
district officials and head teachers; (5) relationships within schools and communities; 
(6) relationships within HQ (e.g. the account of infighting at HQ); (7) relationships 
between HQ and the DEO; and (6) relationships between recipient and donors. These 
factors are intertwined and together they affect the level of monetary fungibility.  
 
The study revealed a negative correlation between the degree of donor control over 
funds and the degree of monetary fungibility. USAID exercised a high level of control 
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over the accountability of its funds, by means of awarding contracts to organisations 
that were familiar with the donor‟s financial requirements. Power over the QUIPS 
programme remained with USAID and the funds were said to have been efficiently 
spent in accordance with the plan QUIPS had mapped out. 
 
In contrast, on the WSD programme DFID overlooked the issue of accountability to 
some extent by entrusting the GES with control the disbursement of funds. The lack of 
GES institutional capacity over the disbursement of funds, however, led to a higher 
degree of monetary fungibility (leakage) than under QUIPS. The WSD funds leaked 
somewhere along the GES pipeline.  
 
The literature on sector-wide assistance reviewed in chapter 3 indicates that one of the 
merits of the approach is its cost-efficiency due to its use of existing structures. This 
view was particularly affirmed by officials at MoE HQ. However, it was not fully 
endorsed by those closer to the grassroots level since the benefits do not trickle down 
from above due to leakage throughout the system.  
 
This study also found that by channelling external funding into the government system, 
the WSD programme did not lead to the expected development outcomes in the short 
term; or at least not in a way that was sufficiently visible to convince those in the 
schools that they were benefiting from the intervention. Weak GES capacity hampered 
the delivery of funds, resources and services to the end-users in an efficient and 
effective manner. It may thus be concluded that GES capacity was not believed to be 
strong enough to deliver funds and resources to schools, much less to do so efficiently. 
 
In this regard, the power shift from the donor to the GES was not unanimously 
welcomed at all levels of the sector. Rather, under circumstances in which the weak 
capacity of the GES was a bottleneck in service delivery, there were voices that argued 
that the donor should apply more power over the GES in order to make certain that the 
funds were delivered; and that such supervision was necessary at least until such time 
that the GES grew competent enough perform the task on its own.   
 
Under the circumstances, bypassing the government system might be the more 
pragmatic way of spending external funds, since there is a lower risk of monetary 
fungibility in the process of disbursal to the end-users. Until GES can develop sufficient 
capacity, the cost of monitoring funds disbursed through GES to the equivalent level of 
accountability might be prohibitive. However, this method of delivering funds raises 
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questions about the cost-efficiency of establishing systems parallel to existing 
structures. This area requires further investigation. 
 
8.2 Trust, Ownership and Sustainability 
In accordance with the literature review of the relative merits of the sector-wide and 
project approaches, WSD enhanced ownership at the ministerial level while QUIPS 
facilitated ownership among the beneficiaries at the grassroots level. In contrast, the 
further the implementation of WSD moved away from HQ, the more the sense of local 
ownership of the programme receded; QUIPS, on the other hand, simply failed to make 
a significant impact at GES HQ or DEO levels.  
 
This study found that behind these different levels of possession, there was a trade-off 
between an increase in ownership and a decrease in donor control, even if this 
correlation was by no means invariable. However, the difficulty lies in the use of 
concrete criteria to measure an abstract concept. Thus, the study showed that even 
when the criteria such as Ostrom et al.‟s (2002a) are met there might still be a lack of 
ownership.  
 
The study also found that entrusting recipients with implementation was a fundamental 
prerequisite to developing a sense of trust towards the donor. This also helped 
MoE/GES officials to accelerate their sense of ownership of the programme, since 
ownership facilitated a better overview of the sector and long-term planning.  
 
The officials at HQ were disengaged from the implementation of QUIPS, which 
hampered the development of a working relationship between the USAID programme 
office and the GES. In turn, this undermined ownership of the QUIPS programme 
among MoE HQ officials.  
 
If a sense of recipient ownership is an important precondition for sustainability, an 
intervention should be owned at various levels. The study revealed the difficulty in 
achieving a high degree of ownership at all levels simultaneously. However, QUIPS 
case demonstrated the notion that national (governmental and ministerial) ownership is 
crucial because any initiative that is owned at the grassroots level cannot be sustained 
for long if there is no national ownership to support it in the field. The project approach 
can bring about swift and tangible changes in target areas (e.g. in schools), but any 
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programme ultimately faces the fundamental issue of sustainability at the end of the 
intervention. 
  
Indeed, the standalone project approach was seriously questioned by the officials in 
terms of its sustainability. Bypassing the existing system that was ultimately 
responsible for national education development because of its inefficiency just 
displaces the fundamental problem. Programmes and projects can succeed in 
establishing an exciting, innovative and effective school in the short term only to find 
that it will not last long if the system and management that are supposed to take over 
the intervention do not have the capacity to do so (Akyeampong, 2004b).  
 
Unless capacity is strengthened sufficiently to sustain changes brought about by 
projects, they will result in wasted effort. It is better to tackle capacity building early on 
than to put it aside in favour of a standalone project that achieves immediate outcomes; 
as such projects do not have a chance of being sustained for long if the capacity of the 
system is weak. 
 
This implies that any education improvement initiative should be in the business of 
institutionalising the long-term capacity of the system in the interests of continuous 
improvement. In this regard, utilising the GES structure seems to be a step in the right 
direction since existing state systems may thus remain effectual throughout the 
intervention. Conversely, newly installed organisations might become dormant along 
with the end of the project. As Akyeampong (2004a; 2004b) emphasises, it is better to 
strengthen the capacity of existing structures within the education system to support 
large-scale whole school improvement initiatives than to set up new structures that are 
intended to bypass ineffective ones.  
 
QUIPS facilitated high quality education to a small target population, but at a cost that 
was neither replicable nor sustainable. The programme was of considerable value in 
addressing the objectives of FCUBE, but it may be argued that a project that is not 
strictly included and implemented within a comprehensive national plan is not in 
principle good value for the money it costs to execute. Moreover, the GES believed that 
it could have operated more efficiently and achieved better results if the same amount 
of money had been released to the MoE. Although USAID/QUIPS countered such an 
argument, this was the prevailing belief among GES HQ officials.  
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However, this is not to deny the potential advantages that project assistance offer, as 
the impact of the project approach is likely to be more tangible and immediate than that 
of programme type assistance. This study shows that the project can reduce the risk of 
fungibility by tightening the monitoring system. This implies that there is a possibility 
that the system can more effectively work if the monitoring function is more strictly put 
in place. This positive aspect can be incorporated into the system-wide assistance. 
Indeed, the project can complement the efforts of a sector-wide approach initiative, as 
it has the means for a more accurate delivery of funds and resources to places the 
programme approach takes time to reach.  
 
 
8.3 Policy Implications 
As found in the literature review in chapter 3, international assistance has largely 
moved away from project assistance towards a more coherent, holistic, sector-wide 
approach to supporting the education sector. This trend is highlighted in the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) as an international commitment to aid 
effectiveness.  
 
The best intentions of this declaration notwithstanding, together with the case of the 
Quality Improvements in Primary Schools (QUIPS) project in the present study, other 
investigations also show that weak capacity or failings of local systems – especially in 
terms of financial management – often prompt donors to bypass state apparatus and 
set up special accounts or separate project implementation units (NORRAG NEWS 40, 
2008; Prospects 39, 2009). This in turn creates a downward spiral by further draining 
local capacity and demoralising the sense of national ownership of the development 
process.  
 
The Accra Action Agenda notes a surprising lack of correlation between improvements 
to national systems and the use of those systems by donors (AAA 2008). As this study 
shows, unless the attitude of the donors changes, they run the risk of sending the 
message to recipients that it is not worth making the effort to improve state systems, as 
the donors will continue to use their own procedures in any case.  
 
The findings of this study imply that the two different approaches to aid delivery may 
complement each other in different phases of a development intervention. For 
example, both the project assistance and the sector-wide approach could be used 
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simultaneously when the state system does not have sufficient capacity or individual 
qualified members of staff are in short supply. A sector-wide approach would allow the 
government to find a long-term solution to the capacity problem; meanwhile, gaps in 
human resources and weakness in the system could be filled by targeted projects. 
 
However, emphasis should be placed on designing activities within a broader 
development framework as part of national level support. Project support should 
employ state systems and designate funds to a specific set of activities within its state 
structure. Donor support projects may then be integrated into the government/ministry 
budget and resources can be disbursed and accounted for with the use of state 
systems. However, as this study shows, there is a high risk of fungibility. Therefore, 
such a strategy should be accompanied by capacity building in terms of reducing 
fungibility, which can be facilitated by the kind of project assistance investigated in this 
study. Thus, focusing capacity building on financial management at all levels of any 
intervention needs to be continually accentuated.  
 
As governments have become more dependent on external funding to support the 
sector, planning has acquired an increasingly external focus (King and Rose, 2005a; 
2005b). Arguably, shifting project assistance to sector funding means that the 
government becomes more dependent on aid and international policy. In this sense, 
adopting a sector-wide approach or broader funding mechanism does not make the 
donors less responsible. Rather, it requires persistent and orchestrated efforts from 
both donors and recipients in assuming greater responsibility and ensuring that aid is 
more effectively absorbed in a given context.  
 
It is particularly important that progress is made and the system strengthened in the 
education sector, as it has the largest budget and is the principal national employer in 
many developing countries; thus, it can be assumed that by so doing there will be a 
positive effect on public financial management as a whole.  
 
If the premise of international assistance is to strengthen the capacity of the recipient 
government and enable it to take the lead in sustainable development, donors should 
adopt an approach that will enable the achievement of this end in the long term, even if 
they run the risk of failing to meet their objectives in the short term. Doubtless, this is 
preferable to adopting an approach that maximises its own aid effectiveness but does 
not contribute to wider, sustainable development.  
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For example, the Government of Ghana already has a sector-wide strategic 
policy(GoG 2009) and urges donors to work within the state framework, both 
operationally and financially. Yet, DFID and the World Bank are the only two agencies 
that have adopted multi-donor and sector budget support, other donors to date having 
employed project assistance as their main approach to aid delivery (King et al., 2009).  
 
If the premise of international assistance is that the recipient is to own the development 
process, and ownership of the development initiative is a decisive factor in making aid 
more effective, donors should not diverge from the path the Ghanaian state has chosen 
or the efforts the government and MoE are making.  
 
 
8.4 Areas for Further Research 
This study is based on field data collected in Lower Denkyira and Upper Denkyira 
districts in Central Region, and does not include other parts of the country. 
Nevertheless, my trips to other districts as well as the available statistics (MoE/EMIS 
2009) suggest that the geographical areas in which the biggest challenges to education 
development persist are the three poorest regions (Upper East, Upper West and 
Northern). Yet, different levels of poverty subject to varying socio-economic conditions 
can affect the results of development efforts, especially in terms of the impact of an 
intervention and its sustainability. Moreover, the two DEOs chosen for this study were 
classified by the GES as non-ready and partially ready respectively. In ready districts, 
the DEO‟s capacity to control funds and implement activities may differ. Therefore, in 
order to capture a more comprehensive picture of how aid-related interventions are 
implemented and perceived, similar studies in other geographic regions and districts 
with different local capacity would be useful. 
 
Another area for further study is the reasons for and implications of the failure to 
achieve FCUBE. The question is whether the disappointing development outcome was 
due to a lack of funding; problems in sourcing and securing funding; MoE/GES 
incapacity to use and implement any given level of funding; or a lack of coordination of 
development approaches.  
 
This question is related to another fundamental challenge: whether there has been 
adequate funding to allow the Ghanaian education sector to attain the Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) of universal primary education. The fact that the sector has 
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not achieved FCUBE might be attributed to either a lack of funding or the incapacity to 
utilise the available funds. However, the issue should be fully investigated in order to 
determine the future direction of donor assistance to education.  
 
This study reveals the possibility that the system-wide or sector-wide approach can 
promote institutional capacity in the long term. However, at the same time, the weak 
capacity of the current system is a huge bottleneck to the efficient utilisation of aid 
funds. Therefore, further study is necessary to determine how to incorporate the 
advantages of the project approach into sector-wide mechanisms in order to mitigate 
the weaknesses of the latter approach.  
 
Moreover, some donors – including the World Bank and DFID – have opted for a more 
flexible and fungible input, i.e. general budgetary support and sector-wide mechanisms 
channelled through the Ministry of Finance. However, the study of the WSD 
programme did not show measurable quantitative or huge qualitative education 
improvements in its linking of funding at the ministerial level with development 
outcomes at the grassroots level. Empirical evidence of this new trend is so far limited 
and is an obvious area for further research. Indeed, additional inquiry into the manner 
in which the shift towards these funding mechanisms can better improve 
implementation and impact at grassroots level is essential.  
 
 
8.5 Reflections 
Initially, I was interested in tracing the financial flow of aid funds to see how they were 
absorbed, and in assessing the level of monetary fungibility in the education sector. 
However, I soon realised that accurate detection was almost impossible due to several 
obstacles, one of them being the lack of distribution and record keeping systems. 
Having said this, I did not fully realise how financial information was left in a state of 
limbo or how weak Ghanaian education institutions actually were until I undertook the 
fieldwork.  
 
The field study was a most enlightening experience. The view I got through the 
windscreen of a four by four land cruiser as an expatriate officer working at the 
Ghanaian Ministry of Education, and what I saw, heard, felt and smelt as a mere 
oboroni making good use of public transport or on foot was very different. I could not 
help but wonder if I had really seen the country and the dynamism of people‟s lives up 
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to that point. This apprehension scared me as well, as I came to realise that I was 
handling the JICA education aid policy to Ghana without having captured what was 
really going on outside of my office. This realisation humbled me deeply.  
 
Now that I am nearing the end of my PhD study, I feel that this experience has simply 
been part of the processes of my search for better aid and not something I can leave 
behind once I leave Sussex. Rather, I feel that this study has become a map to help 
me navigate what I will do next. As a Japanese national whose country is one of the 
largest donors, I hope that my finings will contribute to making the approach to aid – 
notably Japanese aid policy – more effective; effective for the recipients in the long 
term rather than merely for the donors.  
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Appendix 1 A List of Interviewees and Reference Codes 
The MoE/GES Headquarters 
Code Designation Date 
M1 
Director, planning, budgeting, monitoring and evaluation division (PBME) 
MoE 
28/12/2005 
M2 Budget officer, PBME MoE 16/01/2006 
M3 Head of education management information statistics, MoE 22/01/2006 
G1 
Decentralisation coordinator 
Former WSD zonal coordinator 
31/05/2005 
G2 
WSD desk officer for NGOs 
Former WSD zonal coordinator  
14/06/2005 
 
G3 
Former director of curriculum research development division (CRDD)  
Former director of basic education division 
10/08/2005 
G4 Former WSD national coordinator 03/10/2005 
G5 Former coordinator of FCUBE implementation coordinating unit 12/10/2005 
G6 Budget officer of teacher education division (TED)  05/12/2005 
G7 Chief internal auditor  08/12/2005 
G8 Deputy director of pre-service, TED  12/12/2005 
G9 
District director, eastern region 
Former deputy director of in-service, TED  
15/12/2005 
29/12/2005 
G10 Principle accountant 14/12/2005 
G11 
District director, central region 
Former officer of basic education division 
22/12/2005 
G12 Director of CRDD 28/12/2005 
G13 Deputy director of in-service teacher training, TED  04/01/2006 
G14 Budget officer 15/12/2005 
G15 Former district director, Greater Accra region 
15/08/2005 
19/12/2005 
G16 Deputy director general 14/12/2005 
G17 Director general 31/05/2005 
Donors 
Code Designation Date 
UQ1 
Education development specialist, USAID Ghana office 
Deputy team leader of QUIPS 
03/06/2005 
UQI1 Director of Improvement Learning through Partnerships (ILP) project 
21/06/2005 
07/12/2005 
UQI2 Consultant, ILP project 
21/06/2005 
07/12/2005 
UQC1 Deputy director of Community School Alliance (CSA) project 27/06/2005 
UQI3 Consultant, ILP project 13/12/2005 
UQI4 
Consultant, ILP project 
Consultant, BECCA project  
14/12/2005 
11/01/2006 
UQC2 
Team leader of CSA project  
Team leader of Education Quality For All project  
20/12/2005 
DW1 Senior advisor, DFID Ghana office  
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Twifu Hemang Lower Denkyira District 
District Education Office and District Assembly 
Code Designation Date 
L1 
WSD coordinator 
District head teachers advisor 
Assistant director (finance and administration) 
Team Leader, District teacher support team 
(DTST)  
17/10/2005 
25/10/2005 
L2 Circuit supervisor  17/10/2005 
L3 
Budget officer 
Former circuit supervisor  
17/10/2005 
 
L4 
Assistant director (supervision) 
DTST member 
18/10/2005 
L5 
Circuit supervisor 
Cultural officer 
25/10/2005 
L6 Chief accountant (district accountant) 
27/10/2005 
31/10/2005 
L7 
Assistant director (pre-school) 
Former DTST member 
Director of women and child affairs 
31/10/2005 
L8 Welfare officer 31/10/2005 
L9 Accountant (donor funds) 01/11/2005 
L10 District director of education 01/11/2005 
L11 Budget officer 01/11/2005 
L12 
Former DTST member 
District girl child education officer 
01/11/2005 
L13 
Assistant director (human resources and 
management) 
DTST member 
01/11/2005 
L14 Accountant (GoG funds) 02/11/2005 
L/D1 District planning officer, District Assembly 19/10/2005 
QUIPS schools 
School code Code Designation Date 
L/Q1 
SMC1 Assembly man 19/10/2005 
HT Head teacher  19/10/2005 
SMC2 
PTA chairperson 
Teacher  
19/10/2005 
SMC3 KG teacher 19/10/2005 
SMC4 SMC vice-chairperson 19/10/2005 
L/Q2 
HT Head teacher 25/10/2005 
SMC1 SMC chairperson 25/10/2005 
SMC1 Unit committee chairperson  25/10/2005 
L/Q3 
SMC1 Chief 28/10/2005 
SMC2 SMC chairperson 28/10/2005 
SMC2 PTA chairperson 28/10/2005 
SMC2 Unit committee chairperson 28/10/2005 
SMC2 Unit committee member 28/10/2005 
SMC2 SMC, treasurer  28/10/2005 
SMC2 Unit committee secretary 28/10/2005 
HT Head teacher 28/10/2005 
T1 Teacher 28/10/2005 
WSD schools 
L/W1 
HT Head teacher 20/10/2005 
T Teacher 20/10/2005 
T Teacher 20/10/2005 
SMC1 SMC chairperson 21/10/2005 
L/W2 SMC1 SMC secretary 26/10/2005 
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SMC1 
PTA chairperson 
Queen mother 
26/10/2005 
SMC1 SMC chairperson 26/10/2005 
HT Head teacher 26/10/2005 
T1 Assistant head teacher 26/10/2005 
L/W3 
HT Head teacher 27/10/2005 
T1 Assistant head teacher 27/10/2005 
T2 Teacher 27/10/2005 
SMC1 SMC chairperson 27/10/2005 
 
Upper Denkyira District 
DEO and DC 
Code Designation Date 
U1 Circuit supervisor  07/11/2005 
U2 
Community participation coordinator (CPC) 
Culture co-ordinator 
07/11/2005 
U3 
Assistant director (administration and finance) 
Budget committee member 
District management implementation team (DMIT) 
member 
08/11/2005 
22/11/2005 
U4 DTST member  10/11/2005 
U5 
Budget officer 
Budget committee member 
DMIT member 
12/11/2005 
U6 Circuit supervisor  12/11/2005 
U7 
QUIPS coordinator 
Assistant director (human resources and 
management) 
DTST member 
12/11/2005 
U8 
District training officer 
DTST member 
QUIPS facilitator 
21/11/2005 
 
U9 
WSD coordinator 
District head teachers advisor  
DTST member  
QUIPS facilitator 
21/11/2005 
 
U10 District girl child education officer 22/11/2005 
U11 Assistant internal auditor 22/11/2005 
U12 Chief accountant 22/11/2005 
U13 District director 23/11/2005 
U/D1 District coordinating director, District Assembly 
07/11/2005 
15/11/2005 
QUIPS schools 
School code Code Designation Date 
U/Q1 
HT Head teacher 09/11/2005 
T1 Teacher 09/11/2005 
T2 Teacher 09/11/2005 
SMC1 SMC chairperson 09/11/2005 
SMC1 PTA chairperson 09/11/2005 
SMC1 Assembly man 09/11/2005 
SMC1 JSS head teacher 09/11/2005 
SMC1 PTA secretary 09/11/2005 
SMC1 Queen mother 09/11/2005 
U/Q2 
SMC1 PTA chairperson 11/11/2005 
SMC1 SMC chairperson 11/11/2005 
HT Head teacher 11/11/2005 
T1 Assistant head teacher 11/11/2005 
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T2 Teacher 11/11/2005 
T3 Teacher 11/11/2005 
U/Q3 
SMC1 SMC chairperson 16/11/2005 
SMC1 Unit committee member 16/11/2005 
SMC1 PTA vice-chairperson 16/11/2005 
SMC1 PTA chairperson 16/11/2005 
SMC1 Women‟s representative 16/11/2005 
SMC1 Old students‟ representative 16/11/2005 
SMC1 SMC member 16/11/2005 
SMC1 PTA member 16/11/2005 
SMC1 PTA member 16/11/2005 
HT Head teacher 16/11/2005 
T1 Teacher 16/11/2005 
WSD schools 
School code Code Designation Date 
U/W1 
SMC1 SMC member 15/11/2005 
SMC1 SMC member 15/11/2005 
SMC1 PTA chairperson 15/11/2005 
SMC1 Chief 15/11/2005 
SMC1 SMC member 15/11/2005 
SMC1 SMC member 15/11/2005 
SMC1 PTA member 15/11/2005 
SMC1 PTA member 15/11/2005 
HT Head teacher 15/11/2005 
T1 Teacher 15/11/2005 
U/W2 
HT Head teacher 17/11/2005 
SMC1 SMC chairperson 17/11/2005 
SMC1 SMC vice-chairperson 17/11/2005 
SMC1 SMC secretary 17/11/2005 
SMC1 Assembly lady 17/11/2005 
SMC1 SMC treasury 17/11/2005 
SMC1 Muslim representative 17/11/2005 
SMC1 JSS head teacher 17/11/2005 
SMC1 Primary school head teacher 17/11/2005 
T1 Assistant head teacher 17/11/2005 
U/W3 
SMC1 SMC chairperson 19/11/2005 
SMC1 PTA chairperson 19/11/2005 
SMC1 SMC chairperson 19/11/2005 
HT Head teacher 19/11/2005 
T1 Assistant head teacher 19/11/2005 
T2 Teacher 19/11/2005 
T3 Teacher 19/11/2005 
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Appendix 2 Sample of Interview Schedules 
Each interview was tailor-made according to each person‟s role based on the following 
basic interview schedules.  
 
Ministry of Education and GES National Headquarters 
Perceptions of  About WSD About QUIPS 
Mechanism of 
releasing and 
using foreign 
funds 
 Could you explain your role in the WSD 
programme? 
 Are you part of the QUIPS project? If 
so, could you explain your role in 
QUIPS? 
The role of 
WSD/QUIPS in 
FCUBE  
 What contributions do you think that 
DFID has made to basic education by 
supporting WSD? 
 What do you think WSD„s role has 
been in achieving GES‟s main 
objectives? 
 What contributions do you think that 
USAID has made to basic education 
through the QUIPS project? 
 What do you think QUIPS‟s role has 
been in achieving GES‟s main 
objectives? 
Efficiency of 
WSD/ QUIPS  
 How efficient do you think WSD is, in 
terms of the use of WSD funds?   
 What do you think about the strategy 
and implementation of QUIPS?   
Effectiveness of 
WSD/ QUIPS  
 What impact do you think WSD has 
had on basic education (in terms of 
achieving the GES‟s main objectives)?  
 What impact do you think WSD has 
had on the teaching and learning in this 
school? 
 What effect do you think WSD has had 
on the enrolment and completion rates 
of pupils in the school? 
 What effect do you think WSD has had 
on school management? 
 
 What impact do you think QUIPS has 
had on the QUIPS schools? 
 What impact do you think QUIPS on 
basic education (in terms of achieving 
the GES‟s main objectives)?  
 What effect do you think QUIPS has 
had on the teaching and learning in 
this school? 
 What effect do you think QUIPS has 
had on the enrolment and completion 
rates of pupils in the school? 
 What effect do you think QUIPS has 
had on school management? 
Constraints on 
the efficient use 
of the funds for 
WSD/ QUIPS 
 Are there any difficulties for you in 
using funds and resources for WSD? If 
so, what and why? 
 What do you think can be done to 
improve the use of funds for WSD?  
 
  What do you think can be done to improve the efficiency of the use of foreign 
resources on the whole? 
 What do you think about the situation where different projects or different 
approaches dedicated to basic education co-exist in the basic education system?  
 
GES District Office 
Perceptions of  About WSD About QUIPS 
Mechanism of 
releasing and 
using foreign 
funds 
 Could you explain your role in the 
WSD programme? 
 Could you explain how the district 
budgets for WSD are planned? (Could 
you explain the planning and 
budgeting of WSD?) 
 Could you explain how the funds for 
WSD are released from GES HQ to 
the District Office? 
 Are t any WSD funds released from 
the district office to WSD schools? If 
so, could you explain how the funds 
for WSD are released from the district 
office to WSD schools?  
 Has the mechanism for releasing and 
using WSD funds changed? Why? 
 Did you take part in the QUIPS project? 
If yes, could you explain your role in 
the QUIPS project? 
 If the interviewee knows about or plays 
a role in QUIPS, ask the following 
questions. 
 Could you explain how the funds for 
QUIPS were released to Partnership 
schools /QUIPS schools? 
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Efficiency of 
WSD/ QUIPS 
 What do you think of the WSD‟s 
strategy for school improvement?  
 How efficient do you think WSD is in 
terms of using funds and resources for 
school improvement in this district? 
 What do you think/is your view of the 
QUIPS‟s strategy for school 
improvement? 
 What do you think of how funds are 
used to implement QUIPS? 
 What is your assessment of the 
efficiency of the QUIPS project? 
Effectiveness of 
WSD/ QUIPS 
 What benefits do you think the district 
has gained from the WSD 
programme?    
 What do you think the impact of WSD 
is on the quality of teaching and 
learning? 
 What do you think the impact of WSD 
is on access and expansion? 
 What do you think the impact of WSD 
is on educational management? 
 What benefits do you think the 
schools have had from WSD? 
 Do you satisfy the outcomes of WSD? 
 Has the WSD met your initial 
expectation in terms of achieving the 
FCUBE? Why?  
 Do you think WSD is effective enough 
to meet the needs in the district? (Do 
you think WSD is effective enough to 
have an impact on the quality of basic 
education? 
 What benefits do you think the district 
has gained from QUIPS?    
 What benefits do you think the pilot 
schools had from QUIPS? 
 How do you think the QUIPS schools 
benefited? 
 How long do you think the benefits 
from QUIPS will last in the district? 
(From the practical point of view, how 
long do you think the QUIPS activities 
will be practiced in the district?) 
 What do you think the outcomes of 
QUIPS schools are? 
 Did the QUIPS meet your initial 
expectation in terms of achieving the 
FCUBE? Why? (Do you think this is 
due to a lack of resources or due to 
any other reasons?) 
 Do you think QUIPS is effective enough 
to meet the needs in the district? (Do 
you think QUIPS is effective enough to 
have an impact on the quality of basic 
education?) 
Constraints on 
the efficient use 
of the funds for 
WSD/ QUIPS 
 What do you think of the WSD‟s way 
of using funds? 
 Has the district office faced any 
difficulties in using funds for WSD? If 
yes (no), why? 
 What do you think can be done to 
improve the use of funds for WSD? 
 What are the difficulties in 
implementing WSD? 
 What do you think of the QUIPS‟s way 
of using funds and resources? 
 What do you think can be done to 
improve the use of funds for QUIPS? 
 What were the difficulties in 
implementing QUIPS or working with 
QUIPS? 
The role of WSD/ 
QUIPS in FCUBE 
 (What ole do you think WSD has 
played in expanding quality basic 
education (or: achieving the FCUBE 
objectives) in this district?) 
 What role do you think QUIPS played 
in expanding quality primary education 
(or: achieving the FCUBE objectives) in 
this district?   
 
 If you could choose to expand QUIPS or WSD in your district, which would you 
prefer to adopt?  
School 
Head Teacher 
Perceptions of With Head Teacher about WSD/QUIIPS 
Mechanism for 
releasing and 
using foreign 
funds 
 Could you explain your role in the WSD/QUIPS programme? 
 Could you explain how the plans and budget are formulated in your school? 
 (Could you explain the mechanism for receiving the funds for WSD/QUIPS?) 
 Did the processes of planning and budgeting change with the introduction of 
WSD/QUIPS in your school? If so, how and why? 
Efficiency of 
WSD/QUIPS  
 What do you think of the strategy used by WSD/QUIPS? 
 What do you think of the way the resources for WSD/QUIPS are used in this 
school? 
 Do you think the resources for WSD/QUIPS could be used in a better way> more 
efficiently? If so, how and why? If not, why not? 
Effectiveness of 
WSD/QUIPS  
 What kinds of changes were brought about by the introduction of WSD/QUIPS in 
your school? 
 What have been the benefits of QUIPS for your school? 
 What impact has WSD/QUIPS had on teaching and learning? 
 What has been the impact of WSD/QUIPS on the enrolment and completion rates of 
pupils? 
 What do you think of the impact of WSD/QUIPS on school management has been? 
 Do you think the resources for WSD/QUIPS are sufficient to meet the needs of the 
school? If yes (no), how and why? 
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Constraints on 
the efficient use 
of the funds for 
WSD/QUIPS 
 Have you faced any difficulties in using WSD/QUIPS resources in your school? If so 
(if not so), what and why? 
 What don‟t you like about WSD/QUIPS? 
 How do you think any difficulties could be overcome? 
The role of 
WSD/QUIPS in 
FCUBE  
 If you are in a position to choose to do either WSD or QUIPS in your school in the 
future, which would you prefer? Why? 
 What do you think about the situation where different projects or different 
approaches co-exist in your school? 
Teachers 
Topics With Teachers about WSD/QUIPS 
Mechanism of 
releasing and 
using foreign 
funds 
 Could you explain your role in the WSD/QUIPS programme? 
 Do you participate in school planning and budgeting?  
 If yes, could you explain in what way?  
 If no, how do you think plans and budget are formulated in your school?  
Efficiency of 
WSD/QUIPS  
 What do you think of how funds and resources are used in your school? 
 Do you think the resources can be used in a better way? If yes, how? If not, why 
not? 
Effectiveness of 
WSD/QUIPS  
 What changes were brought about by WSD/QUIPS? 
 What have been the benefits of WSD/QUIPS for your school? 
 What impact do you think WSD/QUIPS has had on teaching and learning? 
 What impact do you think WSD/QUIPS has had on the enrolment and completion of 
pupils? 
 What impact do you think WSD/QUIPS has had on school management? 
 Do you think WSD/QUIPS resources are sufficient to meet the needs of the school? 
If yes (no), why? 
Constraints on 
the efficient use 
of WSD/QUIPS 
funds 
 Do you think there are difficulties in using WSD/QUIPS resources in your school? If 
so, why do you think that is the case? 
 How do you think difficulties could be overcome? 
The role of 
WSD/QUIPS in 
FCUBE  
 If you were in a position to choose, and Ii you could or needed to choose to do 
either WSD or QUIPS in your school in the future, which would you prefer and why? 
SMC Representatives 
Topics With SMCs about WSD/QUIPS 
Mechanism for 
releasing and 
using foreign 
funds 
 Could you explain your role in (your school or the WSD/QUIPS programme)? 
 Do you participate in school planning and budgeting?  
 If yes, could you explain in what way? 
 If not, how do you think plans and budget are formulated in your school?  
The efficiency 
of WSD/QUIPS  
 What do you think of how funds and resources are used in your school? 
 Do you think the resources could be used in a better way? If so, how? If not, why 
not? 
Effectiveness 
of WSD/QUIPS  
 What changes have been brought by WSD/QUIPS (or FCUBE)? 
 What have been the benefits of WSD/QUIPS for your school? 
 What impact do you think WSD/QUIPS has had on teaching and learning? 
 What impact do you think WSD/QUIPS has had on the enrolment and completion of 
pupils? 
 What impact do you think WSD/QUIPS has had on school management? 
 Do you think the resources for WSD/QUIPS are sufficient to meet the needs of the 
school?  Why/ Why not? 
Constraints on 
the efficient 
use of the 
funds for 
WSD/QUIPS 
 Do you think there are difficulties in using WSD/QUIPS resources in your school? If 
so, why do you think that is? 
 How do you think difficulties could be overcome? 
The role of 
WSD/QUIPS in 
FCUBE  
 If you were in a position to choose, and if you could or needed to choose to do 
either WSD or QUIPS in your school in the future, which would you prefer and why? 
 What do you think about the situation where different projects or different 
approaches co-exist in your school? 
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